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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET DESIGN AND LABOR MARKET
INTERACTIONS
Naoki Aizawa
Hanming Fang
This dissertation aims to develop empirical frameworks to assess a variety of health in-
surance market policies and explore the optimal policy design taking into account their
impacts on the labor market and public insurance program.
The first chapter (co-authored with Hanming Fang) presents and empirically imple-
ments an equilibrium labor market search model where risk averse workers facing medical
expenditure shocks are matched with firms making health insurance coverage decisions.
We use our estimated model to evaluate the equilibrium impact of the 2010 Affordable
Care Act (ACA) and find that it would reduce the uninsured rate among the workers in
our estimation sample from 20.12% to 7.27%.
The second chapter evaluates the current health insurance exchange (HIX) system
implemented under the ACA and examines its optimal design, accounting for adverse
selection and equilibrium labor market interactions. I develop and empirically implement
a life cycle equilibrium labor market search model integrated with the pre-ACA health
insurance market. Counterfactual experiments show that the ACA decreases not only
the uninsured rate but also aggregate labor productivity. Next, I examine the optimal
design of HIX by choosing the values of three major design components—tax penalties
on the uninsured, premium subsidies and age-based rating regulations. I find that the
optimal combination of these components makes it less beneficial for older workers relative
to younger workers to purchase health insurance from HIX. Implementing the optimal
structure leads to higher labor productivity and a slightly lower uninsured rate.
The third chapter (co-authored with You Suk Kim) studies the incentives for private
v
insurers to use advertising to attract low-cost, healthy individuals and the impacts of ad-
vertising on selection, competition, and welfare in the context of the Medicare Advantage
(MA). We develop and estimate an equilibrium model of the MA market, which incor-
porates strategic advertising by insurers. We find that advertising has positive effects on
overall demand, but a much larger effect on the demand of the healthy individuals. More-
over, we find that advertising accounts for 15% of the selection of healthier individuals
into MA. The impact of risk adjustment policies is also examined.
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Chapter 1
Equilibrium Labor Market Search
and Health Insurance Reform
This chapter is co-authored with Hanming Fang.
1.1 Introduction
The Affordable Care Act (hereafter, ACA), signed into law by President Barack Obama
in March 2010, represents the most significant reforms to the U.S. health insurance and
health care market since the establishment of Medicare in 1965.1 The health care reform
in the U.S. was partly driven by two factors: first, a large fraction of the U.S. population
does not have health insurance (close to 18% for 2009); second, the U.S. spends a much
larger share of the national income on health care than the other OECD countries (health
care accounts for about one sixth of the U.S. GDP in 2009).2 There are many provisions in
the ACA whose implementation will be phased in over several years, and some of the most
significant changes will take effect from 2014. In particular, four of the most important
1The Affordable Care Act refers to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) signed
into law by President Obama on March 23, 2010, as well as the Amendment in the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010.
2See OECD Health Data at www.oecd.org/health/healthdata for a comparison of the health care
systems between the U.S. and the other OECD countries.
1
components of the ACA are as follows:3
• (Individual Mandate) All individuals must have health insurance that meets the
law’s minimum standards or face a penalty when filing taxes for the year, which will be
2.5 percent of income or $695, whichever is higher.4, 5
• (Employer Mandate) Employers with more than 50 full-time employees will be
required to provide health insurance or pay a fine of $2,000 per worker each year if they do
not offer health insurance, where the fines would apply to the entire number of employees
minus some allowances.
• (Insurance Exchanges) State-based health insurance exchanges will be established
where the unemployed, the self-employed and workers who are not covered by employer-
sponsored health insurance (ESHI) can purchase insurance. Importantly, the premiums
for individuals who purchase their insurance from the insurance exchanges will be based on
the average health expenditure risks of those in the exchange pool.6 Insurance companies
that want to participate in an exchange need to meet a series of statutory requirements
in order for their plans to be designated as “qualified health plans.”
• (Premium Subsidies) All adults in households with income under 133% of Federal
poverty line (FPL) will be eligible for receiving Medicaid coverage with no cost sharing.7
3Detailed formulas for the penalties associated with violating the individual and employer mandates,
as well as for that for the permium subsidies, are provided in Section 1.8.2.
4These penalties would be implemented fully from 2016. In 2014, the penalty is 1 percent of income
or $95 and in 2015, it is 2 percent or $325, whichever is higher. Cost-of-living adjustments will be made
annually after 2016. If the least inexpensive policy available would cost more than 8 percent of one’s
monthly income, no penalties apply and hardship exemptions will be permitted for those who cannot
afford the cost.
5This component of the ACA was one of the core issues in the U.S. Supreme Course case 567 U.S.
2012 where twenty-six States, several individuals and the National Federation of Independent Business
challenged the constitutionality of the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion. The U.S. Supreme
Court ruled on June 28, 2012 to uphold the constitutioniality of the individual mandate on a 5-to-4
decision.
6States that opt not to establish their own exchanges will be pooled in a federal health insurance
exchange.
7This represents a significant expansion of the current Medicaid system because many States currently
cover adults with children only if their income is considerably lower, and do not cover childless adults at
all. The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruled on June 28, 2012 that the law’s provision that, if a State does not
comply with the ACA’s new coverage requirements, it may lose not only the federal funding for those
requirements, but all of its federal Medicaid funds, is unconstitutional. This ruling allows states to opt
out of ACA’s Medicaid expansion, leaving each state’s decision to participate in the hands of the nation’s
2
For individuals and families whose income is between the 133 percent and 400 percent
of the FPL, subsidies will be provided toward the purchase of health insurance from the
exchanges.
The goal of this study is to understand how the health care reform will change the
health insurance and labor markets. Would the ACA significantly reduce the uninsured
rate? Would more employers be offering health insurance to their employees? How would
the reform affect workers’ wages, health and productivity? How would it affect employ-
ment and firm size distributions? What is the impact on total health expenditures and on
government budget? We are also interested in several counterfactual policies. For exam-
ple, how would the remainder of the ACA perform if its individual mandate component
had been struck down by the Supreme Court? What would happen if the current tax
exemption status of employer-provided insurance premium is eliminated? Are the pre-
mium subsidies necessary for the insurance exchanges to overcome the adverse selection
problem? Can we identify alternative reforms that can improve welfare relative to the
ACA?
An equilibrium model that integrates the labor and health insurance markets is nec-
essary for us to understand the general equilibrium implications of the health insurance
reform. First, the United States is unique among industrialized nations in that it lacks a
national health insurance system and most of the working-age population obtain health
insurance coverage through their employers. According to Kaiser Family Foundation and
Health Research and Educational Trust (2009), more than 60 percent of the non-elderly
population received their health insurance sponsored by their employers, and about 10
percent of workers’ total compensation was in the form of ESHI premiums.8 Second, there
have been many well-documented connections between firm sizes, wages, health insurance
offerings and worker turnovers. For example, it is well known that firms that do not offer
governors and state leaders.
8Among those with private coverage from any source, about 95% obtained employment-related health
insurance (see Selden and Gray (2006)).
3
health insurance are more likely to be small firms, to offer low wages, and to experience
higher rate of worker turnover. In the 1997 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Employer
Health Insurance Survey which we use later in our analysis, we find that the average size
was about 8.8 for employers that did not offer health insurance, in contrast to an average
size of 33.9 for employers that offered health insurance; the average annual wage was
$20,560 for workers at firms that did not offer health insurance, in contrast to average
wage of $29,077 at firms that did; also, annual separation rate of workers at firms not
offering health insurance was 17.3%, while it was 15.8% at firms that did. Moreover, in
our data sets, workers in firms that offer health insurance are more likely to self report
better health than those in firms that do not offer health insurance.
In this study we present and empirically implement an equilibrium labor market search
model integrated with health insurance market. Our model is based on Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) and Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (1999, 2000).9 But we de-
part from these standard models by incorporating health and health insurance; thus we
endogenize the distributions of wages and health insurance provisions, employer size, em-
ployment and worker’s health. In our model workers observe their own health status which
evolves stochastically. Workers’ health status affects both their medical expenditures and
their labor productivity. Health insurance eliminates workers’ out-of-pocket medical ex-
penditure risks and affects the dynamics of their health status. In the benchmark model,
we assume that workers can obtain health insurance only through employers. Both un-
employed and employed workers randomly meet firms and decide whether to accept their
job offer, compensation package of which consists of wage and ESHI. Firms, which are
heterogenous in their productivity, post compensation packages to attract workers. The
cost of providing health insurance, which will be used to determine ESHI premiums, is
9Their model theoretically explains both wage dispersion among ex ante homogeneous workers and the
positive correlation between firm size and wage. Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012) demonstrate that the
extended version of this model, which allows firm productivity heterogeneity and aggregate uncertainty,
has very interesting but also empirically relevant properties about firm size and wage adjustment over
the business cycles.
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determined by both the health composition of its workforce and a fixed administrative
cost. When deciding the compensation packages, the firms anticipate that their choice of
compensation packages will affect the health composition of their worker as well as their
sizes in the steady state.
We characterize the steady state equilibrium of the model in the spirit of Burdett and
Mortensen (1998). We estimate the parameters of the baseline model using data from Sur-
vey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP, 1996 Panel), Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS, 1997-1999), and Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Employer Health In-
surance Survey (RWJ-EHI, 1997). The first two data sets are panels on worker-side labor
market status, health and health insurance, while the third one is a cross-sectional estab-
lishment level data set which contains information such as establishment size and health
insurance coverage. Because the data on the supply-side (i.e., workers) and demand-side
(i.e. firms) of labor markets come from different sources, we estimate the model using
GMM for the case of combinations of data sets, as proposed by Imbens and Lancaster
(1994) and Petrin (2002). We show that our baseline model delivers a rich set of pre-
dictions that can qualitatively and quantitatively account for a wide variety of the afore-
mentioned phenomenon observed in the data including the correlations among firm sizes,
wages, health insurance offering rates, turnover rates and workers’ health compositions.
In our empirical analysis, we find that a critical driver to explain these correlations
is the positive effect of health insurance on the dynamics of health status. While it
is true that firms by offering health insurance can benefit from the tax exemption of
the insurance premium, they also attract unhealthy workers who both increase their
health insurance costs and decrease their labor productivity – this is the standard adverse
selection problem. This creates a potential disincentive for firms to offer health insurance.
In Section 1.4.1, we show that in the presence of the positive effect of health insurance
on health, the degree of the adverse selection problem faced by high-productivity firms
offering health insurance is less severe than that for low-productivity firms. The reason
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is that, a high-productivity firm offering health insurance can poach workers from a much
wider range of firms, including a larger fraction of workers who worked in firms that
already offer insurance and thus are healthier; in contrast, a low-productivity firm offering
health insurance can only poach workers from firms with even lower productivity, most
of which do not offer health insurance and thus have less healthy workers.
Moreover, the adverse selection problem that firms offering health insurance suffer is
attenuated over time by the positive effect of health insurance on health. Importantly,
however, this effect from the improvement of health status of the workforce is captured
more by high productivity firms due to what we term as “retention effect,” which simply
refers to the fact that high-productivity firms tend to offer higher wages and retain workers
longer (see Fang and Gavazza (2011) for an evidence for this mechanism). These effects
jointly allow our model to generate a positive correlation between wage, health insurance,
and firm size; and they moreover explain why health status of employees covered by ESHI
is better than that of uninsured employees in the data.10
We use our estimated model to examine the impact of the previously-mentioned four
key components of the ACA. We find that the implementation of the ACA would signifi-
cantly reduce the uninsured rate among the workers in our estimation sample from 20.12%
in the benchmark economy to 7.27%. This large reduction of the uninsured rate is mainly
driven by the unemployed (3.2% of the population) and 9.65% of the employed workers
with relatively low wages participating in the insurance exchange with their premium
supported by the income-based subsidies. We find that the employer mandate increases
the health insurance offering rate for firms with 50 or more workers from 91.13% in the
benchmark to 99.93% under the ACA; however, the health insurance offering rate is some-
what reduced for firms with less than 50 workers. Moreover, the employer mandate leads
to a slight increase in the fraction of firms with less than 50 workers, with a small but
10In fact, we will show in Table 1.15 that, due to these effects, the incentives for firms, even the more
productive ones, to offer health insurance is largely unaffected in a counterfactual environment where the
tax exemption of ESHI premiums is eliminated.
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noticeable clustering of firms with size just below the employer mandate threshold of 50.
Overall, there is only a small increase in the fraction of employed workers receiving ESHI,
from 82.53% in the benchmark to 82.84% under the ACA. We also find that the ACA
would raise the health expenditure by about 8%, and lead to an increase in the fraction
of healthy workers in the population.
We also investigate the effect of the ACA if its individual mandate component were
removed, a scenario that would have resulted had the Supreme Court ruled the individual
mandate unconstitutional (see Footnote 5). We find that a significant reduction in the
uninsured rate would also have been achieved: the uninsured rate in our simulation under
“ACA without individual mandate” would be 12.18%, significantly lower than the 20.12%
under the benchmark. The premium subsidy component of the ACA would have in itself
drawn all the unemployed (healthy or unhealthy) and the low-wage employed (again both
healthy and unhealthy) in the insurance exchange. In fact, if we were to remove the
premium subsidies, instead of the individual mandate, from the ACA, we find that the
insurance exchange will suffer from adverse selection problem so severe as to render it
non-active at all. However, the presence of the exchange, though non-active, still changes
the workers’ outside option and thus affects the firms’ decisions, which leads to a small
reduction of the uninsured rate from 20.12% in the benchmark to 17.14-17.28% under
“ACA without the subsidies.”
Interestingly, we find that, under a policy of “ACA without the employer mandate,”
the uninsured rate would be 6.44%, lower than the uninsured rate under the full ACA.
Without the employer mandate, the health composition of the workers in the health
exchange pool is improved, which leads to a decrease in the premium in the exchange.
This makes it less desirable for individuals to stay uninsured and subject to individual
mandate penalty. We also find that the equilibrium under the policy of “ACA without
employer mandate” achieves a higher average productivity, higher average wages and
higher worker’s average utility, without increasing the government spending.
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We also simulate the effects of eliminating the tax exemption for ESHI premium both
under the benchmark and under the ACA. We find that, while the elimination of the
tax exemption for ESHI premium would reduce the probability of all firms, especially the
larger ones, offering health insurance to their workers, the overall effect on the uninsured
rate is rather modest. We find that the uninsured rate would increase from 20.12% to
23.39% when the ESHI tax exemption is removed in the benchmark economy; and it will
increase from 7.27% to 9.15% under the ACA. We also experimented with the effect of
prohibiting firms from offering ESHI. We find that it would lead to a large reduction in
the fraction of active firms in the labor market, which suggests that ESHI allows low-
productive firms to be active in the market because they can potentially extract the
workers’ risk premium.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 1.2, we review
the related literature; in Section 1.3, we present the model of the labor market with
endogenous determinations of wages and health insurance provisions; in Section 1.4, we
present a qualitative assessment of the workings of the model; in Section 1.5, we describe
the data sets used in our empirical analysis; in Section 1.6, we explain our estimation
strategy; in Section 1.7, we present our estimation results and the goodness-of-fit; in
Section 1.8, we describe the results from several counterfactual experiments; and finally
in Section 1.9, we conclude and discuss directions for future research.
1.2 Related Literature
This study is related to three strands of the literature. First and foremost, it is related
to a small literature that examines the relationship between health insurance and labor
market. Dey and Flinn (2005) propose and estimate an equilibrium model of the labor
market in which firms and workers bargain over both wages and health insurance offerings
to examine the question of whether the employer-provided health insurance system leads
to inefficiencies in workers’ mobility decisions (which are often referred to as “job lock”
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or “job push” effects). However, because a worker/vacancy match is the unit of analysis
in Dey and Flinn (2005), their model is not designed to address the relationship between
firm size and wage/health insurance provisions, which is important to understand the size-
dependent employer mandate in the ACA. Moreover, in Dey and Flinn (2005), workers’
health status and health expenditures are not explicitly modeled, and firms’ heterogenous
costs of offering health insurance are also exogenous. In our framework, we explicitly
incorporate workers’ health and health expenditures, and endogenize health insurance
costs and premium. We believe these features are essential to assess the general equilib-
rium effects of the ACA on population health, health expenditures and health insurance
premiums.
Bruegemann and Manovskii (2010) develop a search and matching model to study
firms’ health insurance coverage decision. In their model, firm sizes are discrete to high-
light the effect of fluctuations in the health composition of employees on the dynamics
of firm’s coverage decision, and they argue that the insurance market for small firms
suffers from adverse selection problem because those firms try to purchase health insur-
ance when most of their employees are unhealthy. Our study provides a complementary
channel which has received little attention in the literature: it is harder for small firms
to overcome adverse selection problems because they cannot retain their workers long
enough to capture the benefits from the advantageous dynamic effects of health insur-
ance on health. This channel arises in our environment because we allow for on-the-job
searches and explicitly model the dynamic effect of health insurance on health, both of
which are absent in their model. Moreover, our model endogenously generates reasonable
wage distributions, which are important to study the impact of income-based premium
subsidies and individual mandates.
The channel that worker turnover discourages firm’s health insurance provision is
related to Fang and Gavazza (2011). They argue that health is a form of general human
capital, and labor turnover and labor-market frictions prevent an employer-employee pair
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from capturing the entire surplus from investment in an employee’s health, generating
under-investment in health during working years and increasing medical expenditures
during retirement. We advance their insights by showing that in an equilibrium model
of labor market, it also reduces the adverse selection problem for high-productivity firms
relative to low-productivity firms, and helps explain why high-productivity firms have a
stronger incentives to provide health insurance to their workers. Moreover, our primary
focus is about health insurance coverage provision and labor market outcomes, while theirs
is about the life-cycle medical expenditure.
Second, there are a growing number of empirical analyses examining the likely impact
of the ACA by focusing the Massachusetts Health Reform, implemented in 2006, which
has similar features with the ACA. Kolstad and Kowalski (2012b,a,c) study the effect on
medical expenditure, selection in insurance markets, and labor markets. Courtemanche
and Zapata (2012) found that Massachusetts reform improves the health status of indi-
viduals. They study these issues based on a “difference-in-difference” approach. These
approaches are very informative to understand the overall and likely impact of reform. By
structurally estimating an equilibrium model, we complement this literature by providing
a quantitative assessment of the mechanisms generating such outcomes. Moreover, we
provide the assessment of various other counterfactual policies such as the removal of tax
exclusion of ESHI premiums. In a recent paper, Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2013)
evaluates the ACA using a calibrated life-cycle incomplete market general equilibrium
model. They consider several individual decisions such as health insurance, consumption,
saving, and labor supply, but they do not model firms’ decision of offering health insurance
as well as firm size distribution. Therefore, their model is not designed to address the
effects of ACA on firms’ insurance coverage and wage offer decisions and the equilibrium
effects of size-dependent employer mandate.
Third, this study is related to a large literature estimating equilibrium labor market
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search models.11 Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) and Bontemps, Robin, and Van den
Berg (1999, 2000) empirically implement Burdett and Mortensen (1998)’s model. Their
empirical frameworks have been widely applied in subsequent studies investigating the
impact of various labor market policies on labor market outcomes. Among this literature,
our study is mostly related to Shephard (2012) and Meghir, Narita, and Robin (2012),
which also allow for multi-dimensional job characteristics as in our study: wage and part-
time/full-time in Shephard (2012), wage and formal/informal sector in Meghir, Narita,
and Robin (2012), and wage and health insurance offering in our study. However, in
Shephard (2012) a firm’s job characteristics is assumed to be exogenous, while in our
study employers endogenously choose job characteristics. In Meghir, Narita, and Robin
(2012) firms choose whether to enter the formal or informal sectors so in some sense their
job characteristics are also endogenously determined; however, in Meghir, Narita, and
Robin (2012), workers are homogeneous so firms’ decision about which sector to enter
does not affect the composition of the types of workers they would attract. In contrast, in
our model, workers are heterogenous in their health, thus employers endogenously choose
job characteristics, namely wage and health insurance offering, by taking into account
their influence on the initial composition of its workforce as well as the subsequent worker
turnover.
1.3 An Equilibrium of Model of Wage Determination
and Health Insurance Provision
1.3.1 The Environment
Consider a labor market with a continuum of firms with measure normalized to 1 and a
continuum of workers with measure M > 0.12 They are randomly matched in a frictional
11See Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) for a seminal study that initiated the literature.
12Throughout the study, we use “workers” and “firms” interchangeably with “individuals” and “em-
ployers” respectively.
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labor market. Time is discrete, and indexed by t = 0, 1, ..., and we use β ∈ (0, 1) to
denote the discount factor for the workers.13
Workers have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences:14
u(c) = − exp(−γc), (1.1)
where γ > 0 is the absolute risk aversion parameter.
Workers’ Health. Workers differ in their health status, denoted by h, and they can
either be Healthy (H) or Unhealthy (U) . In our model, a worker’s health status has two
effects. First, it affects the distribution of health expenditures. Specifically, we model
an individual’s health expenditure distributions as follows. Let x ∈ {0, 1} denote an
individual’s health insurance status, where x = 1 means that he has health insurance. We
assume that the probability that an individual will experience a medical shock is given
by:
Pr(m > 0|h, x) = Φ(α0 + β01 {h = U}+ γ0x), (1.2)
and conditional on a medical shock, the realization of the medical expenditure is drawn
from a log normal distribution:
m| (h, x) ∼ exp (αm + βm1 {h = U}+ γmx+ hx) , (1.3)
where hx ∼ N(0, σ2hx) and is independently and identically distributed across time peri-
ods. Note that in (1.2) and (1.3) we allow both the individual’s health and health insur-
ance status to affect the medical expenditure distributions; moreover, in (1.3) we allow
that the log normal medical expenditure distributions to be conditionally heteroskedas-
13In our empirical analysis, a “period” correponds to four months.
14Alternatively we can assume constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences as in Rust and
Phelan (1997), but then would have to deal with the issue of possible negative consumption.
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tic.15 In subsequent analysis, we will use m˜xh to denote the random medical expenditure
for individuals with health status h and health insurance status x as described by (1.2)
and (1.3), and use mxh to denote the expectation of m˜
x
h which is given by:
16
mxh ≡ Em˜xh = exp (αm + βm1 {h = U}+ γmx) exp
(
σ2hx
2
)
Φ (α0 + β01 {h = U}+ γ0x) .
(1.4)
Second, a worker’s health status affects his productivity. Specifically, if an individual
works for a firm with productivity p, he can produce p units of output if he is healthy,
but he can produce only d × p units of output if he is unhealthy where 1 − d represents
the productivity loss from being unhealthy.17
In each period, worker’s health status changes stochastically according to a Markov
Process. The period-to-period transition of an individual’s health status depends on his
health insurance status. We use pixh′h ∈ (0, 1) to denote the probability that a worker’s
health status changes from h ∈ {H,U} to h′ ∈ {H,U} conditional on insurance status
x ∈ {0, 1}. The transition matrix is thus, for x ∈ {0, 1} ,
pix =
 pixHH pixUH
pixHU pi
x
UU
 , (1.5)
where pixUH = 1− pixHH and pixHU = 1− pixUU .
15In our empilical application, we truncate it at the top at twice the highest medical expenditure
observed in the data. Our specification allows us to capture two of the most salient features of the
medical expenditure distributions: they are heavily skewed to the right and there is a sizable fraction of
individuals with zero medical expenditure. Similar specifications have been used in Einav, Finkelstein,
Ryan, Schrimpf, and Cullen (2013).
16The conditional variances of the medical expenditures can also be analytically characterized:
V ar (m˜xh|h, x)
= exp [2 (αm + βm1 {h = U}+ γmx)] exp
(
σ2hx
) [
exp
(
σ2hx
)− 1]Φ (α0 + β01 {h = U}+ γ0x)
We use these moments in our first-step estimation described in Section 1.6.1.
17One can alternatively assume that the productivity loss only occurs if an individual experiences a
bad health shock. Because an unhealthy worker is more likely to experience a bad health shock, such a
formulation is equivalent to the one we adopt in the study.
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Firms. Firms are heterogeneous in their productivity. In the population of firms, the
distribution of productivity is denoted by Γ (·) which we assume to admit an everywhere
continuous and positive density function. In our empirical application, we specify Γ to be
lognormal with mean µp and variance σ
2
p, i.e., p ∼ lnN(µp, σ2p).
Firms, after observing their productivity, decide a package of wage and health insur-
ance provision, denoted by (w, x) where w ∈ R+ and x ∈ {0, 1}. If a firm offers health
insurance to its workers, it has to incur a fixed administrative cost C > 0. We assume
that any firm that offers health insurance to its workers is self-insured, and will charge an
insurance premium from its workers each period to cover the necessary reimbursement of
all the realized health expenditures in addition to the administrative cost C.18
Importantly, we assume, due to regulations in Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act (HIPAA) which prohibits discrimination against employees and depen-
dents based on their health status, that all the workers in a given firm will receive the
same compensation package (wage and health insurance offering regardless of their health
status.19
Health Insurance Market. In the baseline model, which is intended to represent
the pre-ACA U.S. health insurance market, we assume that workers can obtain health
insurance only if their employers offer them. This is a simplifying assumption meant to
capture the fact that the individual private insurance market is rather small in the U.S. In
our counterfactual experiment, we will consider the case of competitive private insurance
market to mimic the health insurance exchanges that would be established under the
ACA.
18In principle, firms should also be able to decide on the premium if they decide to offer health insurance.
However, because we require that firms be self-insured, the insurance premium will be determined in
equilibrium by the health composition of workers in steady state.
19HIPAA is an amendment of Employee Retirement Security Act (ERISA), which is a federal law
that regulates issues related to employee benefits in order to qualify for tax advantages. A description
of HIPPA can be found at the Department of Labor website: http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/health-
plans/portability.htm
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Labor Market. Firms and workers are randomly matched in the labor market. In each
period, an unemployed worker randomly meets a firm with probability λu ∈ (0, 1) . He
then decides whether to accept the offer, or to remain unemployed and search for jobs in
next period. We assume that all new-born workers are unemployed.
If an individual is employed, he meets randomly with another firm with probability
λe ∈ (0, 1) . If a currently employed worker receives an offer from another firm, he needs to
decide whether to accept the outside offer or to stay with the current firm. An employed
worker can also decide to return to the unemployment pool.20 Moreover, each match is
destroyed exogenously with probability δ ∈ (0, 1), upon which the worker will return to
unemployment. As we discuss in Section 1.3.2, we assume that individual may experience
both the exogenous job destruction and the arrival of the new job offer within in the same
period.21
To generate a steady state for the labor market, we assume that in each period any
individual, regardless of health and employment status, will leave the labor market with
probability ρ ∈ (0, 1) . An equal measure of newborns will enter the labor market unem-
ployed and their initial health status with be healthy with probability µH ∈ (0, 1) .
Income Taxes and Unemployment Benefit. Workers’ wages are subject to a non-
linear tax schedule, but the ESHI premium is tax exempt in the baseline model. For the
after-tax income T (y) , we follow the specification in Kaplan (2012) which approximates
the U.S. tax code by:22
T (y) = τ0 + τ1
y(1+τ2)
1 + τ2
(1.6)
20Returning to unemployment may be a better option for a currently employed worker if his heath
status changed from when he accepted the current job offer, for example.
21This specification is used by Wolpin (1992) and more recently by Jolivet, Postel-Vinay, and Robin
(2006). This allows us to account for transitions known as “job to unemployment, back to job” all
occurring in a single period, as we observe in the data.
22Robin and Roux (2002) also studied the impact of progressive income tax within the framework of
Burdett and Mortensen (1998).
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where τ0 > 0, τ1 > 0 and τ2 < 0.
1.3.2 Timing in a Period
At the beginning of each period, we should imagine that individuals, who are heteroge-
neous in their health status, are either unemployed or working for firms offering different
combinations of wage and health insurance packages. We now describe the explicit timing
assumptions in a period that we use in the derivation of the value functions in Section
1.3.3. We believe that our particular timing assumptions simplify our derivation but they
are not crucial.
1. Any individual, whether employed or unemployed, and regardless of his health sta-
tus, may leave the labor market with probability ρ ∈ (0, 1) ;
2. If an employed worker stays in the labor market matched with a firm with produc-
tivity p, then:
(a) he produces output p if healthy and d× p if unhealthy;
(b) the firm pays wage and collects insurance premium if it offers health insurance;
(c) he receives a medical expenditure shock, the distribution of which depends on
his beginning-of-the-period health status;
(d) he then observes the realization of the health status that will be applicable
next period;
(e) he randomly meets with new employers with probability λe;
(f) the current match is destroyed with probability δ ∈ (0, 1) , in which case the
worker must decide whether to accept the outside offer, if any, or to enter
unemployment pool;
(g) if the current match is not destroyed, then he decides whether to accept the
outside offer if any, to stay with the current firm, or to quit into unemployment.
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3. Any unemployed worker experiences the following in a period:
(a) he receives the unemployment benefit b;
(b) he receives a medical expenditure shock, the distribution of which depends on
his beginning-of-the-period health status;
(c) he then observes the realization of the health status that will be applicable
next period;
(d) he randomly meets with employers with probability λu, and decides whether
to accept the offer if any, or to stay unemployed.
4. Time moves to the next period.
1.3.3 Analysis of the Model
In this section, we characterize the steady state equilibrium of the model. The analysis
here is similar to but generalizes that in Burdett and Mortensen (1998). We first consider
the decision problem faced by a worker, for a postulated distribution of wage and insurance
packages by the firms, denoted by F (w, x), and derive the steady state distribution of
workers of different health status in unemployment and among firms with different offers of
wage and health insurance packages (w, x) . We then solve the firms’ optimization problem
and provide the conditions for the postulated F (w, x) to be consistent with equilibrium.
Value Functions
We first introduce the notation for several valuation functions. We use vh(y, x) to denote
the expected flow utility of workers with health status h from income y and insurance
status x ∈ {0, 1}; and it is give by:
vh(y, x) =
 u (T (y)) if x = 1Em˜0hu (T (y)− m˜0h) if x = 0, (1.7)
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where T (y) is after-tax income as specified in (1.6) and m˜0h is the random medical expendi-
ture for uninsured individual as specified by (1.2) and (1.3). Note that when an individual
is insured, i.e., x = 1, his medical expenditures are fully covered by the insurance. As
long as m˜0h is not always 0, vh (y, 1) > vh (y, 0) ; i.e., regardless of workers’ health, if wages
are fixed, then all workers desire health insurance.
Let Uh denote the value for an unemployed worker with health status h at the beginning
of a period; and let Vh(w, x) denote the value function for an employed worker with health
status h working for a job characterized by wage-insurance package (w, x) at the beginning
of a period. Uh and Vh (·, ·) are of course related recursively. Uh is given by:
Uh
1− ρ = vh(b, 0) + βEh′|(h,0)
 λu ∫ max{Vh′(w, x), Uh′}dF (w, x)
+(1− λu)Uh′
 , (1.8)
where the expectation Eh′ is taken with respect to the distribution of h
′ conditional on the
current health status h and insurance status x = 0 because unemployed workers are unin-
sured in the baseline model. (1.8) states that the value of being unemployed, normalized
by the survival rate 1−ρ, consists of the flow payoff vh (b, 0) , and the discounted expected
continuation value where the expectation is taken with respect to the health status h′ next
period, whose transition is given by pi0h′h as described in (1.5). The unemployed worker
may be matched with a firm with probability λu and the firm’s offer (w, x) is drawn from
the distribution F (w, x) . If an offer is received, the worker will choose whether to accept
the offer by comparing the value of being employed at that firm Vh′(w, x), and the value
of remaining unemployed Uh′ ; if no offer is received, which occurs with probability 1−λu,
the worker’s continuation value is Uh′ .
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Similarly, Vh (w, x) is given by
Vh(w, x)
1− ρ = vh(w, x)
+ βλe
 (1− δ)Eh′|(h,x)
[∫
max{Vh′(w˜, x˜), Vh′(w, x), Uh′}dF (w˜, x˜)
]
+δEh′|(h,x)
[∫
max {Uh′ , Vh′(w˜, x˜)} dF (w˜, x˜)
]

+ β(1− λe)
{
(1− δ)Eh′|(h,x) [max {Uh′ , Vh′(w, x)}] + δEh′|(h,x)[Uh′ ]
}
. (1.9)
Note that in both (1.8) and (1.9), we used our timing assumption that a worker’s health
status next period depends on his insurance status this period even if he is separated from
his job at the end of this period (see Section 1.3.2).
Workers’ Optimal Strategies
Standard arguments can be used to show that a worker’s decision about whether to accept
a job offer is characterized by “generalized reservation wage” policies. Note that in our
model, both unemployed and employed workers make decisions about whether to accept or
reject an offer, and their reservation wages will depend on their state variables, i.e., their
employment status including the terms of their current offer (w, x) if they are employed,
and their health status h.
Optimal Strategies for Unemployed Workers. First, consider an unemployed worker.
As the right hand side of (1.7) is increasing in w, Vh(w, x) is increasing in w. On the other
hand, Uh is independent of w. Therefore, the reservation wage for an unemployed worker
with health status h satisfies:
Uh = Vh(w
x
h, x), (1.10)
so that if an unemployed worker meets a firm with offer (w, x), he will accept the offer
if w > wxh and reject otherwise. Because a worker’s expected flow utility vh(w, x) as
described in (1.7) and the law of motion for health as described in (1.5) both depend on
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his current health and health insurance status, the reservation wages of the unemployed
also differ across these statuses.
Optimal Strategies for Currently-Employed Workers: Job-to-Job Transitions.
Now we consider the reservation wages for a currently-employed worker. Let (w, x) be
the wage-insurance package offered by his current employer; and let (w′, x′) be the one
offered by his potential employer. Then, the reservation wage for the employed worker
with health status h to switch, denoted by sx
′
h (w, x), must satisfy
Vh(w, x) = Vh
(
sx
′
h (w, x) , x
′
)
. (1.11)
A worker with health status h on a current job (w, x) will switch to a job (w′, x′) if and
only if w′ > sx
′
h (w, x). It is straightforward from (1.9) that
sx
′
h (w, x) = w if x = x
′.
However, when x 6= x′, the exact value of sx′h (w, x) must be solved from (1.11); in partic-
ular, it will differ by worker’s health and health insurance status. It can be easily shown
that
sx
′
h (w, x) > w if x = 1 and x
′ = 0; sx
′
h (w, x) < w if x = 0 and x
′ = 1.
Once we solve sxh(·, ·), we can use its definition as in (1.11) to obtain, for any new offer
(w′, x′) ,
Vh (w
′, x′) = Vh (sxh(w
′, x′), x) ,
thus a worker with a current offer (w, x) will accept the new offer (w′, x′) if and only if
w < sxh(w
′, x′). (1.12)
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We will use this characterization in the expressions for steady steady conditions in Section
1.3.3.
Optimal Strategies for Currently-Employed Workers: Quitting to Unemploy-
ment. Finally, a worker with health status h who is currently on a job (w, x) may choose
to quit into unemployment. This may happen because of the changes in workers’ health
condition since he last accepted the current job offer and the possibility that the offer
arrival probability for unemployed worker, λu, may be higher than that for an employed
worker, λe. Clearly a worker with health status h and health insurance status x will quit
into unemployment only if the current wage w is below a threshold. Let us denote the
threshold wages for quitting into unemployment by qx
h
. Clearly, qx
h
must satisfy
Vh
(
qx
h
, x
)
= Uh. (1.13)
Comparing (1.13) with (1.10), it is clear that qx
h
= wxh. Thus we can conclude that em-
ployed workers will quit to unemployment only if his health status changed from when
he first started on the current job. Moreover, if wxH < w
x
U , then a currently unhealthy
worker who accepted a job (w, x) with wage w ∈ (wxH , wxU) when his health status was H
may now quit into unemployment; if wxH > w
x
U instead, then a currently healthy worker
who accepted a job (w, x) with wage w ∈ (wxU , wxH) when his health status was U may
now quit into unemployment.
Steady State Condition
We will focus on the steady state of the dynamic equilibrium of the labor market described
above. We first describe the steady state equilibrium objects that we need to characterize
and then provide the steady state conditions.
In the steady state, we need to describe how the workers of different health status h are
allocated in their employment (w, x) . Let uh denote the measure of unemployed workers
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with health status h ∈ {U,H}; and let exh denote the measure of employed workers with
health insurance status x ∈ {0, 1} and health status is h ∈ {U,H} . Of course, we have
∑
h∈{U,H}
(uh + e
0
h + e
1
h) = M. (1.14)
Let Gxh(w) the fraction of employed workers with health status h working on jobs with
insurance status x whose wage is below w, and let gxh (w) be the corresponding density
of Gxh (w) . Thus, e
x
hg
x
h(w) is the density of employed workers with health status h whose
compensation package is (w, x).
These objects would have to satisfy the steady state conditions for unemployment and
for the allocations of workers across firms with different productivity. First, let us consider
the steady state condition for unemployment. The inflow into unemployment with health
status h is given by
[uh]
+ ≡ (1− ρ) [δ(1− λe) + δλe(F (w1h, 1) + F (w0h, 0))]
× [e0hpi0hh + e1hpi1hh + e0h′pi0hh′ + e1h′pi1hh′] (1.15a)
+(1− ρ)uh′pi0hh′ [1− λu(1− F (w1h, 1)− F (w0h, 0))] (1.15b)
+(1− ρ)(1− δ)e1h′pi1hh′G1h′(w1h)
× [1− λe(1− F (w1h, 1)− F (w0h, 0))] (1.15c)
+(1− ρ)(1− δ)e0h′pi0hh′G0h′(w0h)
× [1− λe(1− F (w1h, 1)− F (w0h, 0))] (1.15d)
+Mρµh. (1.15e)
In the above expression, the term on line (1.15a) is the measure of employed workers
who had health status h this period, did not leave the labor market but had their jobs
terminated exogenously, and did not subsequently find a job that was better than being
unemployed. The term on line (1.15b) is the measure of workers whose health status was
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h′ last period but transitioned to h this period and who did not leave for employment.
The terms on lines (1.15c) and (1.15d) are the measures of workers currently working
on jobs with and without health insurance, respectively, quitting into unemployment.
To understand these expressions, consider the term on line (1.15c). First, quitting into
unemployment only applies to workers who did not leave the labor market and whose job
did not get terminated (i.e., (1− ρ) (1− δ) measure of them). Second, note that quitting
into unemployment at health status h this period is possible only if the worker’s health
status was h′ in the previous period then transitioned to h this period, because otherwise
the worker would have quit already in the previous period, and moreover only if his
wage was lower than w1h defined in (1.10); these are captured by the term e
1
h′pi
1
hh′G
1
h′(w
1
h).
Third, those who quit into unemployment will remain in the unemployment pool only
if the offer they may have received is not acceptable, which happens with probability
[1− λe(1− F (w1h, 1)− F (w0h, 0))] . Finally, the term on line (1.15e) is the measure of new
workers born into health status h.
The outflow from unemployment with health status h is given by:
[uh]
− ≡ uh
{
ρ+ (1− ρ) [pi0h′h + pi0hhλu(1− F (w1h, 1)− F (w0h, 0))]} . (1.16)
It states that a ρ fraction of the unemployed with health status h will die and the remainder
(1− ρ) will either change to health status h′ (with probability pi0h′h), or if their health does
not change (with probability pi0hh) they may become employed with probability λu(1 −
F (w1h, 1)− F (w0h, 0)). Then, in a steady-state we must have
[uh]
+ = [uh]
− , h ∈ {U,H} . (1.17)
Now we provide the steady state equation for workers employed on jobs (w, x) with
health status h. The inflow of workers with health status h to jobs (w, 1) , denoted by
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[e1h (w)]
+
, is given as follows. If w > w1h,
[
e1h (w)
]+ ≡ (1− ρ)f(w, 1)λu (uhpi0hh + uh′pi0hh′) (1.18a)
+(1− ρ)f(w, 1)δλe
× (pi0hhe0h + pi0hh′e0h′ + pi1hhe1h + pi1hh′e1h′) (1.18b)
+(1− ρ)f(w, 1)(1− δ)λe
×
 pi0hhe0hG0h (s0h(w, 1)) + pi0hh′e0h′G0h′ (s0h(w, 1))
+pi1hhe
1
hG
1
h(w) + pi
1
hh′e
1
h′G
1
h′(w)
 (1.18c)
+(1− ρ)(1− δ)pi1hh′e1h′g1h′ (w)
[
1− λe
(
1− F˜h (w, 1)
)]
, (1.18d)
where h′ 6= h and F˜h(w, 1) is defined by
F˜h(w, 1) = F (w, 1) + F (s
0
h(w, 1), 0); (1.19)
and [e1h (w)]
+
= 0 if w < w1h. To understand expression (1.18), note that line (1.18a)
presents the inflows from unemployed workers with health status h to job (w, 1) ; line
(1.18b) represents the inflow from those whose current match was destroyed but tran-
sitions to job (w, 1) without experiencing an unemployment spell (recall our timing as-
sumption 3(e) and 3(f) in Section 1.3.2); line (1.18c) represents inflows from workers
who were employed on other jobs to job (w, 1) ; and finally line ((1.18d) is the in-
flow from workers who were employed on the same job but has experienced a health
transition from h′ to h and yet did not transition to other better jobs, which occurs
with probability
[
1− λe
(
1− F˜h (w, 1)
)]
.
Denote the outflow of workers with health status h from jobs (w, 1) by [e1h (w)]
−
, and
it is given by
[
e1h (w)
]− ≡ e1hg1h(w)
 [ρ+ (1− ρ)pi
1
hhδ] + (1− ρ)pi1h′h
+ (1− ρ) pi1hhλe(1− δ)
[
1− F˜h(w, 1)
]
 . (1.20)
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The outflow consists of job losses due to death and exogenous termination represented by
the term e1hg
1
h(w) [ρ+ (1− ρ)pi1hhδ] , changes in current workers’ health status represented
by the term e1hg
1
h(w)(1 − ρ)pi1h′h, and transitions to other jobs represented by the term
e1hg
1
h(w) (1− ρ) pi1hhλe(1− δ)
[
1− F˜h(w, 1)
]
. The steady state condition requires that
[
e1h (w)
]+
=
[
e1h (w)
]−
for h ∈ {U,H} and for all w in the support of F (w, 1) . (1.21)
Similarly, the inflow of workers with health status h into jobs (w, 0) , denoted by [e0h (w)]
+
,
is as follows. If w > w0h,
[
e0h (w)
]+
= f(w, 0)(1− ρ)λu
(
uhpi
0
hh + uh′pi
0
hh′
)
+f(w, 0)(1− ρ)δλe
× (pi1hhe1h + pi1hh′e1h′ + pi0hhe0h + pi0hh′e0h′)
+f(w, 0)(1− ρ)λe(1− δ)
×
 pi1hhe1hG1h (s1h(w, 0)) + pi1hh′e1h′G1h′(s1h(w, 0))
+pi0hhe
0
hG
0
h(w) + pi
0
hh′e
0
h′G
0
h′(w)

+(1− ρ)(1− δ)pi0hh′e0h′g0h′(w)
[
1− λe
(
1− F˜h(w, 0)
)]
, (1.22)
where h 6= h′ and F˜h(w, 0) is defined by
F˜h(w, 0) = F (w, 0) + F (s
1
h(w, 0), 1); (1.23)
and [e0h (w)]
+
= 0 if w < w0h. The outflow of workers with health status h from jobs (w, 0),
denoted by [e0h (w)]
−
, is given by:
[
e0h (w)
]−
= e0hg
0
h(w)
{
ρ+ (1− ρ)
[
pi0h′h + pi
0
hh(δ + (1− δ)λe(1− F˜h(w, 0))
]}
. (1.24)
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The steady state condition thus requires that
[
e0h (w)
]+
=
[
e0h (w)
]−
for h ∈ {H,U} and for all w in the support of F (w, 0) . (1.25)
From the four employment densities, 〈exhgxh(w) : h ∈ {U,H} , x ∈ {0, 1}〉 , we can define
a few important terms related to firm size. First, given exhg
x
h(w) for h ∈ {U,H} and
x ∈ {0, 1} , the number of employees with health status h if a firm offers (w, x) is simply
given by
nh(w, x) =
exhg
x
h(w)
f(w, x)
, (1.26)
where the numerator is the total density of workers with health status h on the job (w, x)
and the denominator is the total density of firms offering compensation package (w, x) .
Of course, the total size of a firm that offers compensation package (w, x) is
n (w, x) =
∑
h∈{U,H}
nh (w, x) =
∑
h∈{U,H}
exhg
x
h(w)
f(w, x)
. (1.27)
Expressions (1.26) and (1.27) allow us to connect the firm sizes in steady state as a
function of the entire distribution of employed workers {0, 1} .
Firm’s Optimization Problem
A firm with a given productivity p decides what compensation package (w, x) to offer,
taken as given the aggregate distribution of compensation packages F (w, x) . We assume
that, before the firms make this decision, they each receive an i.i.d draw of σf where 
has a Type-I extreme value distribution and σf is a scale parameter. We interpret σf as
an employer’s idiosyncratic preference for offering health insurance. We assume that the
σf shock a firm receives is persistent over time and it is separable from firm profits.
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Given the realization of , each firm chooses (w, x) to maximize the steady-state flow
profit inclusive of the shocks. It is useful to think of the firm’s problem as a two-stage
23These shocks allow us to smooth the insurance provision decision of the firms.
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problem. First, it decides on the wage that maximizes the deterministic part of the profits
for a given insurance choice; and second, it maximizes over the insurance choices by com-
paring the shock-inclusive profits with or without offering health insurance. Specifically,
the firm’s problem is as follows:
max{Π0(p),Π1(p) + σf}, (1.28)
where
Π0(p) = max{w0}
Π (w0, 0) ≡
 (p− w0)nH(w0, 0)
+ (pd− w0)nU(w0, 0)
 ; (1.29)
Π1(p) = max{w1}
Π (w1, 1) ≡
 (p− w1 −m1H)nH(w1, 1)
+ (pd− w1 −m1U)nU(w1, 1)
− C. (1.30)
To understand the expressions (1.29), note that nH (w0, 0) and nU (w0, 0) are respectively
the measure of healthy and unhealthy workers the firm will have in the steady state as
described by (1.26) if it offers compensation package (w0, 0). Thus, (p− w0)nH(w0, 0)
is the firm’s steady-state flow profit from the healthy workers and (pd− w0)nU(w0, 0)
is the flow profit from the unhealthy workers. The expressions (2.10) can be similarly
understood after recalling that m1h is the expected medical expenditure of worker with
health status h and health insurance as defined in (1.4). For future reference, we will
denote the solutions to problems (1.29) and (1.30) respectively as w0 (p) and w1 (p) .
Due to the assumption that  is drawn from i.i.d. Type-I extreme value distribution,
firms’ optimization problem (1.28) thus implies that the probability that a firm with
productivity p offers health insurance to its workers is
∆ (p) =
exp(Π1(p)
σf
)
exp(Π1(p)
σf
) + exp(Π0(p)
σf
)
, (1.31)
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where Π0 (p) and Π1 (p) are respectively defined in (1.29) and (1.30).
1.3.4 Steady State Equilibrium
A steady state equilibrium is a list
〈(
wxh, s
x
h (·, ·) , qxh
)
, (uh, e
x
h, G
x
h (w)) , (wx (p) ,∆ (p)) , F (w, x)
〉
(1.32)
such that the following conditions hold:
• (Worker Optimization) Given F (w, x) , for each (h, x) ∈ {U,H} × {0, 1} ,
– wxh solves the unemployed workers’ problem as described by (1.10);
– sxh (·, ·) solves the job-to-job switching problem for currently employed workers
as described by (1.11);
– qx
h
describes the optimal strategy for currently employed workers regarding
whether to quit into unemployment as described by (1.13);
• (Steady State Worker Distribution) Given workers’ optimizing behavior de-
scribed by
(
wxh, s
x
h (·, ·) , qxh
)
and F (w, x) , (uh, e
x
h, G
x
h (w)) satisfy the steady state
conditions described by (1.14), (1.17), (1.21) and (1.25);
• (Firm Optimization) Given F (w, x) and the steady state employee sizes implied
by (uh, e
x
h, G
x
h (w)), a firm with productivity p chooses to offer health insurance with
probability ∆ (p) where ∆ (p) is given by (1.31). Moreover, conditional on insurance
choice x, the firm offers a wage wx (p) that solves (1.29) and (1.30) respectively for
x ∈ {0, 1} .
• (Equilibrium Consistency) The postulated distributions of offered compensa-
tion packages are consistent with the firms’ optimizing behavior (wx (p) ,∆ (p)) .
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Specifically, F (w, x) must satisfy:
F (w, 1) =
∫ ∞
0
1(w1(p) < w)∆(p)dΓ(p), (1.33)
F (w, 0) =
∫ ∞
0
1(w0(p) < w) [1−∆(p)] dΓ(p). (1.34)
1.4 Qualitative Assessment of the Model
The complexity of the model precludes an analytical characterization of the equilibrium,
thus we solve the equilibrium numerically.24 The complexity of our model also prevents us
from proving the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, but, throughout extensive
numerical simulations, we always find a unique equilibrium for our baseline model based
on our algorithm. We then present numerical simulation results using parameter estimates
that we will report in Section 1.7 to illustrate how our model can generate the positive
correlations among wage, health insurance and firm size we discussed in the introduction.
We also use the numerical simulations to provide informal arguments about how some of
key parameters of model are identified.
1.4.1 Numerical Simulations
In Column (1), labeled “Benchmark,” of Table 1.1, we report the main implications ob-
tained from our benchmark model using parameter estimates that we report in Section
1.7. It shows that our baseline model is able to replicate the positive correlations among
health insurance coverage rate, average wage, and employer size. Moreover, it also gener-
ates the empirically consistent prediction that the average health status of employees at
firms offering health insurance is relatively better that those at firms not offering health
insurance.
In Table 1.2, we use the estimates from Section 1.7 to shed light on the detailed
24The details of our numerical algorithm are provided in Appendix A.1.
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mechanisms for why in our model more productive firms have stronger incentives to
offer health insurance than less productive firms. For this purpose, we simulate the
health composition of the workforce for the firms with the bottom 20 and the top 20
productivity levels in our discretized productivity distribution. Row 1 of Table 1.2 shows
that, in the steady state, the fraction of unhealthy workers in low and high productivity
firms that offer health insurance are respectively 4.9% and 3.7%; in contrast, the fraction
of unhealthy workers in low and high productivity firms that do not offer health insurance
are respectively 9.6% and 10.7%. Offering health insurance seems to improve the health
composition of workers over not offering health insurance for high-productivity firms,
more so than for the low productivity firms. In Panels A-C, we disentangle the advantage
of high-productivity firms relative to low-productivity firms in offering health insurance
into three components.
In Panel A (or Row 2), we show that, in the low-productivity firms, the fraction of
unhealthy among the new hires – including those hired directly from unemployment pool
and those poached from other firms (i.e., job-to-job switchers) – is 8.0% if they offer
health insurance and 7.4% if they do not; in contrast, in the high-productivity firms the
fraction of unhealthy is 5.06% if they offer health insurance and 5.05% if they do not.
Thus, the new hires attracted to firms that offer health insurance are indeed somewhat
unhealthier, which is manifestation of adverse selection; but importantly, the new hires to
high-productivity firms are significantly healthier than those to the low-productivity firms.
This reflects the fact that, a high-productivity firm offering health insurance can poach
workers from a much wider range of firms, including a larger fraction of workers from firms
that already offer insurance and thus are healthier; in contrast, a low-productivity firm
offering health insurance can only poach workers from firms with even lower productivity,
most of which do not offer health insurance and thus have less healthy workers.
In Panel B, we show that any adverse selection effect that a firm offering health
insurance suffers in terms of the health composition of their new hires is quickly remedied
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by the positive effect of health insurance on health. In Row 3, we show that, just one-
period later, the new hires’ health composition is already in favor of firms that offer
health insurance. For low-productivity firms, the fraction of unhealthy workers among
those hired a period (4-months) ago, were they not to leave, is 6.7% and 8.4% respectively
in those offering health insurance and those not offering health insurance. Similarly, for
high-productivity firms, the fraction of unhealthy workers among those hired a period ago
is 4.6% and 6.7% respectively in those offering health insurance and those not offering
health insurance. In Row 4 we show that if the new hires from nine-periods (3 years) ago
were not to leave, the fraction of unhealthy among them would be only 3.807% in low-
productivity firms that offer health insurance, but it would be 10.9% in low-productivity
firms that do not offer health insurance. Similarly, among high-productivity firms, the
fraction of unhealthy workers among those hired nine periods ago, if they were not to
leave, would be 3.7% and 10.7% respectively in those offering health insurance and those
not offering health insurance.
Finally, in Panel C we show that the positive effect of health insurance on health, which
leads to increased productivity of the workers, is better captured by high productivity
firms. It shows that the job-to-job transition rates for workers in high-productivity firms,
regardless of their health status, is significantly lower than that in low-productivity firms.
Thus in our model, high-productivity firms enjoy several advantages in offering health
insurance to their workers relative to low-productivity firms: first, they face less severe
adverse selection problem among the new hires; second, they are more likely to retain
their healthy workers, which allows them to capture the increased productivity from the
health improvement effect of health insurance as well as reduce the health care cost.
1.4.2 Comparative Statics
In Columns (2)-(5) of Table 1.1 we also present some comparative statics result to shed
light on the effects of different parameters on the equilibrium features of our model. These
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shed light on how different parameters may be identified in our empirical estimation.
Fixed Administrative Cost of Offering Health Insurance. In Column (2) of Table
1.1, we investigate the effect of the fixed administrative cost C on health insurance offering
rate, by setting it to 0 as supposed to the estimated value of C = 0.0730 (i.e., $730 per
4 months) as reported in Table 1.8. Comparing the results in Column (2) with the
benchmark results in Column (1), we find that lowering the fixed administrative cost of
offering health insurance affects mainly the coverage rate for small firms; and its effect
on the insurance offering rate of large firms is much smaller. Moreover, it does not affect
much of the other outcomes. Although we still have a positive correlation between firm
size and health insurance offering rate, the offering rate for small firms is around 52.75%
if C = 0.
Health Insurance Effect on Health. In Column (3), we shut down the effect of health
insurance on the dynamics of health status by assuming that health transition process for
the uninsured is the same as that of the insured, pi0h′h = pi
1
h′h.
25 Column (3) of Table 1.1
shows that the fraction of large firms offering health insurance decrease significantly when
pi0h′h is set to be equal to pi
1
h′h. Moreover, this change significantly reduces the positive
correlation between wage and health insurance. Therefore, the health insurance effect on
health substantially affects the relationship among insurance offering rates, wages, and
employer size in our model.
The reason why large firms decide not to offer health insurance when pi0h′h = pi
1
h′h
can be understood as follows. When pi0h′h = pi
1
h′h, i.e., when health insurance provision
does not influence the dynamics of worker’s health status, the health composition of a
firm’s workforce is fully determined by health composition of the workers at the time they
accept the offer. The bottom two cells in Column (3) show that health composition of
firms offering health insurance is worse than that of firms who do not, because health
25We also obtain similar qualitative result in the opposite scenario, where health transition of the
insured is set to be equal to that estimated for the uninsured, i.e., pi1h′h = pi
0
h′h.
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insurance provision attract more unhealthy workers. This creates an adverse selection
problem which is not subsequently overcome as in Panel B of Table 1.2, thus leading to
some firms not to provide coverage.
Risk Aversion. In Column (4) of Table 1.1 we simulate the effect on the equilibrium
when we decrease the CARA coefficient from the estimated value of 0.4915 in Table 1.8 to
0.1. A reduction in CARA coefficient leads to a modest reduction in the health insurance
offering rate for the large firms. It also increases the average wages in firms without health
insurance.
Productivity Effect of Health. In Column (5) of Table 1.1 we investigate the pro-
ductivity effect of health by changing d from 0.3386 in Table 1.8 to 1.00. This eliminates
the negative productivity effect of bad health. Column (5) shows that the absence of the
negative productivity effect of bad health leads to a substantial reduction of the cover-
age rate for the large employers relative to the benchmark. The reason is that, in the
benchmark when bad health reduces productivity, the large firms, which tend to retain
workers longer as shown in Panel C of Table 1.2, have stronger incentive than smaller
firms to improve the health of their workforce in order to raise the expected flow profit.
Moreover, an increase in d increases firms’ wage offers in general due to the productivity
improvement.
1.4.3 Identification of γ, d, C and σf
As shown in Columns (2) and (4)-(5) in Table 1.1, the CARA coefficient γ, the produc-
tivity effect of health d, and the fixed administrative cost of offering health insurance C,
all have important effects on the firms’ incentives to provide health insurance. How are
they separately identified? Here we provide some “heuristic” discussion.
As we detail in Section 1.6, in our estimation we use both worker-side data which has
information about workers’ labor market dynamics and firm-side data that has information
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about firm size, wages and health insurance offering. While it is true that the CARA
coefficient γ affects the firms’ incentives to provide insurance as shown in Column (4) of
Table 1.1, it also affects the workers’ job-to-job transitions. In particular, if γ is larger (i.e.
when workers are more risk averse), we would expect to observe more frequent transitions
of workers from jobs without health insurance to a job with health insurance, especially
after a deterioration of health status, and even if the transition involves a reduction in
wages. Moreover, the magnitude of the wage cut a worker is willing to tolerate in order
to switch from a job without health insurance to a job with health insurance increases
with the risk aversion parameter γ. These effects are not shown in Table 1.1, but will be
incorporated in our estimation via the likelihood function of the workers’ labor market
transition dynamics.
As shown in Columns (4) and (5) in Table 1.1, both the productivity effect of health
d and risk aversion γ affect the relationship between the probability of offering health
insurance and firm size. Of course, the scale parameter σf in (1.31) also affects the
relationship between the probability of offering health insurance and firm productivity
(and thus firm size). These three parameters are separately identified for the following
reasons. First, the risk aversion parameter γ is disciplined by the worker-side job-to-
job transition information as we described above; second, even though the parameter d
and the scale parameter σf both affect the slope between the firm size and insurance
offering probability from the firm-side data, the parameter d has an additional effect
on the differences in wages for firms depending on whether they offer health insurance.
Finally, the administrative cost C is identified from the the probability (in level) of small
firms offering health insurance.
1.5 Data Sets
In this section, we describe our data sets and sample selection. In order to estimate the
model, it is ideal to use employee-employer matched dataset which contains information
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about worker’s labor market outcome and its dynamics, health, medical expenditure,
and health insurance, and firm’s insurance coverage rate and size. Unfortunately, such a
data set does not exist in the U.S. Instead, we combine three separate data sets for our
estimation: (1) Survey of Income and Program participation; (2) Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey; and (3) Robert Wood Johnson Employer Health Insurance Survey.
1.5.1 Survey of Income and Program Participation
Our main dataset for individual labor market outcome, health, and health insurance is
1996 Panel of Survey of Income Program Participation (hereafter, SIPP 1996).26 SIPP
1996 interviews individuals every four months up to twelve times, so that an individual
may be interviewed over a four-year period. It consists of two parts: (1) core module, and
(2) topical module. The core module, which is based on interviews in each wave, contains
detailed monthly information regarding individuals’ demographic characteristics and la-
bor force activity, including earnings, number of weeks worked, average hours worked,
employment status, as well as whether the individual changed jobs during each month of
the survey period. In addition, information for health insurance status is recorded in each
wave; it also specifies the source of insurance so we know whether it is an employment-
based insurance, a private individual insurance, or Medicaid, and we also know whether
it is obtained through the individual’s own or the spouse’s employer. The topical module
contains yearly information about the worker and his/her family member’s self reported
health status and out-of-pocket medical expenditure at interview waves 3, 6, 9 and 12.27
Sample Selection Criterion. The total sample size after matching the topical module
and the core module is 115,981. In order to have an estimation sample that is somewhat
homogeneous in skills as we assume in our model, we restrict our sample to men (drop-
26SIPP 1996 Panel is available at: http://www.census.gov/sipp/core content/1996/1996.html
27In both SIPP and MEPS, we use the self-reported health status to construct whether the individual
is healthy or unhealthy. The self-reported health status has five categorie. We categorize “Excellent”,
“Very Good” and “Good” as Healthy and “Fair” and “Poor” as Unhealthy.
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ping 59,846 female individuals) whose ages are between 26-46 (dropping an additional
38,016 individuals). In addition, we only keep individuals who are not in school, not
self-employed, do not work in the public sector, are not engage in the military, and do not
participate in any government welfare program (dropping an additional 6,995 individuals
in total). We also require that our sample be covered either by an employer-based health
insurance in his own name or is uninsured (dropping an additional 1,948 individuals).
We restrict our samples to individuals who are at most high school graduates (dropping
3,060 individuals). Finally we drop top and bottom 3% of salaried workers (dropping
an additional 817 individuals). Our final estimation sample that meets all of the above
selection criterion consists of a total of 5,309 individuals.
1.5.2 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)
The weakness of using SIPP data for our research is the lack of information for total med-
ical expenditure. To obtain the information, we use Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(hereafter, MEPS) 1997-1999. We use its Household Component (HC), which interviews
individuals every half year up to five times, so that an individual may be interviewed
over a two-and-a-half-year period.28 Medical expenditure is recorded at annual frequency.
Several health status related variables are recorded in each wave. Moreover, health in-
surance status is recorded at monthly level. We use the same sample selection criteria as
SIPP 1996. The sample size is 4,815.
1.5.3 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Employer Health In-
surance Survey
In addition, we also need information for employer size and associated health insurance
offering rate, which is not available from the worker-side data. The data source we use
is 1997 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Employer Health Insurance Survey (hereafter,
28MEPS HC is publicly available at http://www.meps.ahrq.gov.
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RWJ-EHI).29 It is a nationally representative survey of public and private establishments
conducted in 1996 and 1997. It contains information about employer’s characteristics
such as industry, firm size, and employees’ demographics, as well as information about
health insurance offering, health insurance plans, employees’ eligibility and enrollment in
health plans, and the plan type.
We restrict the sample to establishments which belong to the private sector and have
at least three employees. The final sample size is 19,089.
1.5.4 Summary Statistics
Table 1.3 reports the summary statistics of the key variables in the 1996 SIPP data.
About 76% of the employed workers receive health insurance from their employers; the
average 4-month wage for employed workers with health insurance is about $9,240, higher
than that for those without health insurance which is about $6,187. The unemployment
rate for our selected sample is about 3.18%, lower than the overall unemployment rate in
the U.S. in 1996 (which was about 5.4%).30 About 95.11% of our sample reported their
health to be healthy (i.e. either “Good”, “Very Good”, or “Excellent”). Moreover, it is
important to note that 95.36% of the workers with insurance and 93.89% of those without
insurance reported healthy.
In Table 1.4 we report the comparison of summary statistics for the individuals in
MEPS 1997-1999 and those in SIPP 1996. Both the fraction of healthy workers and the
fraction of employed workers who own health insurance are somewhat lower in MEPS than
in SIPP. By using the mean expenditure given health and health insurance in MEPS, we
also impute the annual average medical expenditure based on SIPP’s health and health
insurance composition for the SIPP sample. It shows that annual medical expenditures
are similar in the two samples.
Finally, in Table 1.5 we provide the summary statistics for our firm side data based
29It is publicly available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/HMCA/studies/2935
30See U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics at website: http://stats.bls.gov.
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on RWJ-EHI 1997. In general, firms that tend to offer health insurance have large size in
employment and provide higher wage. Moreover, wages, both unconditional and condi-
tional on insurance status, are very close to the one reported for the 1996 SIPP sample.
Therefore, although we restrict samples to relatively unskilled workers in SIPP, the com-
pensation patterns seem to be quite consistent in the worker-side and employer-side data
sets.
1.6 Estimation Strategy
In this section we present our strategy to structurally estimate our baseline model using
the datasets we described above.31 We estimate parameters regarding health transitions
and medical expenditure distribution without using the model. The remaining parame-
ters are estimated via a minimum-distance estimator which follows Imbens and Lancaster
(1994) and Petrin (2002). They consider the situation where moments come from different
data sources. In this study we construct worker-side moments from the likelihood of indi-
viduals’ labor market transition, as in Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (1999, 2000)
and Shephard (2012). Then, we construct firm-side moments such as firm size distribu-
tion and firm’s coverage rate conditional on their size from employer-side data. Loosely
speaking, the parameters are chosen to best fit the data from both sides of labor markets.
This is the main difference from the existing estimation procedure used in Bontemps,
Robin, and Van den Berg (1999, 2000) and Shephard (2012), where model parameters are
chosen to fit worker side data alone.32 As a result, we assume a parametric specification
31The details of the numerical estimation procecure are available in Appendix A.4.
32Consequently they can estimate productivity distribution nonparametrically so that the model’s pre-
diction of workers’ wage distribution perfectly fits with the data. Specifically, in Bontemps, Robin, and
Van den Berg (1999, 2000) and Shephard (2012), worker-side parameters are estimated from the likeli-
hood function of individual labor market transitions. Then, firm productivity distribution is estimated
to perfectly fit wage distribution observed from the worker side by utilizing the theoretical relation-
ship between wage offer and firm productivity implied from the model. Note that one can still apply
semiparametric multi-step estimation to fit both worker and employer side moments if one has access
to employee-employer matched panel data. For example, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Cahuc,
Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) nonparametrically estimate worker’s sampling distribution of job offer
from each firm to match observed wage distribution. Given the estimated sampling distribution, they
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of the productivity distribution and it is estimated, jointly with other parameters, to fit
both the wage and firm size distributions. Specifically, as we mentioned in Section 1.3.1,
we specify that the productivity distribution is given by a lognormal distribution with
mean µp and variance σ
2
p.
In our empirical application, the model period is set to be four months, driven by
the fact that we can only observe the transition of health insurance status at four-month
intervals in the SIPP data. In this study, we do not try to estimate β but set β = 0.99
so that annual interest rate is about 3%.33 Moreover, we set the exogenous death rate ρ
to be 0.001.34 Finally, the after-tax income schedule (1.6) is set to be that estimated in
Kaplan (2012), i.e., τ0 = 0.0056, τ1 = 0.6377 and τ2 = −0.1362.
1.6.1 First Step
In Step 1 we estimate parameters (α0, β0, γ0) in the probability of receiving a medical shock
in (1.2) and the parameters (αm, βm, γm, σhx : h ∈ {H,U} , x ∈ {0, 1}) in the distribution
of medical expenditures as specified in (1.3), as well as the health transitions pix as in (1.5)
without explicitly using the model. They are estimated by GMM using the MEPS data.
A total of twelve sample target moments are used, including the mean and variance of the
medical expenditure conditional on health and health insurance status (eight moments)
and the fraction of individuals with zero medical expenditures conditional on health and
health insurance status (four moments). For simplicity, we estimate these parameters
using a subsample of individuals whose health and health insurance status are unchanged
throughout the year. The annual theoretical moments conditional on health insurance
and health status are constructed from parameters which are defined for our model with
a four-month period.35
then estimate productivity distribution of firms to perfectly fit the employer-size distribution.
33 It is known from Flinn and Heckman (1982) that it is difficult to separately identify the discount
factor β from the flow unemployed income b in standard search models.
34This roughly matches the average 4-month death rate for men in the age range of 26-46, which is the
sample of individuals we include in our estimation.
35We use the identity weighting matrix for simplicity.
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Because we are assuming that the effect of health insurance and health status on med-
ical shocks and medical expenditures are exogenous, our restriction to the subsample of
individuals whose health and health insurance status are unchanged throughout the year
does not create a biased sample for our estimation purpose. However, it is useful to rec-
ognize that this subsample differs from the overall MEPS sample. Table 1.6 provides the
analogous summary statistics of the MEPS subsample we used in our first step estima-
tion.36 The comparison of Tables 1.6 and 1.4 shows that, not surprisingly, the magnitudes
of medical expenditure are substantially lower in this subsample than those in the overall
sample.
We estimate the parameters in health transition matrix (pi1HH , pi
1
UU , pi
0
HH , pi
0
UU) using
the 1996 SIPP data based on maximum likelihood. The key issue we need to deal with is
that our model period is 4 months; and while we can observe health insurance status each
period (every four months), we observe health status only every three periods (a year).
We deal with this issues as follows. Let xt ∈ {0, 1} be worker’s insurance status at period
t, and let ht ∈ {H,U} and ht+3 ∈ {H,U} denote respectively the worker’s health status
in period t and t+3 (when it is next measured), the likelihood of observing ht+3 ∈ {H,U}
conditional on xt, xt+1, xt+2 and ht ∈ {H,U} can be written out explicitly using the Law
of Total Probability. For example, if ht+3 = H and ht = H, we have:
37
Pr(ht+3 = H|xt, xt+1, xt+2, ht = H) = pixtHHpixt+1HH pixt+2HH
+pixtHH(1− pixt+1HH )(1− pixt+2UU )
+(1− pixtHH)(1− pixt+1UU )pix+2HH
+(1− pixtHH)pixt+1UU (1− pixt+2UU ).
We use them to formulate the log-likelihood of observed data, which records the health
transition every three periods, as a function of one-period health transition parameters
36The sample size is 2,892.
37The formulae for the other cases are analogous and are available in Appendix A.2.
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as captured by pix, for x ∈ {0, 1} , as in (1.5) in our model.
1.6.2 Second Step
In the second step, we estimate the remaining parameters θ = (θ1, θ2) where θ1 =
(λu, λe, δ, γ, µ, b) are parameters that affect worker-side dynamics and their preferences
to work and to have health insurance, and θ2 = (C, d,M, µp, σp) are the additional pa-
rameters that are mostly relevant to the firm-side moments. Our objective function is
based on the optimal GMM which consists of two types of moments. The first set of
moments are derived from the worker-side data in SIPP in the form of the log-likelihood
of the observed labor market dynamics of the workers, which we aim to maximize by re-
quiring that the first derivatives should be equal to zero, following Imbens and Lancaster
(1994). The second set of moments come from the firm-side data RWJ-EHI.
Specifically, let the targeted moments be
g(θ) =

∑
i ∂ log(Li(θ))
∂θ
s− E[s; θ]
 , (1.35)
where Li (θ) is individual i’s contribution to the labor market dynamics likelihood, which
we discuss in details in Section 1.6.3; and s is a vector of firm-side moments we describe
in Section 1.6.4. Then, we construct an objective function as
min
{θ}
g(θ)′Ωg(θ), (1.36)
where the weighting matrix Ω is chosen as a consistent estimator of E[g(θ)′g(θ)]−1, which
is obtained using θ˜, a preliminary consistent estimate of θ. As in Petrin (2002), we first
assume that E[g(θ)′g(θ)] takes block diagonal matrix because different moments come
from different sampling processes. Let G(θ) = E[∂g(θ)
∂θ′ ], the gradient of the moments
with respect to the parameters evaluated at the true parameter values. The asymptotic
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variance of
√
n
(
θˆ − θ
)
is then given by
[G(θ)′ΩG(θ)]−1 ,
which we use to calculate the standard error of parameter estimates.
1.6.3 Deriving the Likelihood Functions of Workers’ Labor Mar-
ket Dynamics
Here we derive the likelihood functions of workers’ labor market dynamics similar to those
in Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (1999, 2000). Let F (w, x) denote the distribution
of (w, x) in the labor market.
We will first derive the likelihood contribution of the labor market transitions of unem-
ployed workers. Consider an unemployed worker at period 1 with health status is h1, who
experiences an unemployment spell of duration l and in period l + 1 transitions to a job
(w˜, x) . To ease exposition, let us first suppose that health history between j = 1 to l + 1
for this worker, (h1, h2, ..., hl+1) , is observed. The likelihood contribution of observing
such a transition is:
uh1
M
× Πlj=2
 Pr(hj|hj−1, xj−1 = 0)× [(1− λu) + λu (F (w1hj , 1)+ F (w0hj , 0))]
 (1.37a)
× Pr(hl+1|hl, xl = 0)× [λuf(w˜, 1)]1(x=1) × [λuf(w˜, 0)]1(x=0) (1.37b)
where 1(x = 1) is an indicator function taking value one if we observe a transition to
employment with (w˜, 1) at period l + 1, and similarly 1 (x = 0) is an indicator function
taking value one if we observe a transition to employment with (w˜, 0) at period l+ 1. To
understand (1.37), note that the first term in line (1.37a), uh/M, reflects the assumption
that the initial condition of individuals is drawn from the steady state worker distribution
because uh/M the probability that an unemployed worker with health status h is sampled.
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The second term in line (1.37a) is the probability that individual experiences l periods
of unemployment with health status transitions (h2, ..., hl) during the process; note that
the term
[
(1− λu) + λu(F (w1hj , 1) + F (w0hj , 0)
]
is the probability that the individual does
not receive an offer or receives an offer that is lower than the relevant reservation wages
w1hj or w
0
hj
. The term on line (1.37b) is the probability that his health transitions from
hl to hl+1 in period l + 1 and receive an acceptable offer (w˜, x) from the relevant density
function f (w˜, x).
Now as we described earlier in Section 1.5, SIPP data we observe the workers’ self-
reported health status only annually (at interview waves 3, 6, 9 and 12); as a result, we do
not always observe workers’ health history in-between labor market transitions. However,
since we already estimated the health transitions conditional on health insurance in Step
1, we can integrate out the unobserved health status.38
We can similarly derive the likelihood contribution of the job dynamics of employed
workers. Consider an employed worker in period 1 with health status h1 working on a
job with compensation package (w, x). Suppose that the worker experiences a job status
changes in period l+1. For an employed worker, there are four possible job status changes:
• [Event “Job Loss”]: The individual experienced a job loss at period l + 1;
• [Event “Switch 1”]: The individual transitioned to a job (w˜, x′) such that x′ = x
and the accepted wage is w˜ > w;
• [Event “Switch 2”]: The individual transitioned to a job (w˜, x′) such that x′ = x
and the accepted wage is w˜ < w;
• [Event “Switch 3”]: The individual transitioned to a job (w˜, x′) such that x′ 6= x
and the accepted wage is w˜.
Again, suppose that the health history between j = 1 to l + 1 for this worker,
38Details for the likelihood functions when the health history in-between labor market transitions are
not observable are provided in Appendix A.3.
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(h1, h2, ..., hl+1) , is observed, then the likelihood contribution is given by:
exhg
x
h (w)
M
×Πlj=2
 Pr(hj |hj−1, x)(1− δ)× [(1− λe) + λe (F (w, x) + F (sx′hj (w, x), x′))]
 (1.38a)
×Pr(hl+1|hl, x)
×

δ
[
(1− λe) + λe
∑
x˜ F (w
x˜
hl+1
, x˜)
]
if Event is “Job Loss”
λef(w˜, x) if Event is “Switch 1”
δλef(w˜, x) if Event is “Switch 2”
(1− δ)λef(w˜, x′) + δλef(w˜, x′) if Event is “Switch 3”,
(1.38b)
To understand (1.38), note that similar to that in (1.37), the first term in line (1.38a),
exhg
x
h(w)/M, is the probability of sampling an employed worker with health status h work-
ing on a job (w, x) ; the second term in line (1.38a) is the probability that individual stays
with the job (w, x) for l periods with health status transitions (h2, ..., hl) during the pro-
cess. Line (1.38b) expresses the likelihood of observing health transition from hl to hl+1 in
period l+1 and one of the four job status change events. For example, the event “Job Loss”
is observed in period l+1 with probability δ
[
(1− λe) + λe
∑
x˜ F (w
x˜
hl+1
, x˜)
]
because in or-
der for a job loss to occur, the worker has to experience an exogenous shock that destroys
the current match (which occurs with probability δ), and then he does not get matched
to another acceptable job (which occurs with probability (1 − λe) + λe
∑
x˜ F (w
x˜
hl+1
, x˜)).
To understand the probability of event “Switch 2”, we note that in order for a worker
to switch to a job (w˜, x′) with x′ = x but w˜ < w, the worker must have experienced
a job separation (which occurs with probability δ), but is then lucky enough to find an
acceptable job immediately, which happens with probability λef(w˜, x). The probability
of the other job switch events are derived similarly.
1.6.4 Employer-Side Moments
In our estimation, we also require that our model’s predictions match the following
employer-side moments calculated from the RWJ-EHI data. These moments correspond
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to the vector s in expression (1.35):
• Mean firm size;
• Fraction of firms less than 50 workers;
• Mean size of firms that offer health insurance;
• Mean size of firms that do not offer health insurance;
• Health insurance coverage rate;
• Health insurance coverage rate among firms with more than 50 workers;
• Health insurance coverage rate among firms with less than 50 workers;
• Average wages of firms with less than 50 workers;
• Average wages of firms with more than 50 workers.
1.7 Estimation Results
1.7.1 Parameter Estimates
Parameters Estimated in the First Step. Table 1.7 reports the parameter estimates
from step 1. The estimated coefficients imply that unhealthy individuals and individuals
with health insurance are more likely to experience medical shocks; moreover, conditional
on experiencing medical shocks, unhealthy and insured individuals are more likely to
incur larger medical expenditures. The finding that health insurance increases both the
incidence and magnitude of medical expenditures captures the moral hazard effect of
health insurance. As we report in Table 1.9, our model fits the means and variances of
medical expenditures by health and healthy insurance status in the data well.
In Panel B of Table 1.7, we find that there is a significant health insurance effect on the
dynamics of health since pi1HH > pi
0
HH and pi
1
UU < pi
0
UU , implying that not having health
insurance increases the probability that the next period health status is unhealthy. It
is also interesting to note that our estimates indicate that health insurance has a higher
marginal effect on health for a currently unhealthy worker than for a currently healthy
51
Parameter Estimate Std. Err.
Panel A: Medical Expenditure Parameters in Eq. (1.4)
α0 -1.0909 (0.0446)
β0 0.5247 (0.0723)
γ0 0.5787 (0.0747)
αm -4.4222 (0.3099)
βm 1.6262 (0.3268)
γm 0.7227 (0.3867)
αp -1.0909 (0.0446)
σH1 1.4783 (0.0662)
σH0 1.9895 (0.1235)
σU1 1.3584 (0.0919)
σU0 1.3193 (0.0173)
Panel B: Health Transition Parameters in Eq. (1.5)
pi1HH 0.9865 (0.0023)
pi0HH 0.9689 (0.0058)
pi1UU 0.7294 (0.0310)
pi0UU 0.7587 (0.0365)
Table 1.7: Parameter Estimate from Step 1.
footnotesizeNote: Standard errors are in parentheses. The unit of medical expenditure is
$10, 000.
worker, that is, pi1HU − pi0HU > pi1HH − pi0HH .
Parameters Estimated in the Second Step. Table 1.8 reports the parameter es-
timates from step 2. Panel A shows that our estimate of CARA coefficient is about
0.4915E-4 (recalling that our unit is in $10,000). Using the four-month average wages
for employed workers reported in Table 1.3, which is about $8,538, our estimated CARA
coefficient implies a relative risk aversion of about 0.42. These are squarely in the range
of estimates of CARA and Relative Risk Aversion coefficients in the literature (see Cohen
and Einav (2007) for a summary of such estimates).
We find that the offer arrival rate for an employed worker, λe, is about 0.268, which
implies that on average it takes about 15 months for a currently employed worker to
receive an outside offer; we also find that the offer arrival rate for an unemployed worker,
λu, is 0.434, implying that on average it takes about 9 months for an unemployed to
receive an offer.39 Our estimate of the unemployment income b is small, about $137,
39Dey and Flinn (2005) estimated that the mean wait between contacts for the unemployed is about
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Parameter Estimates Std. Err.
Panel A: Parameters in θ1 ≡ (λu, λe, δ, γ, µ, b)
γ 0.4915 (0.0051)
b 0.0137 (0.0002)
λu 0.4340 (0.0112)
λe 0.2680 (0.0038)
δ 0.0179 (0.0003)
µH 0.9930 (0.0156)
Panel B: Parameters in θ2 ≡ (C, d,M, µp, σp, σf )
d 0.3386 (0.0063)
C 0.0730 (0.0063)
M 18.8920 (8.7940)
µp -0.5680 (0.0031)
σp 0.4043 (0.0036)
σf 0.2397 (0.0025)
Table 1.8: Parameter Estimate from Step 2.
reflecting that a large fraction of the UI benefits are probably expensed for job search
costs. In Panel A, we also report that our estimate of the probability of exogenous job
destruction, δ, is about 1.79% in a four-month period; and the fraction of newly arrived
workers who are healthy is about 99.30%.
Panel B reports our estimates of parameters θ2 ≡ (C, d,M, µp, σp). We find that the
productivity of a worker in bad health, d, is only 0.3386, implying that there is a significant
amount of productivity loss from bad health. This seems plausible because we categorize
only those whose self-reported health is “Poor” or “Fair” as unhealthy. Moreover, we
find that the fixed administration cost of offering health insurance is about $730 per four
month, i.e., about $2,190 per year.
In order to fit the average firm size, our estimate of M, the ratio between workers and
firms, is about 18.892. This estimate is smaller than the average establishment size of 19.92
3.25 months, while the a contact between a new potential employer and a currently employed individual
occurs about every 19 months. The differences for the contact rate for the unemployed between our study
and Dey and Flinn (2005) could be due to the fact that a period is four months in our study while it is
a week in Dey and Flinn (2005). An unemployed individual in both the first month and the fifth month
will be considered as being in a continuous unemployment spell, though at weekly frequency he could
have been matched with some firms inbetween. This may lead us to a lower estimate for the contact rate
for the unemployed. Another possibility is the differences in the sample selection: our sample includes
only individuals with no more than high school degree, while Dey and Flinn (2005)’s sample has at least
a high school degree.
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reported in Table 1.5 because in our model some low-productivity firms do not attract
any workers in equilibrium. We also estimated that the scale and shape parameters of
the lognormal productivity distribution are respectively -0.5860 and 0.4043, which implies
that the mean (4-month) productivity of firms is about 0.6149 (i.e. $6149). The fact that
the mean accepted four-month wage in our sample is 0.8538 (see Table 1.3) is largely due
to the fact more productive firms attract more workers in the steady state as our model
implies, but also due to the fact that a fraction of the low-productivity firms are not able
to attract any workers in equilibrium i.e., they are inactive.
1.7.2 Within-Sample Goodness of Fit
In this section, we examine the within-sample goodness of fit of our estimates by simulating
the equilibrium of our estimated model and compare the model predictions with their data
counterparts.
Worker-Side Goodness of Fit. Table 1.9 reports the model fits for medical expen-
diture in the first step. It shows that our parameter estimates fit the data on the means
(in Panel A) and variances (in Panel B) of medical expenditure conditional on health
and health insurance status very well; moreover, in Panel C we show that we accurately
replicate the fraction of individuals with zero medical expenditures conditional on health
and health insurance status.
Table 1.10 reports the model fit for the worker-side moments. It shows that the model
fits really well for cross section worker distribution in terms of health, health status, health
insurance, wage, and employment distribution. Note that these moments are not directly
targeted in our estimation.
Figure 1.1 plots the distribution of workers’ accepted wages by health insurance status.
It shows that our model is able to capture the overall patterns reasonably well, but it
predicts a much more concentrated wage distribution than what is in the data, especially
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Data Model
Panel A: Mean Annual Medical Expenditure
Healthy & insured 0.0672 0.0673
Healthy & uninsured 0.0365 0.0359
Unhealthy & insured 0.4804 0.4794
Unhealthy & uninsured 0.1249 0.1249
Panel B: Variance of Annual Medical Expenditure
Healthy & insured 0.0393 0.0392
Healthy & uninsured 0.1601 0.1601
Unhealthy & insured 0.8084 0.8084
Unhealthy & uninsured 0.0856 0.0856
Panel C: Fraction with Zero Medical Expenditure
Healthy & insured 0.3324 0.3368
Healthy & uninsured 0.6458 0.6413
Unhealthy & insured 0.1290 0.1213
Unhealthy & uninsured 0.3600 0.3646
Table 1.9: Fit for Medical Expenditure Distributions: Model vs. Data.
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Figure 1.1: The Distributions of Workers’ Accepted Wages by Health Insurance Status:
Model vs. Data.
among workers who have health insurance from their employers.
Employer-Side Goodness of Fit. Table 1.11 compares the model’s predictions of the
targeted employer-side moments listed in Section 1.6.4 with those in the data. With the
exception of the average wage of firms with less than 50 workers, our model fits all the
other moments, including mean firm size, fraction of firms with less than 50 workers, and
health insurance coverage rate (overall and by firm size).
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Figure 1.2 plots the size distribution of the firms both in the data and that implied by
our model estimates. Figure 1.3 shows the size distributions of firms by health insurance
offering status. Both figures show that our model is able to capture the size distribution
of firms overall and by health insurance status reasonably well.
We should point out that even though our model qualitatively predicts the positive
correlation between wage and firm size, it generates a much steeper relationship between
them than what is in the data. Moreover, as we showed in Figure 1.1, our fit of workers’
wage distribution conditional on health insurance status is still not ideal. Because firm
productivity is positively correlated with wage offer in our model, in order to fit worker’s
wage distribution which is very dispersed, we need to have a relatively large variance
of firm productivity. However, since firm size and wage are positively correlated in our
model, a larger variance of firm productivity distribution leads to a steeper relationship
between wage and firm size. The difficulty of simultaneously fitting firm size distribution
from firm-side data and wage distribution from the worker-side data is known from Postel-
Vinay and Robin (2002) and Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006), who proposed to
address the issue by introducing a wedge between worker’s sampling distribution of firms
and firm’s productivity distribution.40
1.8 Counterfactual Experiments
In this section, we use our estimated model to examine the impact of the Affordable Care
Act, its various components, and alternative policy designs. For the ACA, we consider a
stylized version which incorporates its main components as mentioned in the introduction:
first, all individuals are required to have health insurance or have to pay a penalty;
second, all firms with more than 50 workers are required to offer health insurance, or
have to pay a penalty; third, we introduce a health insurance exchange where individuals
40We believe that incorporating richer worker heterogeneity in their productivity, beside health status,
may be a more important direction for further research.
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Figure 1.2: Size Distribution of Firms: Model vs. Data.
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Figure 1.3: Size Distribution of Firms by Insurance Offering Status: Model vs. Data.
can purchase health insurance at community rated premium; fourth, the participants in
health insurance exchange can obtain income-based subsidies.
The introduction of health insurance exchange represents a substantial departure from
our benchmark model because premium in exchange needs to be endogenously determined.
As a result, we will first describe how we extend and analyze our benchmark model to
incorporate the health insurance exchange.
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1.8.1 Model for the Counterfactual Experiments
We provide a brief explanation of the main changes in the economic environment for the
model used in our counterfactual experiments.
The Main Change in Individuals’ Environment. We now assume individuals who
are not offered health insurance by their employers and those who are unemployed can
purchase individual health insurance from the health insurance exchange. We assume that
the insurance purchased from the exchange is identical to those offered by the employers
in that it also fully insures medical expenditure risk. Thus in the extended model, an
individual’s insurance status x is defined as
x =

0 if uninsured
1 if insured through employer
2 if insured through exchange.
We assume that the effect on health for health insurance purchased from the exchange,
denoted by pi2 analogously defined as (1.5), is identical to that for employer-sponsored
health insurance, i.e., pi2 = pi1.
We also incorporate the premium subsidies to the individuals and penalties if uninsured
into the model. Let S
(
y,REX
)
denote income based subsidies to an individual with
income y who purchase health insurance from the exchange where REX is the premium
in exchange, which is to be determined in equilibrium. Similarly, let PW (y) denote the
penalty to individuals who remain uninsured, which also depends on income level.
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Worker’s problem. Under this extension, the expected flow utility vh(y, x) in the
counterfactual is defined as:
vh(y, x) =

Em˜0hu (T (y)− m˜0h − PW (y)) if x = 0
u (T (y)) if x = 1
u
(
T (y) + S
(
y,REX
)−REX) if x = 2
(1.39)
The value function of an unemployed individual with health insurance status x ∈ {0, 2}
becomes
Uh(x)
1− ρ = vh(b, x) + βEh′|(h,x)

λu
∫
max {Vh′(w, 1), Uh′(x∗h′)} dF (w, 1)
+λu
∫
maxx′∈{0,2} {Vh′(w, x′), Uh′(x∗h′)} dF (w, 0)
+(1− λu)Uh′(x∗h′),
 (1.40)
where
x∗h′ = arg max
x′∈{0,2}
Uh′(x
′). (1.41)
Similarly, the value function of an employed worker with health status h working on
a job with insurance status (w, x), Vh (w, x) , is as follows. If x = 1,
Vh(w, 1)
1− ρ = vh(w, 1) + βλe
 (1− δ) Eh′|(h,1)Ω
1
E(h
′, w, 1)
+δEh′|(h,1)ΩU (h′)

+β(1− λe)
×

(1− δ)Eh′|(h,1) max
 Uh′(x
∗
h′),
Vh′(w, 1)

+δEh′|(h,1)Uh′(x∗h′)
 , (1.42)
61
and if x ∈ {0, 2} ,
Vh(w, x)
1− ρ = vh(w, x) + βλe
 (1− δ)Eh′|(h,1)Ω
1
E(h
′, w, x)
+δEh′|(h,1)ΩU (h′)

+β(1− λe)

(1− δ)Eh′|(h,1) max
 Uh′(x
∗
h′),
V 0h′(w, x
∗
h′ (w˜))

+δEh′|(h,1)Uh′(x∗h′)
 , (1.43)
where in (1.42) and (1.43),
Ω2E(h
′, w, 1) =
 ∫ max{Vh′(w˜, 1), Vh′(w, x∗h′ (w˜)), Uh′(x∗h′)}dF (w˜, 1)
+
∫
max{Vh′(w˜, x∗h′ (w˜)), Vh′(w, x∗h′ (w˜)), Uh′(x∗h′)}dF (w˜, 0)
 (1.44)
Ω1E(h
′, w, 1) =
 ∫ max{Vh′(w˜, 1), Vh′(w, 1), Uh′(x∗h′)}dF (w˜, 1)
+
∫
max{V 0h′(w˜, x∗h′ (w˜)), Vh′(w, 1), Uh′(x∗h′)}dF (w˜, 0)
 (1.45)
ΩU (h
′) =
 ∫ max{Uh′(x∗h′), Vh′(w˜, 1)} dF (w˜, 1)
+
∫
max
{
Uh′(x
∗
h′), Vh′(w˜, x
∗
h′ (w˜))
}
dF (w˜, 0)
 (1.46)
x∗h′ (w˜) = arg max
x∈{0,2}
Vh′(w˜, x). (1.47)
We characterize the individuals’ optimal job acceptance strategies, and their optimal
decision regarding whether to purchase insurance from the exchanges when they are un-
employed or when their employers do not offer health insurance similar to those for the
benchmark model. We also characterize the steady state worker distribution among firms
〈exh, Gxh (w)〉 for x ∈ {0, 1, 2} when the two additional terms, e2h and G2h (w) , are now re-
spectively the measure of employed workers with health status h who purchase insurance
from the exchange, and the distribution of wages among them.41
41Details for the derivation of steady state employment distribution used in our counterfactual policy
experiments are provided in Appendix A.5.3.
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Firms’ Problem. Firms with more than 50 workers now face a penalty if they do not
offer health insurance. Let PE(n) denote the the amount of the penalty, which depends
on the firm size n.
There are two important changes to the firms’ problem. The first one is how firm
size is determined. Because of the insurance exchange, some of their workforce may be
insured even if they do not offer health insurance. Specifically, n(w, 0), the size of firms
not offering health insurance, becomes
n (w, 0) =
∑
h∈{U,H}
nh (w, 0) =
∑
h∈{U,H}
e0hg
0
h(w) + e
2
hg
2
h(w)
f(w, 0)
,
and the expression for n (w, 1) remains the same as before.
Second, because of the employer mandate, firm’s profit maximization problem will
change. It now becomes
max{Π0(p),Π1(p) + σf},
where:
Π0(p) = max
w0
Π (w0, 0) ≡
 (p− w0)nH(w0, 0)
+ (pd− w0)nU(w0, 0)
− PE(n (w, 0)), (1.48)
Π1(p) = max
w1
Π (w1, 1) ≡
 (p− w1 −mH)nH(w1, 1)
+ (pd− w1 −mU)nU(w1, 1)
− C (1.49)
where the term PE (n (w, 0)) in the expression for Π0(p) reflects the possible penalty to
employers for not offering employer-sponsored health insurance to their workers.
Insurance Exchange. The premium in the insurance exchange, REX , is determined
based on the average medical expenditures of all participants in the health insurance
exchange, multiplied by 1+ξ, where ξ > 0 is loading factor for health insurance exchange;
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specifically,
REX = (1 + ξ)
∑
h∈{H,U}m
2
h
[
u2h +
∫
e2h(w)g
2
h (w) dw
]∑
h∈{H,U}
[
u2h +
∫
e2h(w)g
2
h (w) dw
] (1.50)
where m2h is expected medical expenditure of individual with health status h for individ-
uals with insurances purchased from the exchange which, due to our assumption that the
insurances in the exchange are identical to those from the firms, is exactly the same as
m1h described by (1.4); u
2
h is the measure of unemployed workers participating insurance
exchange with health status h; and e2h(w)g
2
h (w) is the density for employed workers not
being offered health insurance from employers but participating insurance exchange with
health status h.
The steady state equilibrium for the post-reform economy can be defined analogous
to that for our benchmark model in Section 1.3.4 and is provided in Appendix A.5.1.
Numerical Algorithm to Solve the Equilibrium. We use numerical methods to
solve the equilibrium. The basic iteration procedure to solve the equilibrium for the
counterfactual environment remains the same as that described in the Appendix A.1,
but there are two important changes. First, we need to find the fixed point of not only
(w0(p), w1(p),∆(p)) but also R
EX , the premium in insurance exchange. Second, because
the penalty associated with employer mandate depends on size of the firm, for example,
the threshold under the ACA for firms to pay penalty if they do not offer health insurance
is 50; as a result we need to modify the algorithm to allow for a potential mass point of
employers just to the left of 50 when we derive optimal wage policy w0(p).
42
Finally, the establishment of the health insurance exchange with community rating
may result in multiple equilibria under some counterfactual policy experiments. In our
numerical simulations, we sometimes find multiple equilibria and we will report them.
42The details of the modified numerical algorithm are provided in Appendix A.5.2.
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1.8.2 Parameterization of the Counterfactual Policies
Before we conduct counterfactual experiments to evaluate the effect of ACA and its com-
ponents, we need to address several issues regarding how to introduce the specifics of ACA
provisions, such as penalty associated with individual mandate, employer mandate and
the premium subsidies, into our model. First, we estimated our model using data sets in
1996, while the ACA policy parameters are chosen to suit the economy in 2011. However,
the U.S. health care sector has very different growth rate than that of the overall GDP; in
particular, there are substantial increases in medical care costs relative to GDP in the last
15 years. Thus we need to appropriately adjust the policy parameters in the ACA to make
them more in line with the U.S. economy around 1996. Second, the amount of penalties
and subsidies are defined as annual level, while our model period is four months. We
simply divide all monetary units in the ACA by three to obtain the applicable number for
a four-month period. Third, we need to decide on the magnitude of the loading factor ξ
that appeared in (1.50) that is applicable in the insurance exchange. We calibrate ξ based
on the ACA requirement that all insurance sold in the exchange must satisfy the ACA
regulation that the medical loss ratio must be at least 80%. This implies that ξ = 0.25.43
We now describe how we translate the ACA provisions for 2011 into applicable formulas
for our 1996 economy.
Penalties Associated with Individual Mandate. The exact stipulation of the penalty
in ACA if an individual does not show proof of insurance (from 2016 when the law is fully
implemented) is that individuals without health insurance coverage pay a tax penalty of
the greater of $695 per year or 2.5% of the taxable income above the Tax Filing Threshold
(TFT), which can be written as:
PACAW (y) = max {0.025× (y − TFT 2011) , $695} (1.51)
43The medical loss ratio is the ratio of the total claim costs the insurance company incurs to total insur-
ance premium collected from participants. The medical loss ratio implied by (1.50) is simply 1/ (1 + ξ),
thus an 80% medical loss ratio corresponds to ξ = 0.25. ACA requires that ξ ≤ 0.25.
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where y is annual income.
We adjust the above formula in several dimensions. First, the $695 amount is adjusted
by the ratio of the 1996 Medical Care CPI (CPI Med 1996) relative to the 2011 Medical
Care CPI (CPI Med 2011); this is appropriate if we believe that the amount $695 is
chosen to be proportional to the 2011 medical expenditures. We then multiply it by
1/3 to reflect our period-length of fourth months instead of a year. Second, we need to
adjust the TFT 2011 by the ratio of 1996 CPI of all goods (CPI All 1996) relative to
the 2011 CPI of all goods (CPI All 2011) and also multiply it by 1/3 to reflect that our
income is the four-month income.44 Finally, we need to adjust the percentage 2.5% by
the differential growth rate of medical care and GDP, i.e., multiply it by the relative ratio
of CPI Med 1996
CPI All 1996
and CPI Med 2011
CPI All 2011
. With these adjustments, we specify the adjusted penalty
associated with individual mandate appropriate for the 1996 economy as:
PW (y) = max

0.025× (CPI Med 1996CPI All 1996 ) / (CPI Med 2011CPI All 2011 )
× (y − 13TFT 2011× CPI All 1996CPI All 2011) ,
1
3 × $695× CPI Med 1996CPI Med 2011

≈ max
{
0.025
1.42
× (y − 2, 323) , $119
}
, (1.52)
where y is four-month income in dollars.
Penalties Associated with Employer Mandate. ACA stipulates that employers
with 50 or more full-time employees that do not offer health insurance coverage will
be assessed each year a penalty of $2,000 per full-time employee, excluding the first 30
employees from the assessment. That is,
PACAE (n) = (n− 30)× $2, 000. (1.53)
We adjust the above formula by first scaling the $2,000 per-worker penalty using the
44We obtain CPI data for medical care and all goods both from Bureau of Labor Statistics website:
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm.
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ratio of the 1996 Medical Care CPI relative to the 2011 Medical Care CPI, and then
multiply it by 1/3 to reflect our period-length of four months instead of a year, i.e.,
PE(n) =
1
3
[
(n− 30)× $2, 000× CPI Med 1996
CPI Med 2011
]
= 342.45 (n− 30) . (1.54)
Income-Based Premium Subsidies. ACA stipulates that premium subsidies for pur-
chasing health insurance from the exchange are available if an individual’s income is less
than 400% of Federal Poverty Level (FPL), denoted by FPL400.45 The premium subsidies
are set on a sliding scale such that the premium contributions are limited to a certain
percentage of income for specified income levels. If an individual’s income is at 133% of
the FPL, denoted by FPL133, premium subsidies will be provided so that the individual’s
contribution to the premium is equal to 3.5% of his income; when an individual’s income
is at FPL400, his premium contribution is set to be 9.5% of the income. When his income
is below FPL133, he will receive insurance with zero premium contribution. If his income
is above FPL400, he is no longer eligible for premium subsidies. Note that the premium
support rule as described in ACA creates a discontinuity at FPL133: individuals with
income below FPL133 receives free Medicaid, but those at or slightly above FPL133 have
to contribute at least 3.5% of his income to health insurance purchase from the exchange.
To avoid this discontinuity issue, we instead adopt a slightly modified premium support
formula as follows:
S
(
y,REX
)
=

max
 R
EX −
[
0.0350 + 0.060 (3y−FPL133)FPL400−FPL133
]
y
×CPI Med 1996CPI Med 2011 , 0
 if y < FPL4003
REX if unemployed
0, otherwise,
(1.55)
when y is four-month income. According to (1.55) the individual contribution to insurance
premium increases linearly from 3.5% of his income when his income is at 133% of the
45We assume that FPL is defined as single person. In 1996, it is $7,730 annually.
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FPL to 9.5% when his income is at 400% of the FPL.
1.8.3 Main Result
In Table 1.12, we report results from several counterfactual policy experiments and con-
trast the outcomes under these counterfactual policies with the benchmark.
Benchmark. In Column (1) of Table 1.12, we report in Panel A predictions related to
the firm side using our baseline model using the parameter estimates reported in Tables
1.7 and 1.8. It shows that our benchmark model predicts that 55.81% of the active firms
offer health insurance to their workers, but the health insurance offering rate is 91.13% if
the firm size is more than 50 and only 52.00% if it has fewer than 50 workers; moreover,
our model predicts that 90.26% of the firms have fewer than 50 workers. We find that
98.72% of the firms are active in the benchmark environment; and the average labor
productivity, taking into account the productivity loss from unhealthy workers, is $11,300
per four months.46
In Panel B, we report predictions related to worker side. We find that our model
predicts that in the benchmark environment, 20.12% of the population would have no
health insurance; 3.22% would be unemployed. We also find that the average wage of all
workers is about $8,501 per four months, but it is about $8,986 for workers with health
insurance from their employers and $6,211 for those without. We find that the fraction
of healthy workers in the economy overall is 94.94%, but it is 96% among those insured
by ESHI is 96.00% in contrast to 90.17% among those who are uninsured. We find that
61.42% of the employed workers work in firms with 50 or more workers. Finally, we find
that the consumption equivalent valuation (CEV) of workers’ lifetime welfare is about
$6,152 in the benchmark economy.
46Recall that in our model, some low-productivity firms would not be able to attract any workers and
they are considered non-active firms. The set of non-active firms is affected by the counterfactual policies.
Thus our model allows for an extensive margin on the firm side.
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In Panel C, we report statistics related to expenditures. We find that the tax ex-
emption of ESHI premium leads to a tax expenditure of about $84 per capita every four
months. We also find that the per capita four-month medical expenditure is about $253;
and the average insurance premium among those insured by ESHI is about $306 every
four months.
Affordable Care Act. In Column (2), we report the simulation results when we intro-
duce the ACA, including insurance exchange (EX), Individual Mandate (IM), Employer
Mandate (EM) and Premium Subsidies (Sub), as parameterized in Section 1.8.2.
The important finding from Column (2) is that, under the ACA, our model predicts
that there would be significant reduction in the uninsured rate relative to the benchmark:
the uninsured rate under ACA is predicted to be about 7.27% in contrast to 20.12%
under the benchmark. While this is certainly a significant reduction in the uninsured
rate, it should be noted that it is still far from universal coverage. It is also interesting to
note that the 7.27% uninsured population are all healthy and are employed workers who
belong to middle income level so that premium subsidies to them are relatively small.
They apparently prefers paying the penalty associated with not meeting the individual
mandate than purchasing insurance from the exchange.
A major reason for the reduction of uninsured rate under the ACA is that 9.65% of
the employed workers purchase insurance from the exchange. This, coupled with the fact
that in our counterfactual model all unemployed workers (3.20%) will purchase from the
exchange as well because they will receive the insurance for free due to their low income at
unemployment, accounts for almost all the reductions in the uninsured rate. Interestingly,
we find in Panel A that the ACA would slightly reduce the fraction of active firms that
offer health insurance from 55.81% to 54.86%. However, we find that, as a result of
employer mandate penalty for firms with more than 50 workers, such firms significantly
increase the probability that they offer health insurance to their workers from 91.13% in
the benchmark to 99.93% under the ACA; in contrast, the probability that firms with less
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than 50 workers offer health insurance is reduced from 52% in the benchmark to 50.39%
under the ACA.
We find that ACA leads to a reduction in average labor productivity and worker wages.
This is related to the changes in the size distribution of firms: fewer workers are employed
in larger, more productive, firms under the ACA. In Panel B we also report that ACA
improves the health of the workers overall: the fraction of healthy workers increases from
94.94% to 95.92%. We find that the fraction of employed workers in firms with 50 or more
workers decreases from 61.42% in the benchmark to 59.4% under the ACA. We also find
that workers’ CEV is $6,133 under the ACA, lower than the benchmark of $6,152.
In Panel C, we report the effect of ACA on expenditure related variables. First,
because a smaller fraction of firms offer health insurance under the ACA, and because
health insurance premium is not subject to income taxation, the tax expenditure due to
ESHI premium exemption is reduced somewhat from $84 per capita in the benchmark
to $83 under ACA. The government also incurs on average $34 per capita subsidies to
health insurance purchases from the exchange; however, the revenue from penalties from
individuals who decide to go without insurance or firms with 50 or more workers which
do not offer health insurance is also about $10 per capita. Because of the reduction in
the uninsured rate, there is about a 8% increase in the average medical expenditure.
Interestingly, the average four-month premium in ESHI is slightly reduced from $306
in the benchmark to $301 under the ACA; this reduction is partly due to the improved
health of the population under the ACA. We also find that the four-month premium in
the exchange is about $439, which is significantly higher than the average ESHI premium
due to the severe adverse selection problem in the exchange.
ACA without the Individual Mandate. In Column (3), we report simulation results
from a hypothetical environment of ACA without the individual mandate, i.e. only EX,
Sub and EM components of ACA are implemented. This would correspond to the case
had the Supreme Court ruled against the constitutionality of the individual mandate.
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Surprisingly, we find that ACA without the individual mandate would also have
achieved significant reduction in the uninsured rate. In Panel B, we show that the unin-
sured rate under “EX+Sub+EM” would be about 12.18%, which is 4.91 percentage points
higher than under the ACA, but still represent close to 39% reduction from the 20.12%
uninsured rate predicted in the benchmark. The reason for the sizeable reduction in the
uninsured rate despite the absence of individual mandate is the premium subsides. Indi-
viduals are risk averse so they would like to purchase insurance if the amount of premium
they need to pay out of pocket is sufficiently small, which is true for many workers in
low-wage firms that do not offer health insurance. Those workers who work in firms with
medium-wages but do not offer health insurance turn out to be those workers who decide
to pay the penalty and go without health insurance, if they are healthy. Notice that
the fraction of employed workers who purchase health insurance from the exchange is
significantly lower in “EX+Sub+EM” (Column 3) than under the full ACA (Column 2):
only 4.82% of the employed workers have insurance from the exchange in “EX+Sub+EM”
while 9.65% do so under the ACA. This further intensifies the adverse selection problem
in the exchange, leading to a substantial increases in the premium in the exchange (from
$439 under the ACA to $595 in “EX+Sub+EM”). Interestingly, because of the premium
increase, the per capita premium subsidy is $38, higher than the $34 per capita amount
under the ACA, despite the decrease in the number of participants in exchange.
Note that the average worker lifetime utility in CEV is $6,164 under ACA without
individual mandate, which is higher than that under the full ACA and that under the
benchmark.
ACA without Employer Mandate. In Column (4), we report the result from a
hypothetical environment of ACA without the employer mandate. This would roughly
correspond to a health care system in the spirit of what is implemented in Netherlands
and Switzerland where individuals are mandated to purchase insurance from the private
insurance market, employers are not required to offer health insurance to their workers,
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and government subsides health care for the poor on a graduated basis.47
We find that, surprisingly, such a system without employer mandate would actually
lead to an even lower uninsured rate than the full version of ACA. We find that the
uninsured rate under this “EX+Sub+IM” system would be about 6.44%, lower than the
7.27% uninsured rate predicted under the full ACA. Because there is no size-dependent
employer mandates, firms do not have to reduce their size to less than 50 in order to
avoid paying penalties.48 Indeed, the fraction of employed workers in firms with 50 or
more workers is 60.96% under this “EX+Sub+IM” system, somewhat higher than 59.40%
under the ACA.
We also find that more individuals obtain health insurance from insurance exchange.
The premium in the exchange decreases from $439 under the full ACA to $427 under this
“EX+Sub+IM” system. Furthermore, the workers’ average lifetime utility measured by
CEV is higher than under the full ACA.
To understand why the employer mandate on large firms might increase the uninsured
rate, it is important to recognize that the employer mandate has the following two ef-
fects. First, since the mandate increases the health insurance offer rate of large firms,
it improves the overall health composition of the population. However, through labor
market transitions, the workers hired at large firms may return to unemployment (due
to exogenous separation) and subsequently find jobs at small firms that may not offer
health insurance. Since these workers are healthier, the health composition of potential
entrants in insurance exchange improves, which alleviates the adverse selection problem
in the insurance exchange. This externality from employer mandate contributes to an
increase of the participants in exchange, lowering uninsured rate.
However, there is a second countervailing effect. The size-dependent employer man-
47Strictly speaking, the Swiss health care system expressly forbids employers from providing basic
social health insurance as a benefit of employment, though employers can provide supplemental health
insurance to their workers. See Fijolek (2012, p.8) for a descriptioin.
48Indeed, we find a probability mass of firms (2.12%) with size just below the mandate threshold of 50
under the ACA. The probability mass disappears under the “EX+Sub+IM” system.
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date indeed increases the health insurance offering by large and high-productivity firms.
However, small firms’ incentive to offer health insurance may be reduced. The reason is
that small firms anticipate that their workers will benefit less from being offered health
insurance. In our model, workers demand health insurance because it not only provides
insurance against the health expenditure shocks in the current period, but also it re-
duces future health expenditure risks since health insurance improves the realization of
future health. If these workers anticipate that they will move to high-productivity firms
offering health insurance with higher probability, the incentives to purchase health insur-
ance in the current period may be lower. This channel may also reduce the incentives of
healthy uninsured workers to participate in insurance exchange. This phenomena, known
as dynamic inefficiency in the literature of insurance markets, may therefore lead small
firms not to offer health insurance, and also lead workers not offered insurance by their
employers to forgo purchasing health insurance from the exchange. Both can lead to
higher uninsured rate. Therefore, the quantitative impact of the size-dependent employer
mandate on overall uninsured rate is nontrivial and can be highly dependent on policy
parameters.
Finally, workers’ lifetime utility is higher under “EX+Sub+IM” system than under
the full ACA for the following reason. Because of the employer mandate in the ACA,
large firms not offering health insurance need to pay penalty. One option to finance
the penalties is to reduce its wage offer. It then has an equilibrium impact on firms
offering health insurance so that they can reduce wage offer to attract workers. Indeed,
in Columns (3) and (4) we see that the average wages of workers with and without health
insurance are both lower under the ACA than under the “EX+Sub+IM” system. This
overall wage decline under the ACA is responsible for the lower worker utility relative to
the “EX+Sub+IM” system.
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1.8.4 Assessing the Effects of Components of the ACA
In Tables 1.13 and 1.14, we report the results from several counterfactual experiments that
are aimed to understand the effects of several components of the ACA. In Columns (1) and
(2) in Table 1.13, we report two equilibria when we introduce only the insurance exchange
to the benchmark economy. In both equilibria, having an exchange alone does little to the
uninsured rate in equilibrium: the equilibrium uninsured rate under this counterfactual
is only slightly lower relative to the benchmark economy. In fact, the exchange will not
have any participants at all due to the adverse selection problem. However, the presence
of the exchange still causes small changes to the labor market, both on the firm side and
on the worker side, because the exchange affects the outside options of the workers’ and
thus affects the firms’ decisions regarding wage and health insurance offering decisions in
equilibrium.
In Column (3) in Table 1.13, we report the results when we introduce health insurance
exchange and health insurance premium subsidies. It shows that the introduction of
premium subsidies and exchange leads to a sizable reduction in the uninsured rate to
about 13.20%. The exchange is quite active with all the unemployed and 5.54% of the
employed workers purchasing insurance from the exchange. However, without employer
mandate, the introduction of exchange and premium subsides also lead to a reduction in
the probabilities of firms offering health insurance to their workers.
In Columns (4) and (5) in Table 1.13, we report the two equilibria when we introduce
health insurance exchange and individual mandate. As in the case of Columns (1) and (2),
the exchange will not have any participants. This indicates that the proposed individual
mandate alone is not sufficiently large enough to solve adverse selection problem in the
insurance exchange. Instead, the individuals mandate leads more employers to offer health
insurance. As a result, uninsured rate is 18.06% in Column (4) and 16.90% in Column
(5). Because there still exists the sizable fraction of uninsured, introducing individual
mandate lowers worker utility relative to an economy with insurance exchange only.
77
In Columns (1) and (2) in Table 1.14, we report the results when we introduce the
health insurance exchange and employer mandate into the benchmark economy. We again
find that the exchange is not active. There is a reduction of the uninsured rate, from
20.12% in the benchmark to 18.82% in Column (1) and to 18.67% in Column (2), but
the declines of the uninsured rate are mostly due to the increased probability of offering
health insurance by firms with 50 or more workers.
In Columns (3) and (4) in Table 1.14, we report the results when we introduce the
ACA without that the income-based premium subsidies. Relative to the full ACA results
reported in Column 2 of Table 2.17, the uninsured rate is about twice as large, 17.14% in
Column (3) and 17.28% in Column (4). Moreover, worker utility is much lower than the
experiments described from Column (1) to Column (5) in Table 1.13 and from Column
(1) and Column (2) in Table 1.14. These results demonstrate that the proposed premium
subsidies are crucial to solve adverse selection problem in the insurance exchange and
contribute importantly to the substantial reduction of uninsured rate achieved under the
full ACA.
1.8.5 Role of Tax Exemption for ESHI Premium
In this section, we describe the results from counterfactual experiments where the tax
exemption status of employer-sponsored health insurance premium is eliminated, both
under the benchmark model and under the ACA. We are interested in these counterfactual
experiments because, given the growing federal deficits in the United States, reducing tax
expenditures - tax exemption for ESHI premium being one of the major tax expenditure
categories – has been mentioned in several prominent reports.49
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 1.15 report the same simulation results for the benchmark
and the ACA as reported in Table 1.12 under the current tax exemption status for ESHI
premium. In Column (2), we remove the tax exemption for ESHI under the benchmark
49See, for example, National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (2010).
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economy. We find that removing the tax exemption increase the uninsured rate from
20.12% to 23.39%. It leads to an increase in average wage for workers, and a deterioration
of workers’ health.
In Column (4), we remove the tax exemption for ESHI under ACA. We find that
removing the tax exemption increase the uninsured rate from 7.27% to 9.15%. These
differences are driven by the fact that under the ACA, workers who do not receive health
insurance from their employers would have to purchase health insurance from the exchange
or pay a penalty. Overall, our findings show that eliminating the tax exemption status
for ESHI premium will increase the uninsured rate, both under the benchmark and under
the ACA, but the impact is not sufficient to lead to the collapse of the ESHI.
In fact, in Table 1.15, we report that even without the tax exemption for ESHI pre-
mium, a substantial fraction of the firms will choose to offer health insurance to their
workers, both in the benchmark economy and under the ACA. In the benchmark econ-
omy, we find that 54.19% of the firms will offer health insurance to their workers when
ESHI premium is no longer exempt from income taxation; this is only slightly lower than
55.58% when ESHI premium is exempt from income taxation. Similarly, 52.90% of the
firms will offer health insurance to their workers under the ACA when ESHI premium is
not exempt from income taxation, which is again only slightly lower than 54.86% with
exemption. There are several reasons that firms have strong incentives to offer health
insurance to their workers in our economy. First, workers are risk averse and firms are
risk neutral; thus firms can enjoy the risk premium by offering health insurance to their
workers. Second, health insurance improves health and healthy workers are more produc-
tive. Thus firms, particularly those with higher productivity, will have incentives to offer
health insurance to their workers so that their workforce will be healthier and thus more
productive. This mechanism is illustrated in Table 1.2.
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1.8.6 Other Counterfactual Experiments
In this section, we describe the results from several additional counterfactual policy ex-
periments.
The Role of Individual Mandate Penalty
Recall that in Columns (4) and (5) in Table 1.13 we considered a counterfactual economy
where we introduce only insurance exchange and individual mandate to the benchmark
economy and we found that the uninsured rate would be 16.90% or 18.82% depending on
equilibrium selection. Here we investigate how high the penalties for not having health
insurance need to be in order to achieve universal coverage with only exchange and indi-
vidual mandate. This experiment allows us to understand the impact of the strictness of
individual mandate on the uninsured rate. To do so, we modify the formula of individual
mandate to:
PW (y) = max

0.025× (
CPI Med 1996
CPI All 1996 )
(CPI Med 2011CPI All 2011 )
× (y − 1
3
TFT 2011× CPI All 1996
CPI All 2011
)
, P ∗

where P ∗ is the amount of penalty under which the economy achieves universal coverage.
Note that in this economy we might encounter multiple equilibria; and in this exercise,
we search for the minimum level of P ∗ that yields a unique equilibrium with full coverage.
We find that if P ∗ is set to
P ∗ = 15× 1
3
× $695× CPI Med 1996
CPI Med 2011
≈ $1785,
which is 15 times as large as the proposed penalty in the ACA, the economy achieves the
universal coverage.
The main results for this counterfactual economy (IM + EX) with an individual man-
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date penalty 15 times as large as in the ACA are reported in Column (1) of Table 1.16.
We find a substantial reduction of coverage rate by large firms relative to the benchmark
economy; instead, 30.52% of employed workers obtain health insurance from insurance
exchange, which is much higher than under the full ACA. While the premium in the ex-
change is still higher than the average ESHI premium, some firms choose not offer health
insurance because the strong presence of the insurance exchange increases the workers’
outside option and thus limits the degree in which firms can extract the risk premium
from workers’ wages by offering health insurance. Moreover, because all individuals are
insured, the fraction of healthy workers increases, and as a result the average labor pro-
ductivity increases. Also, because workers are now all insured and their wages are higher,
worker utility increases relative to the benchmark economy.
ACA without the Individual Mandate: How Much Additional Subsidies Are
Needed?
One of the major criticisms to the ACA has been the presence of individual mandate. As
we demonstrate in Columns (2) and (3) of Table 1.12, eliminating the individual mandate
from the ACA leads to an uninsured rate that is 4.91 percentage points higher than that
under the ACA. An interesting question is, how much additional premium subsidies are
needed to achieve the uninsured rate similar to under the ACA? To answer the question, we
consider that, in addition to the proposed premium subsidies, the government provides a
flat subsidy to any employed workers who choose to participate in the insurance exchange.
We find that if the government offers a four-month subsidy of $135, the uninsured rate
decreases to 7.52%, close to that under the full ACA. However, the per capita subsidies to
exchange purchases increase from $38 to $51, which is higher than the $34 amount under
the ACA. All the results are in Column (2) of Table 1.16.
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Massachusetts Health Care Reform
Next, we examine Massachusetts (MA) Health Care Reform implemented in 2006. It is
well known that the ACA is based on the MA reform and there are strong similarities
between them. However, employer mandate is implemented somewhat differently from
the ACA, so is the premium subsidy. In this section, we investigate what happens if the
government follows exactly the same reform as that in the MA.
To parametrize the MA reform, we consider the following stylized version of the reform
as described in Kolstad and Kowalski (2012c).
Individual Mandates. We assume that it is the same as the ACA.50
Employer Mandates. Firms with more than 10 workers are subject to the penalty tax
if they do not offer health insurance. The amount of penalty is equal to $295 times the
number of full time employees. By using the same argument for the parameterization in
the ACA, we parameterize it as follows: for firms with more than 10 workers, the amount
of penalty, PMAE (n), is
PMAE (n) =
1
3
[
n× $295× CPI Med 1996
CPI Med 2011
]
.
Premium Subsidies to Exchange Participants. As in the ACA, the income based
subsidies are available to individuals participating in insurance exchange. However, it is
available to individuals whose income is less than 300% FPL (FPL300). Therefore, we
50Note that the actual policy taken in MA was that penalty is equal to a half of premium of the least
generous qualifying plan.
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parameterize it as:
S
(
y,REX
)
=

max
 R
EX −
[
0.0350 + 0.060 (3y−FPL133)FPL300−FPL133
]
y
×CPI Med 1996CPI Med 2011 , 0
 if y < FPL3003
REX if unemployed
0, otherwise,
(1.56)
Findings. The main result is Column (3) in Table 1.16. We find that the uninsured rate
is 5.29% under the MA reform, which is lower than the 7.27% under the ACA. Because
employer mandate is imposed more uniformly across firms, the positive externalities from
the health improvement of workers insured by their firms are larger than under the ACA,
which leads to lower premium in the exchange ($411 under the MA reform vs. $439 under
the ACA), as well as that in the ESHI market. Both contributed to a lower uninsured
rate. Worker utility in CEV is $6,146, again higher than under the ACA. These findings
are qualitatively consistent with Kolstad and Kowalski (2012c).
No Employer Sponsored Health Insurance Market
In Columns (4) and (5), we investigate the effects of eliminating employer sponsored health
insurance market. In Column (4), we report the results from an experiment where we
prohibit firms from offering ESHI, but instead we introduce the health insurance exchange,
individual mandate and premium subsidies as stipulated in the ACA. We find a rather
drastic change in the outcomes. Only 20.65% of firms are in operation, compared with
98.72% in the benchmark economy. Unemployment rate also increase to 16.62% from
3.22% in the benchmark economy. Uninsured rate is 58.96%, which is more than twice
as large as the one in the benchmark economy. Insurance premium in exchange is $603,
higher than under the full ACA. It thus indicates that if there is no employer sponsored
health insurance market, the proposed subsidies and individual mandate are not large
enough to solve adverse selection problem in insurance exchange. This result suggests
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that ESHI allows low productive firms to be active in the market because they can exploit
the workers’ risk premium.
The next question we investigate is, is it possible to achieve universal coverage when
ESHI is eliminated by increasing the individual mandate penalty amount? The results
are reported in Column (5). We find that, if we set the penalty of not having insurance
to be 2.5% of income, or $1,390 (i.e. twice the amount of penalty in the ACA), it leads
to the full coverage. The main outcomes are reported in Column (5) of 1.16. Relative to
Column (4), it achieves much lower unemployment rate and higher worker utility. Labor
productivity decreases because less productive firms enter more into the labor market.
More interestingly, it also achieves the substantial reduction in premium subsidies. This
is due to the reduction of the unemployed who receive the full premium subsidies, and
the decrease of premium itself.
1.9 Conclusion
We present and empirically implement an equilibrium labor market search model where
risk averse workers facing medical expenditure shocks are matched with employers making
health insurance coverage decisions. The distributions of wages, health insurance provi-
sions, employer size, employment and worker’s health are all endogenously determined in
equilibrium. We estimate our model using various micro data sources including the 1996
panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the Medical Expendi-
ture Panel Survey (MEPS, 1997-1999) and the 1997 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
Employer Health Insurance Survey. The equilibrium of our estimated model is largely
consistent with the dynamics of the workers’ labor market experience, health, health in-
surance and medical expenditure, as well as the distributions of employer sizes in the
data.
We use our estimated model to examine the impact of the key components of the 2010
Affordable Care Act (ACA), including the individual mandate, the employer mandate, the
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insurance exchange and the income-based insurance premium subsidy, as well as various
combinations of these ACA components.
We find that the implementation of the full version of the ACA would significantly
reduced the uninsured rate from 20.12% in the benchmark economy to 7.27%. This large
reduction of the uninsured rate is mainly driven by low-wage workers participating in the
insurance exchange with their premium supported by the income-based subsidies. We
find that, if the subsidies were removed from the ACA, the insurance exchange will suffer
from severe adverse selection problem so it is not active at all, though the presence of
the exchange still leads to a small reduction of the uninsured rate from 20.12% in the
benchmark to 17.14-17.28% under “ACA without the subsidies.”
We find that the ACA would also have achieved significant reduction in the uninsured
rate if its individual mandate component were removed. We find in our simulation that
under “ACA without individual mandate”, the uninsured rate would be 12.18%, signifi-
cantly lower than the 20.12% under the benchmark. The premium subsidy component of
the ACA would have in itself drawn all the unemployed (healthy or unhealthy) and the
low-wage employed (again both healthy and unhealthy) in the insurance exchange.
Interestingly, we find that the current version of ACA without employer mandate may
be more efficient than the one with employer mandate. The latter achieves higher average
productivity, higher worker’s average utility, higher average wage, and similar government
spending.
We also simulate the effects of eliminating the tax exemption for employer-sponsored
health insurance (ESHI) premium both under the benchmark and under the ACA. We
find that, while the elimination of the tax exemption for ESHI premium would reduce
the probability of all firms, especially the larger ones, offering health insurance to their
workers, the overall effect on the uninsured rate is rather modest. We find that in the
benchmark economy the uninsured rate would increase from 20.12% to 23.39% when the
ESHI tax exemption is removed; and it will increase from 7.27% to 9.15% under the ACA.
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Finally, we find that prohibiting firms from ESHI would lead to a huge reduction on
the fraction of active firms in the labor market. This result suggests that ESHI allows
low productive firms to be active in the market because they can exploit the workers’ risk
premium.
We should emphasize that our study is only a first step toward understanding the
mechanism through which the ACA, and more generally any health insurance reform,
may influence labor markets equilibrium. We estimated our model using a selected sam-
ple of individuals with relatively homogeneous skills (men with no more than high school
graduation between ages 26-46), and thus our quantitative findings may only be valid for
this population. Thus the quantitative results we present in this study should be under-
stood with these qualifications in mind. However, we believe that the various channels
we uncovered in this study through which components of ACA interact with the labor
market and with each other are of importance even in richer models.
There are many areas for future research. First and foremost, it will be important
to introduce richer worker heterogeneity in the equilibrium labor market model; it is
also important to endogenize health care decisions, and incorporate workers’ life-cycle
considerations. Incorporating Medicaid, the free public health insurance for the poor,
into a model with endogenous asset accumulation decisions is also an important direction.
Finally, there are many additional channels through which firms and workers might have
responded to individual mandates and employer mandates that we abstracted in this
study. We plan to address those issues in our future research.
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Chapter 2
Health Insurance Exchange Design
in an Empirical Equilibrium Labor
Market Model
2.1 Introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) represents the most
significant health care reform in the United States in the past 40 years. The proposal and
passage of the ACA was driven by the fact that close to 20% of the U.S. population does
not have health insurance. Under the pre-ACA system, individuals tend to be uninsured
if their family heads do not work at firms offering health insurance through employer
sponsored health insurance (ESHI).1 Among the uninsured, 80% are employed, but most
of them are not offered health insurance by their employer; the remaining 20% are not
employed. Although many provisions of the ACA will take effect starting in 2014, one of
the most important provisions is the establishment of health insurance exchanges (HIX).
HIX are individual insurance markets where insurance plans cannot price or deny coverage
1Roughly 60% of the non-elderly have ESHI. Also, 10% of worker compensation consists of ESHI
premia (Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust (2009)).
89
based on preexisting conditions.2 A core idea of the ACA is to let the uninsured purchase
health insurance from HIX. To provide individuals with incentives to participate in HIX,
the ACA includes features such as individual mandates (a tax penalty on the uninsured),
premium subsidies and an age-based rating.3’4 Although the desirability of these features
has been discussed extensively in policy debates, there have been few studies evaluating
the current HIX system or examining the possibility of alternative designs that improve
welfare.
To examine the welfare impact of HIX design, a number of issues need to be addressed.
First, HIX may be subject to adverse selection due to the prohibition of pricing based on
preexisting conditions. This prohibition, by attracting disproportionally more unhealthy
individuals, may cause healthy individuals to remain uninsured and incur the tax penalty
rather than pay an actuarially unfair (higher) premium. Second, HIX interacts with the
labor market due to the presence of ESHI. Individual health insurance purchase decisions
in HIX, the key decisions affecting the extent of adverse selection, depend on the avail-
ability of ESHI, an outcome endogenously determined in the labor market. HIX may
also affect worker labor supply and job mobility decisions, as well as firm decisions about
offering ESHI.
In this study, I evaluate the current HIX system and consider the question of its op-
timal design, accounting for adverse selection and equilibrium labor market interactions.
First, I develop and empirically implement a life cycle equilibrium labor market search
model integrated with the pre-ACA health insurance market. Various forms of individ-
ual heterogeneity are incorporated to understand the heterogeneous welfare consequences
of HIX. Second, using the estimated model, I investigate the impact of HIX, as imple-
mented under the ACA, on individuals with different characteristics and the aggregate
2Health insurance exchanges are also known as health insurance marketplaces.
3Other important components of the ACA affecting the uninsured rate are Medicaid expansion and
employer mandate (a tax penlty to large firms not providing coverage); these will be incorporated in my
analysis as well.
4In the text of the ACA, individual (employer) mandates are formally referred to as individual (em-
ployer) shared responsibility.
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consequences. Understanding these responses is necessary to conduct the welfare anal-
ysis. Third, I conduct a normative analysis. I examine the optimal design of HIX by
finding, subject to the ACA’s government revenue constraint, the values of three major
design components that maximize a utilitarian social welfare function–tax penalties on
the uninsured, premium subsidies and age-based rating regulations.5
The benchmark model is designed to explain key patterns among health, health insur-
ance and labor market outcomes observed in the pre-ACA economy. It builds on several
strands of literature. First, it builds on a growing literature of empirical life cycle mod-
els of labor supply and health (for example, Rust and Phelan (1997); Blau and Gilleskie
(2008); Khwaja (2010); French and Jones (2011), Papageorge (2012), among others). Sec-
ond, it builds on the small literature on equilibrium search models with endogenous ESHI
provision (Dey and Flinn (2005); Bruegemann and Manovskii (2010); Aizawa and Fang
(2013)).
In the model, individuals make health care utilization, labor supply and job mobility
decisions over the life cycle. In each period, health status affects current period utility, the
distribution of latent medical expenditure shocks and labor productivity. Health status is
influenced by health care utilization, which takes into account its impact on future health
status and its cost. Medical expenditure risk is insured if individuals are covered by health
insurance. Health insurance may be offered by firms as part of compensation. In the labor
market, both non-employed and employed workers meet firms randomly and then decide
whether to accept a job offer based on the compensation package, which consists of a wage
and an ESHI offering. Employed workers accumulate work experience, which increases
their stock of skills. Finally, individuals differ by education and unobserved type, the
latter being a determinant of risk preference, initial labor market skill, and the evolution
of health status.
5The rationale of these policies in insurance markets with adverse selection has been extensively studied
in public economics literature. See Einav, Finkelstein, and Levin (2010b) and Einav and Finkelstein
(2011) for the survey.
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Firms, which differ by their productivity, determine compensation packages to max-
imize their steady state flow profit. To account for various anti-discrimination laws re-
stricting their choice of compensation package, I assume that firms set their wage offers by
choosing a skill price subject to the constraint that the health cannot be priced, and de-
cide whether to offer health insurance to all employees or not.6 Therefore, their coverage
decisions are made to take into account the impact on the composition of workers having
different characteristics within the firm. Moreover, I assume that health insurance costs
are tax-deductible. I characterize a steady-state equilibrium where economic decisions by
workers and firms are simultaneously determined.
The model features various forms of individual heterogeneity, both observed and un-
observed, to understand the welfare consequences of HIX. I incorporate life cycle decision-
making and skill characteristics because the major components of HIX design (individual
mandates, premium subsidies and age-based rating regulation) vary by age and income. I
also incorporate heterogeneity in health risk and risk preference, because those character-
istics are known to be important determinants of health insurance purchasing decisions.7
Moreover, all of these characteristics impact the worker’s and the firm’s responses to the
design of HIX. Individuals of different ages and skills change their labor supply and job
mobility decisions differently because premia and subsidies in HIX vary by a worker’s
age and income. Also, individual heterogeneity impacts the firm’s decision about offer-
ing ESHI given that it is affected by the composition of the firm’s workforce. Although
incorporating various life cycle dimensions of individuals into an equilibrium labor mar-
ket search model substantially complicates the analysis, the model is still numerically
tractable under my approach to solve the firm’s compensation package, using techniques
6Existing anti-discrimination laws in the U.S. prohibit compensation packages from being based on
age and health. Starting in 2014, firms are also prohibited firms from offering different sets of health
plans to full-time employees with different income levels. Also, if ESHI is offered, workers cannot obtain
premium subsidies from HIX unless the premium contribution of the ESHI plan for singles exceeds 9.5%
of annual income. While part-time workers can obtain premium subsidies regardless of the ESHI offering,
this study considers a demographic group that consists of few part-time workers.
7See Chetty and Finkelstein (2012) for an extensive review of the findings in the literature of empirical
insurance markets.
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that are an extension of Barlevy (2008), Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles (2011) and
Bagger, Fontaine, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2013).
I estimate the model using three data sources: the 2004 Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), the 2004-2007 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), and
the Kaiser Family 2004-2007 Employer Health Insurance Benefit Survey (Kaiser). The
first two are panel data sets on worker-side labor market, health, health insurance, and
medical expenditure, while the third is a cross-sectional firm-level data set containing
information about firms’ characteristics and health insurance coverage. Worker-side data
shows that individual health insurance coverage status is positively correlated with wages,
education status, and age. Firm-side data shows that large firms tend to offer ESHI.
Estimation is carried out via the method of simulated moments. The model fits worker-
side moments such as health insurance, wage, employment, health, medical expenditure
and their transitions over age profiles and education status, as well as firm-side moments
such as the coverage rate and the size distribution.
The model estimates show that high-productivity firms are more likely to offer ESHI,
which can be understood as follows. In the model, although firms want to attract more
productive workers, high productivity firms are more likely to attract them because they
can offer greater compensation. These more productive workers are typically experienced
workers, who tend to be older and thus have a higher demand for health insurance.
They also are more educated workers. From my estimates, educated workers are more
risk-averse and have a higher demand for health insurance than less educated workers.
The consequence of sorting of workers with high health insurance demand leads high-
productivity firms to offer ESHI. This mechanism, although intuitive but generally ignored
in the literature, simultaneously explains positive correlations among worker age, wage,
education status, and health insurance coverage and also between firm size and health
insurance coverage.
In counterfactual experiments, I introduce HIX to the pre-ACA economy as a compet-
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itive individual insurance market where individuals can purchase health insurance. More-
over, I incorporate other important features of the ACA, including employer mandate and
Medicaid expansion. I first investigate the impact of the ACA. The key features of the
ACA’s design for HIX are as follows. First, the tax penalty imposed on the uninsured
increases with their income. Second, premium subsidies decrease with income. Third, the
age-based rating regulation is such that the maximum allowable premium ratio (MPR)
between the oldest and the youngest is 3.8
I find that the ACA decreases the uninsured rate in my estimation sample from 23.6%
to 7.8%, where the remaining uninsured are mainly young employed workers who are
healthy. Compared with them, the population of individuals purchasing health insurance
from HIX consists of the sicker and older individuals. It therefore indicates the presence of
adverse selection. The decrease in the uninsured rate leads to an increase in the fraction of
healthy individuals, by 1 percentage point, as insured individuals tend to take health care
utilization whenever they are hit by medical expenditure shocks relative to the uninsured.
Although the fraction of healthy individuals increases, and healthy individuals are
more productive, I find that the steady state level of aggregate labor productivity decreases
by 0.6%. This result arises because more workers are allocated to low productivity firms.
The main channel is the inability of firms to make ESHI offerings separately for each
employee and to provide the opportunity for employees to choose the source of coverage
(i.e., from HIX or ESHI). If firms offer ESHI, their employees lose the opportunity to
purchase subsidized health insurance from HIX. This makes accepting a job offer from
a firm offering ESHI less attractive to older and less skilled workers, who can purchase
health insurance at the lower cost given the ACA’s design of premium subsidies and
rating regulations. Those workers prefer not to move to high productivity jobs offering
ESHI unless these jobs offer a high wage. As a result, more workers are allocated to low
productivity firms. This decline of labor productivity contributes to a decrease in output
8The exact specification of HIX designs and other components in the ACA (employer mandate and
Medicaid expansion) modeled in the study is in section 2.6.
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per capita. Although the ACA increases the employment rate by 0.4 percentage point
due to the increase in the fraction of healthy individuals, output per capita decreases by
0.2%.
Next, I investigate the optimal design of HIX, which maximizes social welfare subject
to the ACA’s government revenue constraint. I allow the government to optimally set
the age-based rating regulation, which determines the maximum premium ratio (MPR)
between the oldest and the youngest, and the premium subsidies and tax penalties to the
uninsured as nonlinear functions of age and income. I find that the optimal combination
of these policies increases aggregate labor productivity by 0.5% relative to the ACA while
achieving a slightly lower level of the uninsured rate, 7.6% under the optimal HIX. To
achieve the same welfare under HIX implemented by the ACA, the government needs to
provide an annual lump-sum transfer to individuals amounting to $195 per year, which
corresponds to 7.6% of medical expenditure. The optimal structure makes it less beneficial
for old workers relative to young workers to purchase health insurance from HIX by setting
larger MPR and subsidies that decrease with age, rather than age-independent subsidies
as in the ACA. In this structure, the adverse selection problem among the young is
partially resolved. Moreover, it gives older workers an incentive to work at firms offering
ESHI. This increases the allocation of workers from low to high productivity firms, raising
aggregate labor productivity.
Finally, I assess the importance of modeling equilibrium labor market interactions to
evaluate the design of HIX. I assume that firm’s compensation package is exogenously
determined and the same as the one under the pre-ACA economy. Then, I evaluate the
impact of each component of HIX, as well as the optimal design of HIX. I find that
both are qualitatively and quantitatively very different from the one with endogenous
compensation packages. This finding suggests the importance of modeling equilibrium
labor market interactions to evaluate the design of HIX.
95
The related literature. This study is related to several strands of literature. First of
all, it belongs to a new and growing literature evaluating the impact of the ACA. Ericson
and Starc (2012), Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski (2013) and Handel et al. (2013)
develop an equilibrium model of HIX with adverse selection and examine HIX designs.9
Ericson and Starc (2012) study the role of imperfect competition in the Massachusetts
(MA) unsubsidized health insurance exchanges established due to the 2006 MA health
care reform which has many features in common with the ACA, while Hackmann, Kol-
stad, and Kowalski (2013) investigate the extent of adverse selection and the optimal
individual mandate in those exchanges. Handel et al. (2013) examine equilibria when
multiple insurance products can be traded in the competitive insurance market. As in
this study, these studies investigate the efficacy of individual mandates, premium subsi-
dies, and age-based rating regulations. The common assumption of these studies is that
individuals have access to HIX only and therefore they do not consider equilibrium labor
market interactions.
Aizawa and Fang (2013) study the labor market effects of the ACA, arguing that ex-
plicit modeling of the labor market equilibrium is crucial to evaluate the ACA.10 They
examine the impact of the ACA under the setting where workers are infinitely lived and
homogeneous except in health. I advance this research agenda in a number of directions.
First and most importantly, I shift the focus to the normative analysis, especially the
optimal design of HIX, which requires modeling individual life cycle decisions and hetero-
geneity. Although incorporating these features into an equilibrium labor market search
model substantially complicates the framework, I show how to maintain the tractability of
analyses. Second, I show how equilibrium effects of HIX interact with individual hetero-
geneity. In particular, because the current HIX system forces a partial pooling between
young and old individuals, the impact of the ACA on individuals with different ages differs
9See Bundorf, Levin, and Mahoney (2012a) and Geruso (2012) for studying premium rating within
employers.
10See Pohl (2012) and Hai (2013) for an evaluation of Medicaid expansion.
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substantially. Third, I show that the optimal structure of HIX consists of age-dependent
policies.
The welfare analysis conducted in this chapter is also related to Kolstad and Kowalski
(2012c), who evaluate the welfare impact of the 2006 MA health care reform by focusing
on labor market distortions.11 This study has a number of important differences from
theirs: First, theirs is based on the sufficient statistic approach which allows to conduct
a welfare analysis using difference-in-difference identification strategy. This approach
requires both pre- and post-reform data, the latter being not available for the ACA at
present. Second, while they consider labor market distortions in terms of the level of
employment and wages, my study also takes into account distortions arising from the
misallocation of workers. Third, while they examine welfare costs from the labor market
distortion alone, my welfare analysis considers both the labor market and HIX together.12
My focus on the general equilibrium effects of HIX design is also related to studies
assessing the macroeconomic impacts of ACA (Bruegemann and Manovskii (2010), Ozkan
(2011), Cole, Kim, and Krueger (2012), Hansen, Hsu, and Lee (2012), Pashchenko and
Porapakkarm (2013), and others). Although their models are richer than mine in certain
dimensions (e.g., saving and capital accumulation), my study complements theirs by en-
dogenizing firm coverage decisions and allowing both individual and firm heterogeneity,
which play an important role in characterizing the optimal design of HIX.
Second, this study is also related to a large literature investigating the link between
health insurance systems and labor markets, early contributions of which are reviewed by
Currie and Madrian (1999) and Gruber (2000). A main topic in this literature has been
whether the existing employer based health insurance system leads to an inefficient sorting
of workers across firms, known as job lock and job push problems. Among them, Dey
11See also Finkelstein, Taubman, Wright, Bernstein, Gruber, Newhouse, Allen, Baicker, and the Oregon
Health Study Group (2012), Baicker, Finkelstein, Song, and Taubman (2013) and Garthwaite, Gross, and
Notowidigdo (2013) for an evaluation of the impact of Medicaid on health and labor supply by focusing
on recent Oregon Medicaid experiments and Tennessee Medicaid reform.
12See also Mulligan (2013b) and Mulligan (2013a) who argue that the ACA may distort labor markets
because it imposes large marginal tax rates.
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and Flinn (2005) is the closest to my study.13 They develop a search-matching-bargaining
model with endogenous ESHI provisions and quantify the extent of job lock and job push
in the pre-ACA economy. This study extends their approach and shows that HIX causes
additional inefficiency in worker allocation.
Finally, this study is methodologically related to several branches of the labor and
public finance literature. The empirical approach is closely related to the literature on
structural estimation of equilibrium search allowing worker heterogeneity. Recently, Bag-
ger, Fontaine, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2013) estimate an equilibrium search model with
two sided heterogeneity, allowing for individual human capital accumulation.14 This study
adds to the literature by fitting various additional worker life cycle economic events and
decisions within an empirical equilibrium labor market search model. My focus on how
a certain institution affects labor productivity through worker reallocation is also related
to Gourio and Roys (2012) and Garicano, LeLarge, and Van Reenen (2013), who empiri-
cally study the impact of regulations in France that are dependent on firm-size on worker
reallocation and labor productivity. My empirical welfare analysis is related to the liter-
ature studying optimal insurance and taxation policies, including Einav et al. (2010c) for
optimal mandates in annuity markets, and also Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) and
Blundell and Shephard (2012) for optimal taxation. Finally, my welfare analysis about
age- and income-based pricing and subsidies is related to the optimal taxation literature
studying the role of tagging (e.g., Akerlof (1978); Michelacci and Ruffo (2011); Weinzierl
(2011); Farhi and Werning (2013)).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the pre-ACA
model of this study; Section 2.3 describes the data sets; Section 2.4 explains my estimation
strategy; Section 2.5 presents my estimation results; Section 2.6 describes the main results
13See Fang and Gavazza (2011), a study of the link between ESHI systems and life-cycle medical ex-
penditure. Lang (2010) and Dizioli and Pinheiro (2012) theoretically study incentives of ESHI provisions.
14Shephard (2012) also estimates a two-sided heterogenous version of Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
model, but worker heterogeneity is assumed to be a permanent characteristic. See also Yamaguchi (2010)
for an estimation of search-matching-bargaining model with endogenous human capital accumulation.
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from evaluating the ACA and the components of HIX; Section 2.7 shows the main results
from evaluating the ACA and the current HIX system; Section 2.8 concludes and discuss
directions for future research.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Environment
In this section, I first lay out an economic environment for the benchmark model, i.e., the
model of the pre-ACA economy, which I use for estimation. Time is discrete and measured
in periods of four months.15 Consider an economy populated with a continuum of workers
with a measure M > 0 and a continuum of employers with a measure normalized to 1.
They are randomly matched in a frictional labor market. Each worker lives for a finite
horizon t = t0, . . . , T, while employers exist infinitely. I use β ∈ (0, 1) to denote the
discount factor. Each worker makes health care, labor supply and job mobility decisions
up to the period T . Then, they exogenously retire from the labor market and are replaced
by newborn workers. Upon entering the labor market, the new workers are initially
heterogeneous with respect to their education status ed which is either college graduate
(C) or non-college graduate (NC) and with respect to their time-invariant type type ∈
{type1, type2}, the latter of which is a determinant of individual preference, labor market
skills, and health transitions.16
Individual preference
Each individual has time-separable, expected-utility preferences, which are defined over
consumption Cit; employment status Pit ∈ {0, 1}, which takes a value of 1 if he is employed
and 0 if he is not employed; and health status hit ∈ {H,U}, which takes on value H if
15My choice of four months as a unit of time is motivated by the construction of data sets. See Section
2.3 for details.
16As is common with many empirical life cycle labor supply models, type will be treated as heteroge-
neous and unobserved by the econometrician in the empirical part of this study.
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he is healthy and U if he is unhealthy. Let Ut(Cit, Pit, hit; type) be the period utility for
individuals with time-invariant type type, which takes the following functional form:
Ut(Ct, Pt, ht; type) = exp(−γtypeCt)− ηptPt
− ηtypeh I(ht = U)− ηhptPtI(ht = U)
where γtype is the CARA coefficient, ηpt is the disutility from working which varies with
individual age; ηtypeh is the disutility from being unhealthy U ; and ηhpt is the disutility
of work for an unhealthy individual which varies with individual age. The last term is
incorporated to fit the relationship between health and employment status. I assume that
individuals can neither save nor borrow. The budget constraint of the individual is then
given by
Ct = τw(wt)Pt + (1− Pt)b−OOP INS(xtmt) (2.1)
where τw(wt) is after-tax labor income, b is non-employed income, and OOP
INS(xtmt) is
out-of-pocket expenditure. Out-of-pocket expenditure is a function of period t’s medical
expenditure and health insurance status: xt ∈ {0, 1} is health care choice, mt is latent
medical expenditure shocks, and INS ∈ {0, 1} is health insurance status, where INS = 0
if the individual is uninsured and INS = 1 if the individual is insured through ESHI.
Although it is plausible to allow heterogeneous characteristics of insurance plans, given the
limitation of the data, I assume that insurance is a homogeneous product in the pre-ACA
model. Moreover, I assume that health insurance provides full insurance to individuals.
In addition, I specify that after period T , individuals receive the terminal value, which
is merely a function of health status. The formal specification of the terminal value is
described in Section (2.2.2).
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Health shock and health transition
In each period, a worker is hit by latent medical expenditure shock mt which is a function
of health ht, age (measured in four-month intervals) t, and idiosyncratic shock t. I specify
its functional form as follows:
mt = max{m∗t − κht , 0}
m∗t = exp(ω
ht
1 + ω
ht
2 t+ ω
ht
3 t
2 + mt ),
mt |ht ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2ht),
ht ∈ {H,U}
where m∗t is a latent health shock which is distributed over the log normal distribution;
and t is i.i.d. idiosyncratic shock which is conditionally heteroskedastic with respect to
health status ht. In this specification, I incorporate a parameter κht > 0 which is used
to capture the possibility that individuals do not report any positive medical expense
because they are not hit by a positive amount of latent medical expenditure shocks, i.e.,
they are not hit by health shocks at all. Moreover, note that all of the parameters in the
latent medical expenditure distribution differ according to the beginning of period health
status ht.
Conditional on latent medical expenditure shocks mt, the worker chooses health care
utilization xt ∈ {0, 1}, which affects the realization of the next period health status. The
transition to next period health status is determined by
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Pr[ht+1 = k|xt, ht, mt , t, type]
=
exp
 φ1kmt + φ2kxt + φ3kxtmt + φ4kt
+
∑
φi5k1(ht = i) +
∑
φj6k1(type = j)

∑
k′ exp
 φ1k′mt + φ2k′xt + φ3k′xtmt + φ4k′t
+
∑
φi5k′1(ht = i) +
∑
φj6k′1(type = j)

where 1(type = j) is the dummy variable for individual unobserved type j. It is im-
portant to allow an interaction term between xt and mt. Otherwise, to avoid reducing
consumption, individuals tend to choose no health care utilization when they are hit by
large latent medical expenditure shocks.
Health insurance market
In the baseline model intended to capture the pre-ACA U.S. health insurance market, I
assume that workers can obtain health insurance only if their employers offer it. This is
a simplifying assumption meant to capture the fact that the individual private insurance
market is very small in the U.S.17 In my counterfactual experiment, I will introduce
a competitive individual insurance market which I call the health insurance exchange
(HIX).
Individual labor productivity
Each individual possesses labor productivity which affects the size of their compensation. I
assume that an individual produces output eX˜(p) as a function of (1) a vector of individual
17Indeed, the fraction of individuals with individual insurance among the whole sample is 2%, and the
fraction of such individuals among the sum of individuals with individual insurance and the uninsured
is just 10% in my data set. Moreover, even for those who are covered by individual insurance, insurance
products typically do not cover pre-existing conditions. In addition, one in seven applicants for health
insurance are rejected (Hendren (2013)). Hendren (2013) provides both theoretical and empirical analyses
showing that adverse selection leads to a collapse of many other individual insurance markets.
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characteristics X˜ = (ed, type, Et, ht) where ed is education, type is individual permanent
type, Et is labor market experience, and ht is health status, and (2) the permanent
productivity of the firm the individual is currently matched with, denoted by p. The log
of output is specified as
ln(eX˜(p)) = e
∗
w(ed, type, Et) + e
∗
h(ht) + p
=
∑
αe11(ed = e) +
∑
αk11(type = k)
+ (
∑
αe41(ed = e) +
∑
αk41(type = k))Et
+ (
∑
αe51(ed = e) +
∑
αk51(type = k))E
2
t
+ αh1(ht = U) + p. (2.2)
where e∗w(ed, type, Et) is the worker skill explained by (ed, type, Et) and e
∗
h(ht) is the worker
skill explained by ht. I assume that output is multiplicatively separable in (ed, type, Et)
and ht. The separability of health is assumed to maintain tractability when I characterize
firm’s optimal wage policy.
Individual labor market experience is accumulated as long as the individual is em-
ployed. That is,
Et+1 =
 Et + 1 if Pt = 1Et if Pt = 0 .
Firm
Firms are heterogeneous with respect to their permanent productivity. In the population
of firms, the distribution of productivity is denoted by Γ (·) which has a density function
dΓ that is continuous and positive everywhere. In my empirical application, I specify Γ
to be lognormal with mean µp and variance σ
2
p, i.e., p ∼ lnN(µp, σ2p).
Firms have access to a constant return to scale production function. In each period,
they offer a package of wage and health insurance provision to maximize their steady state
profit flow. If they offer health insurance, they incur the cost of health insurance provision,
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which is equal to the sum of the total expected medical expenditure of their workforce
and a fixed administrative cost ξESHI . The health insurance costs are tax-exempt.
Compensation package
Health insurance provision and the wage offer are determined as a solution of the firm’s
profit maximization problem. Given the laws prohibiting discrimination in compensation
packages based upon health or age, firms cannot offer separate compensation packages to
each individual. Moreover, given this constraint and dimensionality of individual charac-
teristics, it is hard to solve the optimal compensation contract for each worker. Therefore,
I reduce the dimension of the potential contract space so that the model is still tractable,
but captures the most important patterns of the data.
Specifically, I assume that firms post a skill price θed for each skill group ed subject
to the constraint that health ht cannot be priced. Moreover, I assume that firms decide
whether to offer health insurance to all of their workforce INS ∈ {0, 1}. As a result,
a worker with characteristics X˜ = (ed, type, Et, ht) in a firm offering a compensation
package (θ, INS) receives a wage offer which is equal to
wINS
X˜
(θ) = θedINS exp(e
∗
w(ed, type, Et)). (2.3)
Given the wage offer, the flow profit of a firm with productivity p from hiring a worker
with X˜ is exp(e∗w(ed, type, Et))(exp(p)e
∗
h(ht) − θ) where g∗h(ht) is the productivity effect
of health.18 Finally, I assume that wages are subject to classical measurement error, with
errors following a log normal distribution.19
18I implicitly assume that employer contribution of insurance premium is 100% in this baseline model.
That is, if workers want to opt out the coverage, they cannot receive an additional wage to compensate.
This is not an unrealistic choice because the current U.S. average is 85% for single workers’ premiums.
19One could instead model these errors as transitory skill shock. My treatment of measurement error
follows the work of Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010) which estimates the wage process of a life-cycle
search model using the same data source (SIPP).
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Labor market
The labor market is frictional and workers and employers randomly meet. A non-employed
worker receives a new job offer from an employer with probability λedu and an employed
worker receives an offer from an employer with probability λede where ed is individual
education status. The compensation is drawn from the offer distribution F ed(θ, INS).
Upon receiving the job offer, the worker decides whether to accept it.
In addition to changing jobs, employed workers are allowed to quit and become non-
employed. Furthermore, they are hit by an exogenous job destruction shock with prob-
ability δed, upon which workers lose their current jobs. Because the model period is a
relatively long, I allow the exogenous job destruction shock and the arrival of a new job
offer to occur within the same period with probability δedλede > 0. Moreover, I allow an
additively separable preference shock to being non-employed nt which follows a Type-I
extreme value distribution with scale parameter σn.
20
Timing in a period
At the beginning of each period, individuals, who are heterogeneous in their education,
unobserved type, age, and health status, are either unemployed or working for employers
offering different wage and health insurance packages. I now describe the explicit timing
assumptions for a period that I use in the derivation of the value functions in Section 2.2.2.
These particular timing assumptions simplify our derivation, but they are not crucial.
1. An employed individual produces output and accumulates labor market experience.
2. Idiosyncratic health shock mt is realized.
3. An individual makes health care decision xt.
20This preference shock is incorporated to smooth the labor supply function with respect to wage offers,
which is useful when I solve the model numerically. An alternative is to add time-invariant continuous
heterogeneous flow utility of being non-employed, as done by Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (1999).
Because of the nonstationary nature of the individual problem in my model, I need to allow for dynamics
of unobserved flow utility, which substantially complicates analysis.
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4. The next period health status is realized.
5. An employed worker is hit by an exogenous job destruction shock with probability
δ.
6. An individual draws a preference shock for being non-employed.
7. A non-employed worker receives a job offer with probability λu and decides whether
to accept the job offer. An employed worker receives a job offer with probability λe
and chooses to accept the offer, to stay at the current job, or to quit and become
non-employed. The employed worker who does not receive the offer decides whether
to stay at the current job or quit and become non-employed.
Initial condition
I assume that non-college graduates enter the labor market at age 18, while college grad-
uates enter at age 22. I assume that upon entry into the labor market, they have no
labor market experience and start their career as non-employed. Notice that the return
to education is captured by labor productivity. Workers are assigned an unobserved type,
the distribution of which is specific to education. Moreover, I assume that all newborn
workers are healthy.21 Finally, I assume that the population of individuals and firms grows
at the constant rate n in each period. Let µτ
t
denote the fraction of a cohort size of age
t in the total population of individuals at period τ . I consider a steady state economy in
which µτ
t
is constant over time, i.e., µτ
t
= µ
t
.
2.2.2 Analysis of the Model
In this section, I define the steady state equilibrium of the model. To do so, I first consider
the individual life cycle optimization problem. The solution to the individual optimization
problem is then used to determine the steady state distribution of individuals. Next, I
21Note, however, that their health evolution is affected by their permanent type type and therefore
they face different health risks.
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formulate the firm’s optimization problem and characterize their optimal decisions for
posting compensation package.
Individual optimization problem over the life cycle
At the beginning of a period, the state space of an individual at age t consists of a six
dimensional vectors: (X˜t, θ, INS): four dimensional vector of individual characteristics
X˜t = (ed, type, Et, ht) and the compensation package (θ, INS). Note that INSt = 0
for any non-employed worker. Consider that all individuals face offer distribution of
compensation package, which is denoted by F ed(θ, INS). Denote V t0
(
X˜t
)
as the value
function of a non-employed worker with age t who is in a state X˜ and V t1
(
X˜t, θ, INS
)
is
the value function of an employed worker with age t who is in a state
(
X˜t, θ, INS
)
.
Consider a non-employed worker having characteristics X˜t = (ed, type, Et, ht). His
value function is defined by
V t0 (X˜t) = Emt

maxxt Ut(Ct(xt, 
m
t , X˜t), 0, ht)
+β
∑
hˆ Pr(ht+1 = hˆ|X˜t, xt, mt )λedu V˜ t0 (X˜t+1)
+β
∑
hˆ Pr(ht+1 = hˆ|X˜t, xt, mt )(1− λedu )V t+10 (X˜t+1)
 (2.4)
subject to budget constraint (2.1) where X˜t+1 is the next period’s individual characteris-
tics, X˜t+1 = (ed, type, Et, hˆ). V˜
t
0 (X˜t+1) is defined as
V˜ t0 (X˜t+1) =
∫
Ent [max{V t+10 (X˜t+1) + nt , V t+11 (X˜t+1, θ, INS)}]dF ed(θ, INS)
The first term is the flow utility from the current period’s consumption which is affected
by the health care utilization choice xt and the realization of an i.i.d. latent medical
expenditure shock mt . The second term is the expected value from receiving a job offer,
denoted by V˜ t0 (X˜t+1), multiplied by the health transition probability which is affected by
xt and the realization of the i.i.d. latent medical expenditure shock 
m
t . Conditional on
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receiving the offer, the individual decides whether to accept it, which depends on the value
from staying as unemployed V t+10 (X˜t+1) and the value from accepting the job offer with
compensation package (θ, INS) denoted V t+11 (X˜t+1, θ, INS). Note that the decision is
subject to the preference shock of working, denoted by nt . The third term is the expected
value from not receiving a job offer.
Similarly, consider an employed worker who is in a state (X˜t, θ, INS). The value
function of such an individual is defined by
V t1 (X˜t, θ, INS) = Emt

maxxt Ut(Ct(xt, 
m
t , X˜t, θ, INS), 1, ht)
+β
∑
hˆ Pr(ht+1 = hˆ|X˜t, xt, mt )δedV˜ t1 (X˜t+1)
+β
∑
hˆ Pr(ht+1 = hˆ|X˜t, xt, mt )(1− δed)Vˆ t1 (X˜t+1, θ, INS)

(2.5)
subject to budget constraint (2.1) where X˜t+1 = (ed, type, Et + 1, hˆ) is the next period
individual characteristics and
V˜ t1 (X˜t+1) = (1− λede )V t+1n (X˜t+1)
+λede
∫
Ent max
 V
t+1
0 (X˜t+1) + 
n
t ,
V t+11 (X˜t+1, θ
′, INS ′)
 dF ed(θ′, INS ′)
and
Vˆ t1 (X˜t+1, θ, INS) = (1− λede )Ent max
 V
t+1
0 (X˜t+1) + 
n
t ,
V t+11 (X˜t+1, θ, INS)

+λede
∫
Ent max

V t+10 (X˜t+1) + 
n
t ,
V t+11 (X˜t+1, θ, INS),
V t+11 (X˜t+1, θ
′, INS′)
 dF
ed(θ′, INS′).
As before, the first term is the flow utility from the current period’s consumption, which
is affected by health care utilization choice xt and the realization of the i.i.d. latent
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medical expenditure shock mt . The second term is the expected value from being hit by
an exogenous job destruction shock, V˜ t1 (X˜t+1), which consists of two parts, expressed in
the following square bracket. The first part is the gain from not receiving a job offer. In
this case, the worker is forced to be non-employed in the next period. The second part is
the gain from receiving a job offer. In this case, the worker decides whether to accept the
job offer or remain non-employed. The third term is the expected value from being hit by
an exogenous job destruction shock, denoted by Vˆ t1 (X˜t+1, θ, INS). Again, it consists of
two parts, expressed in the following square bracket. The first part is the gain from not
receiving a job offer from another firm. In this case, the worker decides whether to stay
in the current job or to become non-employed. The second part is the case in which the
worker receives a job offer. If the worker receives a job offer with compensation package
(θ′, INS ′) , he decides whether to move to a new firm, stay in his current job, or quit and
become non-employed.
Because individuals live for a finite period, we need to specify the value of the terminal
period. The terminal value function of an individual with state St is simply given by
V Ti (ST ) = υ
T
h I(hT = U), (2.6)
where i ∈ {0, 1} is his employment status at period T .
It is easy to see that the decisions of non-employed individuals about accepting a
job offer follow the standard reservation rule strategy. Here, notice that the strategy is
nonstationary because my model uses a life cycle environment. It is easy to see that for
the employed worker working at a firm offering a compensation package of skill price and
health insurance provision status (θ, INS) and receiving a job offer from a firm offering
a compensation package (θ′, INS ′), his job acceptance decision is purely determined by
comparing these two compensation packages and is not affected by firm productivity per
se. This is because individual wages are fully determined by skill prices given the skill
level, as seen from (2.3).
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Moreover, it is clear that individual decisions to choose health care utilization xt take
into account its impact on the current period’s consumption and the dynamics of health
status. Because health enters into an individual’s direct utility, which allows interactions
with disutility from working, an individual’s health care decisions affect his ability to work
in the future.
Steady state worker distribution
The steady state distribution of workers is given by workers’ optimal choices. I assume that
at t = 1, new workers enter the population as non-employed with exogenously determined
health, education, and type. Because workers live for a finite period, the steady state dis-
tribution of individuals includes age as state variables. Denote gt
(
X˜, θ, INS
)
as a steady
state measure of employed workers with age t and characteristics X˜t = (ed, type, E, hˆ) re-
ceiving compensation packages (θ, INS). Similarly, ut(X˜) is defined as a steady state
measure of the non-employed with age t and characteristics X˜. Note that gt and ut are
fully determined by the inflow from the distribution of gt−1 and ut−1. The determinants
of gt
(
X˜, INS, θedINS
)
and ut(X˜) are described as follows. Given the offer distribution of
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compensation package F ed(θ, INS):
gt
(
X˜t, θ, INS
)
1 + n
=
∑
ht−1
gt−1
(
X˜A−1, θ, INS
)
×Emt
[
Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜A−1, θ, INS, mt )
]
Ψt−1(X˜t, θ, INS)
+
∑
ht−1
ut−1
(
X˜B−1
)
×Emt
[
Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜B−1, mt )
]
Pr(ΩE1 (X˜t, θ, INS))
×λedu fed(θ, INS)
+
∑
ht−1
∑
INS′
∫
gt−1
(
X˜A−1, θ
′, INS′
)
×Emt
[
Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜A−1, θ′, INS′, mt )
]
1(θ, INS, θ′, INS′)dθ′
×(1− δed)λede fed(θ, INS)
+
∑
ht−1
∑
INS′
∫
gt−1
(
X˜A−1, θ
′, INS′
)
×Emt
[
Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜A−1, θ′, INS′, mt )
]
Pr(ΩE1 (X˜, θ, INS))dθ
′
×δedλede fed(θ, INS) (2.7)
where X˜A−1 = (ed, type, Et−1, ht−1) and X˜
B
−1 = (ed, type, Et, ht−1) are individual character-
istics in the last period for the employed and non-employed, respectively, which can turn
into X˜ in this period. Ψt−1(X˜t, θ, INS) is the probability of staying at the same firm
Ψt−1(X˜t, θ, INS) = (1− δed)(1− λede ) Pr(ΩE1 (X˜t, θ, INS))
+ (1− δed)λede (Pr(ΩE2 (X˜t, θ, INS)) Pr(Ω1(X˜t, θ, INS)).
(Note that I will provide an intuition for each term of Ψt−1 in the next paragraph).
Pr(ΩE1 (X˜t, θ, INS)) is the probability that individuals with X˜ prefer to work a job with
compensation package (θ, INS) over being non-employed, where the set ΩE1 (X˜t, θ, INS)
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is formally defined as
ΩE1 (X˜t, θ, INS) = V
t
0 (X˜t) + 
n
t < V
t
1 (X˜t, θ, INS)
where nt is a preference shock from not working. Because it follows a type-I extreme value
distribution with scale parameter σn, Pr(Ω
E
1 (X˜t, θ, INS)) is characterized as
Pr(ΩE1 (X˜t, θ, INS)) =
exp(
V t1 (X˜t,θ,INS)
σn
)
exp(
V t0 (X˜t)
σn
) + exp(
V t1 (X˜t,θ,INS)
σn
)
.
Next, Pr(ΩE2 (θ, INS)) is the probability that individuals who receive a job offer from
other firms decide to stay in the current job:
Pr(ΩE2 (X˜t, θ, INS)) = F
ed(θ, INS) + F ed(θ˜ÎNS(X˜t, θ), ÎNS)
for ÎNS 6= INS where θ˜ÎNS(X˜t) is the threshold skill price which can be defined as
V t1 (X˜t, θ, INS)) = V
t
1 (X˜t, θ˜ÎNS(X˜t, θ), ÎNS)).
1(θ, INS, θ′, INS ′) is the indicator function such that individuals prefer to take an offer
from (θ, INS) over (θ′, INS ′):
1(θ, INS, θ′, INS ′) =
 1 if V
t
1 (X˜t, θ, INS)) > V
t
1 (X˜t, θ
′, INS ′))
0 otherwise
While the expression of how gt is determined looks rather complicated, it can be un-
derstood fairly easily. The first term is the inflow from the workers who work in firms
offering the same contract (θ, INS) , transition to the health status hˆ this period, and
decide to stay at the same firm. Notice that the health transition probability is denoted
by Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜A−1, θ, INS ′, mt ) which does not include health care decision xt, as the op-
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timal health care decision is a function of a vector of (X˜A−1, θ, INS
′, mt ). The probability
of staying at the same firm, denoted by Ψt−1(θ, INS, X˜), consists of two terms. The first
term is the probability that the worker does not receive any offer at all and prefers to
stay at the same firm over quitting and becoming non-employed. The second term is the
probability that the worker receives an offer from another firm but turns it down and stays
at the same firm. The second term of the right-hand side of (2.7) is the inflow from the
non-employed. This happens if a non-employed individual gets an offer with probability
λedu f
ed(θ, INS) and decides to accept it. The third and fourth terms of the right-hand side
of (2.7) are the inflow from the currently employed working in other firms but receiving
and accepting offers with compensation (θ, INS). The difference between the third and
fourth terms derives from whether they are hit by an exogenous job destruction shock,
which affects the probability of accepting a job offer. Finally, in order to determine the
size of gt, I need to take into account that population size grows at a constant rate n.
Therefore, the population at age t, gt, should be divided by 1 + n.
Similarly, one can express the determinant of ut(X˜t) as
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ut(X˜t)
1 + n
=
∑
ht−1
ut−1
(
X˜B−1
)
×Emt
[
Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜B−1, mt )
]
(1− λedu )
+
∑
ht−1
ut−1
(
X˜B−1
)
×Emt
[
Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜A−1, mt )
]
Pr(ΩU1 (X˜t))λ
ed
u
+
∑
ht−1
∑
INS
∫
gt−1
(
X˜A−1, θ, INS
)
×Emt
[
Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜A−1, mt )
]
Pr(ΩU2 (X˜t, θ, INS))dF (θ, INS)(1− δed)(1− λede )
+
∑
ht−1
∑
INS
∫
gt−1
(
X˜A−1, θ, INS
)
×Emt
[
Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜A−1, mt )
]
Pr(ΩU3 (X˜t, θ, INS))dF (θ, INS)(1− δed)λede
+
∑
ht−1
∑
INS
∫
gt−1
(
X˜A−1, θ, INS
)
×Emt
[
Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜A−1, mt )
]
dθδed(1− λede )
+
∑
ht−1
∑
INS
∫
gt−1
(
X˜A−1, θ, INS
)
×Emt
[
Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜A−1, mt )
]
Pr(ΩU1 (X˜t))dθδ
edλede (2.8)
where X˜A−1 and X˜
B
−1 are defined as above, and Pr(Ω
U
1 (X˜t)) is the probability that the
unemployed with characteristics X˜ decides to turn down the offer:
Pr(ΩU1 (X˜t)) =
∫
Pr(V t0 (X˜t) + 
n
t > V
t
1 (X˜t, θ, INS))dF
ed(θ, INS).
Pr(ΩU2 (X˜t, θ, INS)) is the probability that an employed individual with characteristics
X˜t who has a job with compensation package (θ, INS) decides to quit and become non-
employed:
Pr(ΩU2 (X˜t, θ, INS)) = Pr(V
t
0 (X˜t) + 
n
t > V
t
1 (X˜t, θ, INS)).
Finally, Pr(ΩU3 (X˜t, θ, INS)) is the probability that an employed individual with charac-
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teristics X˜t who has a job with compensation package (θ, INS) receives a job offer from
another firm but decides to quit and become non-employed:
Pr(ΩU3 (X˜t, θ, INS))
=
∫
1
V t0 (X˜t) + nt = max

V t0 (X˜t) + 
n
t ,
V t1 (X˜t, θ, INS),
V t1 (X˜t, θ
′, INS ′)

 dF ed(θ′, INS ′).
Again, one can interpret (2.8) very intuitively. The first two terms of the right-hand side
of (2.8) are the inflow from the currently non-employed workers with state variable X˜B−1.
They stay non-employed and have state variable X˜t in the following period if they are not
offered health insurance, or if they receive a job offer but turn it down. The third and the
fourth terms are the inflow from currently employed workers with state variable X˜A−1 who
choose to quit and become non-employed: the third term is the case where they do not
receive a job offer from another firm; the fourth term is the case where they receive a job
offer from another firm but turn it down. The fifth and sixth terms are the inflow from
the currently employed who are hit by job destruction shock. The fifth term depicts those
individuals who are forced to be unemployed and the sixth term depicts individuals who
also receive job offers from other firms, but choose to quit and become non-employed.
Finally, the steady state condition requires that the sum of all measures of workers is
equal to M , that is
∑
t
∑
X˜t
ut(X˜t) +
∑
t
∑
X˜t
∑
INS
∫
gt
(
X˜t, θ, INS
)
dθ = M. (2.9)
Therefore, by using (2.7), (2.8) and (2.9), one can characterize the steady state worker
distribution. Although the expression looks rather complicated, it can be derived fairly
easily by using forward induction. That is, we can analytically calculate the whole dis-
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tribution once we know the period 1 distribution g1 and u1, the worker’s value function,
health transition function, and the offer distribution F ed(θ, INS).
From the steady state employment measure gt
(
X˜t, θ, INS
)
, one can define the terms
related to firm size, by following the same spirit as Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). Specifically, the density of employees with age t and
characteristics X˜t for firms offering compensation package (θ, INS) is given by
lt
(
X˜t, θ, INS
)
=
gt
(
X˜t, θ, INS
)
f ed(θ, INS)
where f ed(θ, INS) is density of firms offering compensation package (θ, INS).
Firm’s optimization problem
Next, I formalize the firm’s problem. Firms choose wage offers and health insurance
offerings to maximize steady state profit flow. I assume that the firm draws a shock,
ESHI , in each period, which is specific to its choice of whether to offer health insurance.
The shock is additively separable from the steady state profit flow, but affects the payoff
of health insurance provisions. I incorporate the choice-specific shock to smooth the
insurance provision decisions of the employers. This problem can be formulated as
Π(p, HI) = max
{
Π1(p) + 
ESHI ,Π0(p)
}
where ΠINS is the conditional profit under the health insurance offering status INS ∈
{0, 1}. It is a solution of the following problems:
Π1(p) = max
θed1
∑
t
∑
X˜
pi1(X˜, t, p, θ
ed
1 )lt
(
X˜, θed1 , 1
)
− ξESHI (2.10)
Π0(p) = max
θed0
∑
t
∑
X˜
pi0(X˜, t, p, θ
ed
0 )lt
(
X˜, θed0 , 0
)
. (2.11)
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where pi1(X˜, t, p, θ
ed
1 ) is the flow net profit of firms with productivity p offering skill price
θed1 and health insurance when hiring a worker with characteristics (X˜, t)
pi1(X˜, t, p, θ
ed
1 ) = exp(e
∗
w(ed, type, Et))
(
exp(p) exp (e∗h(ht))− θed1
)− E[mX˜,t∗ |INS(p) = 1].
(2.12)
The second term of the right-hand side is the expected medical expenditure of the em-
ployed worker having characteristics Xand age t at firms with productivity p offering
health insurance. pi0(X˜, t, p, θ
ed
1 ) is the flow of net profit of firms with productivity p offer-
ing skill price θed1 but not offering health insurance by hiring a worker with characteristics
(X˜, t):
pi0(X˜, t, p, θ
ed
0 ) = exp(e
∗
w(ed, type, Et))
(
exp(p) exp (e∗h(ht))− θed0
)
. (2.13)
I assume that ESHI follows an i.i.d. Type-I extremum value distribution with scale pa-
rameter σf . As a result, the fraction of firms with productivity p offering health insurance
is characterized by
∆(p) =
exp(Π1(p)
σf
)
exp(Π0(p)
σf
) + exp(Π1(p)
σf
)
. (2.14)
Steady state equilibrium
Now, I am in a position to define an equilibrium.
Definition 1. A steady state equilibrium consists of workers’ value functions {V t0 , V t1 }
and corresponding policy functions, the steady state measure of workers with characteris-
tics of X˜ = (ed, type.E, h), gt
(
X˜, θ, INS
)
and ut(X˜), the firms’ compensation packages
consisting of skill price {θed1 (p), θed0 (p)} and insurance offer {∆(p)} for all p, and offer
distribution F ed(θ, INS) such that
1. Given offer distribution F ed(θ, INS), the value functions at age t {V t0 , V t1 } and
corresponding policy functions solve (2.4), (2.5), and (2.6).
2. Given worker’s optimization behavior described by {V t0 , V t1 } and corresponding pol-
icy functions and offer distribution F ed(θ, x), gt
(
X˜, θ, INS
)
and ut(X˜) must satisfy
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(2.7), (2.8) and (2.9).
3. Given F ed(θ, INS) and the steady state employee sizes implied by gt
(
X˜, θ, INS
)
and ut(X˜), a firm with productivity p chooses to offer health insurance with probability
∆(p), where ∆(p) is given by (2.14). Moreover, conditional on insurance choice x, the firm
offers skill price {θedINS(p)} that solves (2.10) and (2.11) respectively for INS ∈ {0, 1}.
4. The postulated distributions of offered compensation packages are consistent with the
firms’ optimization behavior {θed1 (p), θed0 (p),∆(p)}. Specifically, F ed(θ, INS) must satisfy
F ed (θ, 1) =
∫ ∞
0
1(θed1 (p) < θ
ed)∆(p)dΓ(p), (2.15)
F ed (θ, 0) =
∫ ∞
0
1(θed0 (p) < θ
ed) [1−∆(p)] dΓ(p). (2.16)
for each education group ed ∈ {NC,C}.
Characterization of equilibrium
I can characterize the firm’s optimal skill price θedINS(p) by extending an approach by
Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (1999) and Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg
(2000). By applying an envelope condition to (2.10), we obtain that
Π′1(p) =
∑
t
∑
X˜
(
eX˜(p)−
∂E[mX˜,t∗ |HI = 1]
∂p
)
lt
(
X˜, θed1 (p), 1
)
.
Integrating over [p1, p], where p1 represents the lowest productivity firms that hire a
positive number of workers, we obtain that
Π1(p) = Π1(p1) +
∫ p
p1
∑
t
∑
X˜
(
eX˜(p
′)− ∂E[m
X˜,t
∗ |INS = 1]
∂p′′
)
lt
(
X˜, θ1(p
′), 1
)
dp′.
By equating this with (2.10), one can characterize θed1 (p) and θ
ed
0 (p) as follows:
118
Proposition 2. For p > p, θed1 (p) and θ
ed
0 (p) satisfy
θed1 (p) =
∑
t
∑
X˜
(
eX˜(p)− E[mX˜,t∗ ]
)
lt
(
X˜, θed1 (p), 1
)
− Π1(p1)∑
t
∑
X˜ exp(e
∗
w(ed, type, Et))lt
(
X˜, θed1 (p), 1
)
−
∫ p
p1
∑
t
∑
X˜
(
eX˜(p
′)− ∂E[mX˜,t∗ |INS=1]
∂p′′
)
lt
(
X˜, θed1 (p
′), 1
)
dp′∑
t
∑
X˜ exp(g
∗
w(ed, type, Et))lt
(
X˜, θed1 (p), 1
) (2.17)
θed0 (p) =
 ∑t∑X˜ eX˜(p)lt
(
X˜, θed1 (p), 0
)
− Π0(p0)
− ∫ p
p0
∑
t
∑
X˜ eX˜(p
′)lt
(
X˜, θed0 (p
′), 0
)
dp′

∑
t
∑
X˜ exp(e
∗
w(ed, type, Et))lt
(
X˜, θed1 (p), 0
) . (2.18)
This form can be utilized when we numerically solve the equilibrium of the model.
θedINS(p1) and θ
ed
INS(p0) must be solved by maximizing (2.10) and (2.11) without relying
on (2.17) and (2.18).
Due to the complexity of the model, I cannot solve the equilibrium analytically. I
instead solve the equilibrium numerically using the algorithm described in Appendix B.1.
The complexity of the model also prevents me from establishing a proof of the existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium, but, by conducting extensive numerical simulations, I
always find a unique equilibrium based on this algorithm.
2.3 Data Set
In this section, I describe my data set and its sample selection. The model describes
rich individual-level dynamics over the life cycle regarding labor market outcome, health
status, health insurance coverage, and medical expenditure. Moreover, it describes how
firms with different productivity decide wage and health insurance provisions which de-
termine the size of the firm. Therefore, an ideal data set for estimating the model is to
use single employee-employer matched data which contains this information. However,
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such a data set is not available in the U.S. Instead, I combine three separate data sets
for the estimation: (1) 2004 Survey of Income and Program Participation; (2) 2004-2007
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey; and (3) Kaiser Family 2004-2007 Employer Health
Benefit Survey. I choose the data period 2004-2007 because estimating the model using
the data after 2008 is not ideal for the following two reasons. First, the Great Reces-
sion has generated dramatic changes in the labor market. Second, possibly due to the
policy announcement effect, there was a sharp jump in the health insurance offering rate
in 2010, which disappears after 2011. These short-term dramatic changes are difficult to
capture with my model. Instead, I choose 2004-2007, when the economic environment
was relatively stable.
2.3.1 Survey of Income and Program Participation
I obtain an individual-level labor market outcome and associated health status, health
insurance coverage status, and demographic information from the 2004 Panel of Survey of
Income Program Participation (hereafter, SIPP 2004). The SIPP 2004 interviews individ-
uals every four months for up to twelve times, so that an individual may be interviewed
over a four-year period. It consists of two parts: (1) the core module, and (2) the topical
module. The core module, which is based on the interviews from each wave, contains de-
tailed monthly information regarding individuals’ demographic characteristics and labor
force activity, including earnings, number of weeks worked, average hours worked, and
employment status, as well as whether the individual changed jobs during any month in
the survey period. In addition, at each interview date the SIPP 2004 gather a variety of
health insurance variables. It specifies the source of insurance so we know whether it is
ESHI, private individual insurance, or Medicaid, and we also know whether it is obtained
through the individual’s own name or the spouse’s name. The topical module, which is
based on annual interviews (i.e., at interview waves 3, 6, 9 and 12), contains yearly in-
formation about the worker and his/her family members’ health status and out-of-pocket
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medical expenditure.22 To link individual health status with individual labor market out-
comes and health insurance coverage status information, I match the core module with
the topical module.
I construct the estimation sample as follows. The total sample size after matching the
topical module and the core module is 131,532. I restrict my sample to men (dropping
71,283 female individuals) whose age are between 25-59 (dropping an additional 33,652
individuals). In addition, I only keep individuals who are not in school, are not self-
employed, do not work in the public sector, do not engage in military service and do not
participate in any government welfare program (dropping an additional 11,433 individu-
als). I also limit our sample to individuals who are either uninsured or covered by ESHI in
their own name (dropping an additional 1,949 individuals). Finally, I exclude individuals
receiving Social Security income (dropping an additional 95 individuals). The sample size
for the estimation is a total of 11,797 individuals.
2.3.2 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)
The SIPP data set allows me to capture the dynamics of health insurance coverage driven
by the labor market mobility, one of the main drivers determining individual insurance
status under the pre-ACA health insurance system. However, a problem with using SIPP
data for my estimation is the lack of information about total medical expenditure. To
obtain the information, I use the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (hereafter, MEPS)
2004-2007. MEPS is a set of large-scale annual rotating panel surveys. I use its Household
Component (HC), which surveys households in two consecutive years, collecting detailed
information for each person in the household on demographic characteristics, health con-
ditions, health status, use of medical services, charges and source of payments, access
to care, satisfaction with care, health insurance coverage, income, and employment. To
22In both SIPP and MEPS, I use the self-reported health status to construct whether the individual is
healthy or unhealthy. The self-reported health status has five categories. I categorize “Excellent”, “Very
Good” and “Good” as Healthy (H) and “Fair” and “Poor” as Unhealthy (U).
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construct the estimation sample, I use the same criteria as SIPP 2004. The sample size
for the estimation is a total of 17,536 individuals.
2.3.3 Kaiser Family Employer Health Benefits Survey
Finally, I obtain firm-side information about the health insurance offering status and
associated firm characteristics from the Kaiser Family 2004-2007 Employer Health Benefit
Survey.23 It is an annual survey of the nation’s private and public firms having three or
more workers. It contains information about firms’ characteristics (such as industry and
size) and categorical information about employees’ demographics (such as age and annual
wage), as well as information about health insurance (such as whether the employer offers
health insurance, the type of plan offered, employees’ eligibility and enrollment, and
whether the employer, the employee, or both contribute to the purchase of insurance.)
I restrict the sample to firms which belong to the private sector and have at least three
employees. The estimation sample size is 18,593.24
2.3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 reports the descriptive statistics of key variables in SIPP 2004. It is shown that
the employed who receive health insurance receive a higher wage than the employed who
do not. Moreover, they are slightly healthier than individuals who do not have health
insurance.
In Table 2.2, I report the descriptive statistics for the individuals in MEPS 2004-2007.
Note that the proportion of healthy workers is similar to that reported in SIPP. The
proportion of individuals who are insured is somewhat under-reported relative to SIPP.
I provide the descriptive statistics for firm-side data based on Kaiser 2004-2007 in
23Note that other studies investigating ESHI often use Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Employer
Health Insurance Survey (e.g., Cebul, Rebitzer, Taylor, and Votruba (2011) and Aizawa and Fang (2013)).
The unit of observation is the establishment. However, the survey has not conducted after 1997.
24The data also shows whether firms consist of a single establishment or not. In my data selection,
90.15% of firms consist of a single establishment.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Fraction of workers who are college graduates 0.4521 0.4977
Average worker age 40.5462 8.8822
Fraction of insured among employed 0.8409 0.3658
Average 4-month wage for employed, in $10,000 1.9383 2.0832
Average 4-month wage for insured, in $10,000 2.1445 2.1896
Average 4-month wage for uninsured, in $10,000 0.8483 0.7230
Employment rate 0.9111 0.2847
Fraction of healthy workers 0.9338 0.2487
Fraction of healthy workers among insured 0.9501 0.2178
Fraction of healthy workers among uninsured 0.8771 0.3284
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics: SIPP 2004.
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Average worker age 41.0386 9.7948
Fraction of healthy workers 0.9116 0.2839
Fraction of insured among employed workers 0.7244 0.4468
Annual medical expenditure, in $10,000 0.2478 0.9583
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for MEPS 2004-2007.
Table 2.3. In general, firms that offer health insurance tend to have many employees.
Moreover, the composition of employees systematically differs by firm’s health insurance
offering status. First, firms offering health insurance tend to employ a larger share of high
income employees. Moreover, firms offering health insurance also consist of a larger share
of older workers.
2.4 Estimation
2.4.1 Identification
In this section, I first discuss identification of several key parameters of the model. Due to
the complexity of the model, the argument is mainly heuristic. The key parameters related
to health and health insurance are risk aversion, γtype, the disutility from bad health, η
type
h ,
productivity loss due to bad health, αh, a scale parameter for firms offering ESHI, σf , and
the fixed cost of offering ESHI, ξESHI . These parameters all affect firm’s health insurance
coverage and it may be unclear how each parameter is separately identified.
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Variable Name Mean Std. Dev.
Average firm Size 20.8198 53.8675
... for those that offer health insurance 29.6444 67.7277
... for those that do not offer health insurance 7.8903 12.3044
Health insurance coverage rate 0.5943 0.4911
... for those with less than 50 workers 0.5686 0.4954
... for those with 50 or more workers 0.9338 0.2486
Average frac. of employees more than age 26 0.8364 0.2093
... for those that offer health insurance 0.8636 0.1519
... for those that do not offer health insurance 0.7991 0.2650
Average frac. of employees annual salaries ≤$21,000 0.2108 0.3107
... for those that offer health insurance 0.1244 0.2328
... for those that do not offer health insurance 0.3288 0.3621
Average frac. of employees annual salaries ≥$50,000 0.2345 0.2833
... for those that offer health insurance 0.2739 0.2935
... for those that do not offer health insurance 0.1807 0.2601
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics: Kaiser 2004-2007.
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
While it is true that higher γtype, η
type
h , and lower αh increase firm’s coverage rate,
γtype and η
type
h affect worker-side moments such as life cycle patterns of coverage rate and
associated job-to-job transitions and medical expenditure. Specifically, if γtype and η
type
h
are larger, we would expect to observe more frequent transitions of workers from jobs
without health insurance to jobs with health insurance, even if the transition involves a
reduction in wages. Moreover, the magnitude of the wage cut a worker is willing to tolerate
in order to switch from a job without health insurance to a job with health insurance
increases with γtype and η
type
h . Then, η
type
h is disciplined by fitting medical expenditure:
because medical expenditure is a choice variable in the model and the benefit of medical
expenditure is to improve future health status, I can identify the disutility from bad health
through the variation of the fraction of positive medical expenditure by individual health
insurance status conditional on individual characteristics, e.g., age. Finally, heterogeneity
of γtype and η
type
h by unobserved type can be identified by differential patterns of the above
moments by education status, as the type distribution differs across education.
The remaining parameters are then identified in the following way. The scale param-
eter σf affects the relationship between the probability of offering health insurance and
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firm productivity (and thus firm size). The parameter αh has an additional effect on the
differences in wages offered by firms, depending on whether they offer health insurance.
This therefore affects the wage difference between the insured and the uninsured. Finally,
the administrative cost ξESHI is identified from the the probability (in the level) of small
firms offering health insurance.
Finally, I discuss additional identification assumptions related to labor market pa-
rameters. As in standard labor market equilibrium models, it is impossible to identify
intercepts in individual skill function described by (2.2) from skill prices. Therefore, I
assume that the mean of log normal distribution for firm productivity distribution µp is
set to be 0. Furthermore, I assume that the intercept for type 2 individual dummy α21 is
equal to 0.
2.4.2 Estimation Strategy
The solution of the model serves as an input to the estimation procedure. Estimation is
by the method of simulated moments (MSM). Specifically, a weighted average distance
between sample moments and simulated moments is minimized with respect to the model’s
parameters. The weights are the inverses of the estimated variances of the moments. The
procedure requires a choice of moments.
The following is a list of moments used in the estimation. Each moment on the
worker-side is a conditional moment by education and age cohort.
1. Labor market status and its dynamics
(a) employment rate
(b) transition rate from non-employment to employment
(c) job-to-job (JJ) transition rate
(d) transition rate from employment to non-employment
125
2. Wage and health insurance
(a) the fraction of the uninsured among employed
(b) wage change through JJ conditional on before-after health insurance coverage
status
(c) the distribution of wage conditional on health insurance coverage status
(d) wage change of job stayers conditional on health insurance coverage status
(e) the distribution of wage among previously unemployed workers, conditional on
health insurance coverage status
3. Health and medical expenditure
(a) health status conditional on employment and health insurance status
(b) annual health transition conditional on health
(c) annual health transition conditional on health and health insurance status
(d) annual medical expenditure conditional on health
(e) annual medical expenditure conditional on health and health insurance
(f) the fraction of zero medical expenditure conditional on health and health in-
surance
4. Firm characteristics
(a) the fraction of firms with less than 50 workers
(b) health insurance coverage rate by whether firm size is less than 50 workers
(c) mean firm size conditional on health insurance offering coverage25
25One could incorporate moments regarding within-firm worker distribution. However, the available de-
mographic information (e.g., the fraction of employees whose age is less than 26, the fraction of employees
earning more than $15 per hour, etc.) is very coarse. Therefore, I decide not to include them as a tar-
get. However, the model prediction of these moments (specifically conditional moments) is qualitatively
consistent. The predicition is available from the author upon request.
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The estimation is done in the standard nested fixed point algorithm and described as
follows:
1. Guess a vector of parameters q.
2. Given the parameters q, solve the equilibrium of the model and then simulate the
data.
3. Evaluate the objective function using the simulated moments:
min
{q}
G(q)′ΩG(q),
where G(q) is the vector of the value of each moment j, Gj(q). Each moment Gj(q)
is constructed as
Gj(q) = G˜j − µj(q)
where G˜j is the sample moment of j and µj(q) is the simulated moment.
4. Repeat steps 1-3 and find q to minimize the objective value.
I compute asymptotic standard errors following Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault
(1993). Certain parameters of the model are calibrated without using the model. In this
study, I do not try to estimate β but set β = 0.99 so that the annual interest rate is about
3%.26 Moreover, the population growth rate n is estimated using the SIPP 2004 sample
by running a regression of cohort size on age. Estimates are n = 1.0005 per four-month
period. Finally, the after-tax income schedule is specified by following Kaplan (2012) who
approximates the U.S. income tax code as T (w) = τ0 + τ1
w(1+τ2)
1+τ2
. Kaplan (2012) estimates
the parameters as τ0 = 0.0056, τ1 = 0.6377 and τ2 = −0.1362.
26 It is known from Flinn and Heckman (1982) that it is difficult to separately identify the discount
factor β from the flow unemployed income b in standard search models.
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2.5 Estimation Result
The parameter estimates are summarized in the Tables 2.4-2.8. Table 2.4 reports the
parameter estimates for individual preferences. Table 2.4 shows that the CARA coeffi-
cient is very heterogenous across different types. In my empirical analysis, I consider the
case where type 1 individuals are more risk averse.27 If we convert this into relative risk
aversion, we get 2.99 for the very high income group of type 1 workers, while it is 1.67 for
type 2 workers. These estimates are much lower than the standard estimates in consump-
tion/saving literature, but consistent with the literature of labor supply elasticity.28 On
the other hand, the disutility from bad health is relatively homogenous across different
types. I also find that the disutility of working is increasing over ages. Moreover, the
coefficient on the interaction between disutility from working and bad health is positive,
implying that old unhealthy individuals suffer higher disutility from working relative to
young unhealthy individuals.
Parameter Estimates Std. Error
γ1 1.2973 (0.038)
γ2 0.7259 (0.033)
η1u 0.0360 (0.001)
η2u 0.0380 (0.001)
ηp 0.0005 (0.00001)
ηhp 0.0223 (0.00003)
b 0.0891 (0.001)
υTU -4.0711 (2.003)
Table 2.4: Parameter Estimate for Individual Preference
Next, Table 2.5 shows the parameter estimates for latent medical expenditure shocks
and health transition processes. I find that the distribution of latent medical expenditure
shocks differs substantially between healthy and unhealthy individuals. For example, al-
27Note that I do not impose any restrictions in terms of the correlation of risk type with other charac-
teristics such as labor market skills, health transition, and disutility from bad health. These correlations
are estimated to fit the data.
28For example, French and Jones (2011) estimate the CRRA coefficient as greater than 8 in his life-cycle
model of labor supply and saving for older workers. On the other hand, Chetty (2006) shows that the
upper bound of the relative risk aversion coefficient for the average worker should be 2 if one estimates it
from labor supply behavior, under the assumption that both college graduates and non-college graduates
share a common parameter value.
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though the constant term for healthy individuals in health shock process is much smaller
than the constant term for unhealthy individuals, the age coefficient in the health shock
process for healthy individuals is much larger than the age coefficient for unhealthy indi-
viduals. Moreover, the health transition process differs substantially between type 1 and
type 2 workers. I find that type 1 workers are more likely to transition to being healthy
in the next period relative to type 2 workers.
Parameter Estimates Std. Error
ωH1 -2.8652 (0.004)
ωH2 0.0097 (0.0001)
ωH3 1.7001E-07 (1.0E-08)
σH 0.5613 (0.003)
κH 0.0684 (0.0004)
ωU1 -1.9286 (0.008)
ωU2 0.00001 (0.00001)
ωU3 0.0000 (1.0E-08)
σU 1.7218 (0.005)
κU 0.0000 (0.0005)
φH1H 3.2557 (0.004)
φU1U 0.4002 (0.001)
φ2U -0.3895 (0.001)
φ3U 0.000015 (0.000002)
φ4U 0.004 (0.001)
φ5U 0.1530 (0.002)
φ6U -0.00016 (0.00002)
φU7U 0.0025 (0.0013)
Table 2.5: Parameter Estimate for Latent Medical Expenditure Shocks and Health Tran-
sition Process
Table 2.6 shows the parameter estimates for the individual labor market environment.
An important finding is that type 1 workers, who are more risk averse and are more likely
to be healthy, are more productive than type 2 workers. Another important finding from
Table 2.6 is that the productivity loss of being unhealthy, αh, is -0.337, which means that
unhealthy workers produce 71.39% of the output of healthy workers.
Table 2.7 shows the parameter estimates for the distribution of workers. It shows that
the fraction of type 1 workers among the college graduates is larger than that among
the non-college graduates. Therefore, by combining results from Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6,
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Parameter Estimates Std. Error
αC1 -0.8008 (0.002)
αNC1 -1.1200 (0.002)
α11 0.3668 (0.002)
αC4 0.00083 (0.0003)
αNC4 3.91E-05 (1.5E-05)
α14 2.16E-06 (5.5E-06)
αC5 1.0E-09 (1.16E-08)
αNC5 -1.5E-06 (1.90E-07)
α15 1.0E-08 (2.1E-07)
αh -0.3370 (0.004)
σn 0.0126 (0.0003)
λCu 0.4340 (0.001)
λCe 0.1360 (0.001)
δC 0.0101 (0.0001)
λNCu 0.2048 (0.001)
λNCe 0.0874 (0.001)
δNC 0.0244 (0.0001)
σw 0.0100 (0.0002)
Table 2.6: Parameter Estimate for Individual Labor Market Activities
parameter estimates show that the college graduates are on average more risk averse,
more productive, and more healthy than non-college graduates in the model. Moreover,
the total measure of workers (relative to the measure of firms) is estimated to be 22.2050
to fit the mean of firm size observed in the data.
Parameter Estimates Std. Error
The frac. of type 1 workers among the college 0.4045 (0.004)
The frac. of type 1 workers among the non-college 0.2715 (0.003)
M 22.2050 (1.26)
Table 2.7: Parameter Estimate for the Distribution of Workers
Finally, Table 2.8 shows parameter estimates for firm-side characteristics. Note that
the scale parameter of firm productivity distribution is normalized to 0 and therefore only
the shape parameter is estimated. The key finding here is that the fixed cost of offering
ESHI is estimated to be $552 per four-month, which is equivalent to $1,656 annually.
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Parameter Estimates Std. Error
σp 0.8517 (0.002)
ξESHI 0.0552 (0.001)
σf 0.3587 (0.0008)
Table 2.8: Parameter Estimate for Firm-side Characteristics
2.5.1 Model Fit
In this section, I first provide tables about model fits to show that the model can fit the
most salient features of the data.
Table 2.9 shows the model fit for the average wage conditional on health insurance
status, age, and education group. In the data, there is a strong positive correlation
between wage and age for college graduates for individuals who have health insurance.
On the other hand, wage-age slopes in other groups are rather flat. The model is able to
fit these moments well.
College graduate Non-college graduate
with HI w/o HI with HI w/o HI
Age Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
25-31 1.8974 1.8695 0.8753 0.8680 1.2624 1.4014 0.7500 0.7772
32-38 2.5425 2.3713 0.9752 1.0004 1.4231 1.4741 0.8915 0.8012
39-45 2.7911 2.7291 0.9603 0.9815 1.6000 1.5107 0.8607 0.8468
46-52 2.9782 3.0157 1.0895 0.9501 1.6467 1.5203 0.8252 0.8461
53-59 2.8987 2.9818 0.9935 0.9065 1.5719 1.5723 0.7103 0.6754
Table 2.9: Model fit: mean 4-month wage conditional on coverage, age and education.
Notes: (a) the unit is $ 10,000. (b) with HI indiciates employed individuals with ESHI; w/o HI
indicates employed individuals are uninsured.
Next, Table 2.10 shows the pattern of health insurance coverage status among the
employed workers over ages. The data shows a positive correlation between coverage
rate and age, regardless of education group. The model captures the insurance gain over
the life cycle quite well. The model somewhat underpredicts the coverage rate among
college graduates in the age group 25-31, while it overpredicts the coverage rate among
non-college graduates in the age group 25-31. Table 2.11 shows the model fit for the
employment rate across each of the age groups. The model can quantitatively explain the
age profile of the employment rate for both education groups.
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College graduate Non-college graduate
Age Data Model Data Model
25-31 0.9045 0.8516 0.6557 0.7494
32-38 0.9494 0.9417 0.7621 0.8005
39-45 0.9516 0.9653 0.8235 0.8478
46-52 0.9527 0.9766 0.8843 0.9028
53-59 0.9607 0.9786 0.8911 0.9185
Table 2.10: Model fit: coverage rate among the employed conditional on age and educa-
tion.
College graduate Non-college graduate
Age Data Model Data Model
25-31 0.9788 0.9692 0.9175 0.9282
32-38 0.9787 0.9795 0.9380 0.9278
39-45 0.9693 0.9809 0.9262 0.9268
46-52 0.9624 0.9757 0.9207 0.9129
53-59 0.9504 0.9678 0.9129 0.9094
Table 2.11: Model fit: employment rate conditional on age and education.
Next, Table 2.12 shows the model fit for health status. It reports the fraction of
healthy individuals across age groups and education status. One striking pattern observed
in the data is that the difference between the fraction of college graduates and non-college
graduates that are healthy increases over time. The model quantitatively accounts for
this pattern well.
College graduate Non-college graduate
Age Data Model Data Model
25-31 0.9889 0.9613 0.9585 0.9278
32-38 0.9784 0.9523 0.9397 0.8968
39-45 0.9590 0.9362 0.9229 0.8692
46-52 0.9564 0.9185 0.8820 0.8857
53-59 0.9182 0.8576 0.8223 0.7822
Table 2.12: Model fit: health status conditional on age and education.
Note: the number in the table is the fraction of individuals who are healthy.
Table 2.13 reports the model fit for the pattern of health status conditional on insur-
ance and employment status. It is shown that the employed workers with ESHI are the
most healthy; the employed who do not have health insurance are less healthy and the
non-employed are the least healthy. The model somewhat over-predicts the fraction of
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the healthy among the non-employed, but it accounts for these qualitative patterns.
Emp. with HI Emp. w/o HI Non-employed
Data Model Data Model Data Model
College graduate 0.9354 0.9507 0.8796 0.8953 0.6803 0.7851
Non-College graduate 0.9009 0.9222 0.8365 0.8632 0.6458 0.7311
Table 2.13: Model fit: mean health status conditioal on insurance, employment and
education.
Table 2.14 shows the model fit for the health transition rate. The data demonstrates
increasing persistence of transitions from unhealthy to unhealthy. Moreover, there is a
stark difference in health transitions between college graduates and non-college graduates.
The table shows that the model is able to capture these patterns.
Table 2.15 shows how well the model fits medical expenditure patterns conditional on
health status. One interesting pattern in the data is that the variation of medical expen-
diture due to health status is much larger for older individuals than for younger. While
the model tends to produce a steeper relationship between age and medical expenditure
relative to the data, it capture the overall pattern of the data reasonably well.
Finally, Table 2.16 shows the model fit of firm-side moments. It demonstrates that the
model fits reasonably well with the data. Specifically, it fits remarkably well for coverage
rate and firm size distributions.
Overall, the model does a good job of quantitatively explaining most salient features of
health, health insurance, and labor market outcomes. While the model contains various
mechanisms generating these outcomes, one of the most important mechanisms is as
follows. First of all, the model estimates predict that high productivity firms tend to
offer health insurance. In the model, firms want to attract more productive workers.
High productivity firms are more likely to attract such workers because they can offer
higher compensation. These more productive workers are typically experienced workers,
who tend to be older and thus have a higher demand for health insurance. College
graduates are another type of productive workers. From my estimates, college graduates
are more risk-averse and have a higher demand for health insurance than less educated
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College graduate Non-college graduate
healthy unhealthy healthy unhealthy
Age Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
25-39 0.1177 0.0875 1.0769 0.8367 0.0688 0.0596 0.5168 0.5931
40-49 0.2032 0.1861 0.9329 1.0988 0.1242 0.0899 0.6964 0.7269
50-59 0.3857 0.3571 1.2109 1.0727 0.2164 0.2219 0.5638 0.5455
Table 2.15: Model fit: mean annual medical expenditure conditional on age and education
and health.
Note: The unit is $ 10,000.
Variable Name Data Model
Average establishment Size 20.8198 20.9779
... for those that offer health insurance 29.6444 31.6429
... for those that do not offer health insurance 7.8903 6.1163
The frac. of firms having less than 50 workers 0.9295 0.8858
Health insurance Coverage Rate 0.5943 0.5957
... for those having less than 50 workers 0.5686 0.5486
... for those having 50 or more workers 0.9338 0.9612
Table 2.16: model fit for firm-side moment
workers. The consequence of sorting of workers with high health insurance demand leads
high-productivity firms to offer ESHI. This then leads to a positive correlation between
firm size and the rate of firms offering ESHI, as high productivity firms attract more
workers and become larger. Furthermore, the model also explains why the coverage rate
increases over age. By moving from low to high productivity firms through job-to-job
transitions over their life cycles, workers gain health insurance. Overall, this mechanism
simultaneously explains positive correlations among workers’ age, wage, education status,
and health insurance coverage and correlations among firm size and ESHI offering rate.29
29In addition to this mechanism, the model has several additional mechanisms that contribute toward
generating a higher rate of firms offering ESHI by large firms. These include tax-deductibility of ESHI
and an improvement of health, and therefore labor productivity, through more usage of health care
(conditional on health shocks). Given my estimates, these mechanisms quantitatively play a minor role
relative to the mechanism described in the main text. The quantitative comparison is available on request.
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2.6 Counterfactual Experiments: Evaluating the ACA
and the components of HIX
In this section, I use the estimated model to evaluate the impact of ACA and each
component of HIX and then study the optimal design of HIX. To do so, I first consider
a stylized version of the ACA as a benchmark counterfactual environment, and then
evaluate the role of HIX in such a context. I consider a stylized version of the ACA
which incorporates its five main components: first, all individuals are required to have
health insurance or pay a penalty (individual mandate); second, all firms with more than
50 workers are required to offer health insurance or pay a penalty (employer mandate);
third, HIX are established where individuals can purchase health insurance at a modified
community rated premium; fourth, the individuals purchasing health insurance from HIX
can obtain income-based subsidies; fifth, Medicaid is expanded.
The introduction of HIX requires a substantial departure from the pre-ACA model
because the premium in HIX will be endogenously determined. As a result, I will first
describe how I extend and analyze the pre-ACA model to incorporate HIX.
2.6.1 The Model for evaluating the ACA
I provide a brief explanation of the main changes in the economic environment, as well as
the definition of equilibrium, for the model used to evaluate the ACA and components of
HIX.
The Main change in individuals’ environment
I assume that individuals who are not offered health insurance by their employers and
those who are non-employed can purchase individual insurance from HIX. I also assume
that the insurance product offered from HIX is the same as that offered by the employers,
in that it also fully insures medical expenditure risk. Moreover, as in the pre-ACA econ-
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omy, health insurance premia for ESHI are pre-paid by firms before an individual accepts
a job offer from the firm. Therefore, there is no incentive for the workers not to take the
offer. Thus in the extended model, an individual’s insurance status INS is defined as:
INS =

0 if uninsured
1 if insured through ESHI
2 if insured through HIX.
I also incorporate the premium subsidies to the individuals and penalties if uninsured
into the model. Let S
(
y,RHIX(t)
)
denote income-based subsidies to an individual with
income y who purchases health insurance from HIX at premium RHIX(t); note that the
subsidy amount does not explicitly depend on individual age t under the specification of
the ACA. Similarly, let IM(y) denote the penalty to individuals who remain uninsured,
which is merely function of income under the ACA.
Ct = τw(wt)Pt + (1− Pt)b−OOPHI(xtmt)
− 1(x = 0)IM(y)− 1(x = 2) (RHIX(t)− S (y,RHIX(t))) (2.19)
where y = wt if employed (Pt = 1) at firms offering (θ, INS) and y = b otherwise (Pt = 0).
Modeling individual decisions of health insurance purchases from HIX requires me to
modify the timing in a period specified in Section 2.2.1. I assume that the decision is
made at the end of the period: after making a working decision in the labor market, an
employed individual not offered health insurance can decide whether to purchase health
insurance from HIX.
Of course, the introduction of HIX into the individual decision problem makes the
expression of individual value functions and steady state worker distributions rather com-
plicated. However the derivation itself is a straightforward extension of the pre-ACA
version. Therefore, I introduce value functions and steady state worker distribution in
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Appendix (B.2).
The main change in firms’ environment
Because of the employer mandate, firms pay a penalty if they do not offer health insurance.
This changes the determination of profits obtained by firms not offering ESHI. The flow
profit Π0(p) is specified as
Π0(p) = max
θed0
∑
t
∑
X˜
pi0(X˜, t, p, θ
ed
0 )lt
(
X˜, θed0 , 0
)
−EM(
∑
t
∑
X˜
(
lt(θ
ed
0 , 0) + lt(θ
ed
0 , 2)
)
)
where pi0(X˜, t, p, θ
ed
0 ) is defined in the pre-ACA economy, which is expressed in (2.13), and
EM(l) is the tax penalty amount, which depends on firm size
∑
X˜
(
l(θed0 , 0) + l(θ
ed
0 , 2)
)
).
The flow profit of firms offering ESHI, Π1(p), as well as the decision of whether to offer
ESHI, ∆(p), are determined as before, and are expressed in (2.10) and (2.14) respectively.
HIX
I assume that HIX is a competitive insurance market, as in Hackmann et al. (2013) and
Handel et al. (2013).30 The premium in HIX is regulated as a modified community rating.
It can vary based on individual age. In equilibrium, it must satisfy
30Ericson and Starc (2012), in their analysis of the HIX in Massachusetts (MA), instead assume that
HIX is an imperfect insurance market. As I will explain, one of the main differences between the MA
reform and the ACA is that the MA reform does not have medical loss ratio regulation while the ACA
has. This limits insurance companies from charging a higher markup for insurance premia. While
allowing imperfect competition in HIX allows us to study the optimal choice of medical loss ratio, such an
assumption substantially complicates the whole analysis and requires the actual data on national samples
of individuals purchasing health insurance from HIX, which is not available at present. Therefore, I leave
this issue for future work.
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∑
t
∑
X˜
∫
gt
(
X˜, θ, 2
)
dθRHIX(t)
= (1 + ξHIX)
∑
t
∑
X˜
∫
E[mX˜∗ |INSt = 2]gt
(
X˜, θ, 2
)
dθ (2.20)
where the left-hand side is the total premium paid by individuals purchasing health in-
surance from HIX, and the right-hand side is the total expected medical expenditure by
those participants multiplied by the loading factor ξHIX .
Note that the health insurance premium RHIX(t) is subject to government regulation
such that it cannot depend on individual health status. The variation of premia due to
age is partially limited due to the age-based rating regulation. Specifically, the regulation
determines the maximum allowable premium ratio between the oldest and the youngest
ωAGE:
ωAGER
HIX(1) ≥ RHIX(T ).
The definition of equilibrium
The definition of steady state equilibrium is a straight forward extension of the equilibrium
under the pre-ACA economy. Specifically, it now includes premiums in HIX
{
RHIX(t)
}
as equilibrium objects. Insurance premia must satisfy a break even condition defined in
(2.20).
Parameterization of policy components in the ACA
In order to evaluate the impact of ACA and the components of HIX, I need to parameter-
ize each component. It requires me to address several issues regarding how to introduce
the specifics of the ACA provisions into my model, such as the penalty associated with
the individual mandate and employer mandate, the premium subsidies, age based rating
regulation, and Medicaid. First, the final picture of the reform regarding Medicaid ex-
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pansion is still unclear. As of the end of August 2013, 25 states plan to expand Medicaid
as the ACA requires, while the others plan not to.31 Because the model does not describe
heterogeneity in terms of states, I can only consider extreme cases: (a) all states expand
Medicaid; (b) no states expand Medicaid. In this analysis, I first show the result for case
(a), and then discuss how results change in case (b). Second, I need to decide on the
magnitude of the loading factor ξHIX that appeared in (2.20), which is applicable in HIX.
I calibrate ξHIX based on the ACA requirement that all insurance sold in the exchange
must satisfy the newly-imposed regulation by the ACA that the medical loss ratio must
be at least 80%.32 This implies that ξHIX = 0.25.
33 Third, the amount of penalties and
subsidies are defined as an annual level, while my model uses four-month as a model
period. I simply divide all monetary units by 3 to obtain the applicable number for a
four-month period. Given these assumptions, I specify the details of the components of
the ACA, which is in Appendix B.3.
2.6.2 The Main Results
The aggregate impact of the ACA
Table 2.17 shows the main results from simulating the ACA and a variety of its combi-
nations. The results for the ACA are reported in Column (2). It reports the outcomes
of several important aggregate variables determined in the model. Panel A reports the
main outcomes regarding the firm side. First, I find that the ACA substantially increases
firms’ coverage rate from 59.6% to 62.7%. The increase in firm’s coverage rate comes not
only from firms with more than 50 workers which are subject to the penalty of employer
31On June 28, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruled unconstitutional the law’s provision that, if a State
does not comply with the ACA’s new coverage requirements, it will lose not only the federal funding for
those requirements, but all of its federal Medicaid fund. This ruling allows states to opt out of ACA’s
Medicaid expansion, leaving each state’s decision to participate in the hands of the nation’s governors
and state leaders.
32The medical loss ratio is the ratio of the total claim costs that the insurance company incurs to total
insurance premium collected from participants.
33The medical loss ratio implied by (2.20) is simply 1/ (1 + ξ), thus an 80% medical loss ratio corre-
sponds to ξ = 0.25. The ACA requires that ξ ≤ 0.25.
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mandate, but also from firms with less than 50 workers, which are not. Secondly, and
more interestingly, I find that the ACA reduces labor productivity and output per worker.
The aggregate labor productivity, defined as the output per employed worker, decreases
by 0.6%, while output per capita decreases by 0.2%, which are substantial.
Panel B reports the main outcomes regarding the worker side. It shows that the
uninsured rate in the estimated sample decreases from 23.6% to 7.8%, which is a sub-
stantial reduction. Half of the reduction is due to the Medicaid expansion, which covers
9.2% of non-employed workers. Moreover, 10.2% of workers, who are employed workers
at firms not offering ESHI, have health insurance from HIX. The remaining increase is
explained by the fact that more workers are covered by ESHI. It also shows that the non-
employment rate decreases by 0.4 percentage point. Furthermore, the fraction of healthy
workers increases by 1 percentage point.
Combining the results from Panel A and B, it is somewhat surprising to observe the
decline of aggregate labor productivity and output. It is important to stress that the im-
pact of the ACA on aggregate labor productivity and output are theoretically ambiguous.
There are several mechanisms counteracting the decline of these variables. First, the frac-
tion of healthy workers increases as more workers are insured and utilize more health care
when they are hit by health shocks. Because the unhealthy individuals produce 30% less
than the healthy individuals, this should increase aggregate labor productivity. Second,
the non-employment rate decreases relative to the pre-ACA economy, which is a conse-
quence of the increase in the fraction of healthy individuals, as the unhealthy individuals
face higher disutility of working.34 This channel has a positive effect on the output per
capita. However, the main reason for observing the decrease in aggregate labor produc-
tivity and output is that more workers are allocated to low productivity firms, reported
in Panel B. The fraction of employed workers in the top 50% of firms in productivity
34Note that an increase in the employment rate is not a trivial result. Indeed, given the expansion
of Medicaid which provides free coverage to non-employed workers, the ACA gives a strong disincentive
to work, as argued by Mulligan (2013b) and Mulligan (2013a). However, I find that such a disincentive
effect is smaller than the effect from improved health which leads to more labor force participation.
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ranking decreases by 1.11%.
Panel C reports the main outcome regarding the government budget. It shows that
government revenues decrease by 3%. The source of the declines is an expansion of
subsidized coverage in HIX and an expansion of Medicaid.
The heterogeneous impact of the ACA
While Table 2.17 is mainly about aggregate outcome, it is also useful to know whether
the ACA has different effects on individuals with different characteristics.
Age Group Pre-ACA ACA
Age Group (1) (2) (3)
25-35 0.18 0.17 0.12
35-45 0.12 0.12 0.07
45-55 0.09 0.10 0.004
Table 2.18: Counterfactual Policy Experiments: the Impact of the ACA by Age Groups.
Notes: Column (1) is the measure of employed workers who are not offered ESHI under the pre-ACA;
Column (2) is the measure of employed workers who are not offered ESHI under the ACA; Column (3)
is the measure of individuals who are uninsured and employed.
Table 2.18 shows the uninsured rate by age cohorts. Interestingly, the third column
in Table 2.18 shows that individuals older than age 45 achieve almost universal coverage.
Most remaining uninsured are younger individuals. The third column in Table 2.18 shows
that 10% of individuals between age 45 and 55 are working for firms not offering ESHI,
while it is 17% for age 25-35. Therefore, this age difference is caused by the low partici-
pation to HIX by younger individuals who are working for firms not offering ESHI. This
pattern is explained by the following two reasons. First, the maximum premium ratio
between the youngest and oldest is binding in my counterfactual. Therefore, younger
individuals need to pay higher premia relative to their expected medical expenditures.
Second, the distribution of medical expenditure among the young is more skewed rela-
tive to the old in my estimates. As a result, HIX for the young pool suffers from more
of an adverse selection problem. These effects lead to a lower proportion of the young
participating in HIX. Another interesting finding is that the fraction of older workers in
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firms not offering ESHI is higher in the ACA than the fraction in the pre-ACA economy.
Because firms not offering ESHI tend to be low productivity firms, a higher proportion
of older workers are allocated to low productivity firms. Such a pattern is documented
in Figure 2.1, which shows that the fraction of older individuals in more productive firms
is lower in the ACA than the fraction in the pre-ACA economy. Moreover, these older
workers are typically less skilled, as seen from Figure 2.2.
Pre-ACA ACA
(1) (2) (3)
0.94 0.96 0.99
Table 2.19: Counterfactual Policy Experiments: the Impact of the ACA by Health Status.
Notes: Column (1) is the fraction of healthy workers among those who are working in firms not offering
ESHI unde the pre-ACA; Column (2) is the fraction of healthy workers among those who are working in
firms not offering ESHI unde the ACA; Column (3) is the frac. healthy uninsured is the fraction of
healthy workers among those who choose to stay uninsured under the ACA.
Table 2.19 shows the change in the distribution of health status among the uninsured.
As shown in the table, the fraction of healthy workers who are working at firms not
offering ESHI is 0.94 in the pre-ACA economy. The ACA increases it to 0.96. Moreover,
those who remain uninsured are healthy individuals. Therefore, almost all unhealthy
individuals are covered by health insurance.
The impact of the components of HIX
To understand the main driving forces and mechanisms generating the impact of the
ACA, I show the importance of each component of HIX in the ACA, which is summarized
in Table 2.17.35 First, Column (3) shows the simulation result under the ACA without
individual mandate. In this case, the uninsured rate more than doubles. This increases in
the uninsured rate is explained by the decline in both the participation rate in HIX and
the rate of firms offering ESHI. This indicates the importance of the individual mandate
in this economy for achieving a lower uninsured rate. The increase in the uninsured rate
35An additional set of the results showing each component of the ACA, in addition to the HIX, is
available on request.
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comes from a lower proportion of firms offering ESHI and lower take-up in HIX. Mainly
due to an increase in the uninsured rate without individual mandates, the fraction of
unhealthy individuals increases, contributing to the decline of labor productivity and
output. However, the magnitude of the decline is quite small.
Column (4) shows the simulation result under the ACA without premium subsidies.
Relative to the case under the ACA without individual mandate, an increase in the
uninsured rate from the ACA is relatively small: it is 9.34% while it is 16.56% under the
ACA without individual mandate. One reason for the increase in the uninsured rate is the
lower participation in HIX, which is the effect we observed in the case of the removal of
the individual mandate. However, this small response is due to the fact that the fraction
of firms offering ESHI in the absence of premium subsidies is 5 percentage points higher
relative to the ACA with the premium subsidies. This is due to the fact that premium
subsidies decrease the ESHI offering rate. Therefore, while both an individual mandate
and premium subsidies increase participation in HIX, each of the components of the ACA
has a qualitatively different effect on the rate of firms offering ESHI.
An interesting finding from Column (4) is that the decline in labor productivity and the
output per capita in the ACA, reported in Column (2) is accounted for by the premium
subsidies. Column (2) also shows that premium subsidies account for the most of the
decline in the fraction of employed workers in firms ranked in the top 50% productivity
ranking.
One can see a similar pattern from Column (5). Here, I consider the case where
individuals whose income is less than 400% obtain full premium subsidies so that they
can obtain free health insurance from HIX. Both output and labor productivity decline,
while the fraction of healthy workers and employment rate increase.
The main reason why more workers are allocated to low productivity firms is that
firms cannot allow individual workers to choose between ESHI and HIX as their source of
coverage. Specifically, if firms offer ESHI, their workers lose the chance to buy subsidized
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health insurance from HIX. This will be a more important problem for older and low
skilled workers, who obtain health insurance at lower costs from the HIX relative to high
skilled workers. Therefore, more older and low skilled workers show their preference for
staying at low productivity firms not offering ESHI by turning down offers from high
productivity firms offering ESHI, unless these high productivity firms offer wages which
are high enough. These effects are confirmed in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. On the other
hand, high skilled workers, who gain less from purchasing health insurance from HIX
prefer to work at jobs offering ESHI. Such heterogeneous preferences can arise from not
only skill heterogeneities, but also other characteristics such as age. These preference
heterogeneities then lead to an inefficient sorting of workers across different firms.
Figure 2.1: The fraction of employed workers in top 50% of firms (by productivity)
This result is very different from the standard perception that HIX can lead to more
efficient sorting of workers across firms. Indeed, there has been a large literature investi-
gating how the pre-ACA, employer based health insurance system leads to misallocation
of workers by hampering reallocation of workers from low to high productivity firms,
which are labeled as job-lock and job-push problems.36 However, the existing evidence
about the quantitative importance of these channels is mixed. Indeed, Dey and Flinn
(2005), who estimate a search, matching, and bargaining model of wage and health in-
36See Currie and Madrian (1999) and Gruber (2000) for an excellent survey of this literature.
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Figure 2.2: The fraction of employed individuals in top 50% of firms (by productivity):
by individual type
surance provisions, find that the existing employer based health insurance system leads
to a negligible amount of inefficient job mobility decisions (i.e., decisions to turn down
job offers from more productive jobs.) My study, rather, points out that the particular
design of HIX can lead to less efficient allocation of workers across firms.
In terms of the quantitative significance of this result, it is comparable to other studies
investigating the impact of institution on labor productivity. For example, Gourio and
Roys (2012) find that size dependent regulations on firms in France lead to a decline
in labor productivity of 0.27%. By using a different model, Garicano, LeLarge, and
Van Reenen (2013) evaluate the impact of the same institution in France and find that it
reduces labor productivity by 0.02% if wages are endogenously adjusted while it reduces
labor productivity by 4% if wages are not adjusted.
Finally, column (6) shows the simulation result under the ACA without age based
rating regulation. Here, I assume that each age group consists of different risk pools
and that premia for each group is determined as a competitive price. Interestingly, the
uninsured rate increases slightly, which reflects the fact that given the individual mandate
and premium subsidies, perfect age based rating causes more adverse selection in each
group. More interestingly, the premium subsidies to HIX substantially increase relative
to the original ACA.
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The partial equilibrium analysis: the role of equilibrium labor market inter-
actions
To understand the role of equilibrium labor market interactions in Table 2.17, I conduct
counterfactual experiments where the distribution of offers of compensation packages is
assumed to be exogenous and the same as in the pre-ACA economy. As I find in Table
2.17, the rate of firm offering ESHI varies substantially depending on the design of HIX.
The key question is how important is this channel to understanding the impact on the
uninsured rate or other labor market outcomes. Note that this analysis is not directly
comparable to Ericson and Starc (2012), Handel et al. (2013) and Hackmann, Kolstad,
and Kowalski (2013). In these models, individuals can choose either to stay uninsured
or to purchase health insurance from HIX. Therefore, their models do not account for
the possibility that individuals change labor supply and job mobility decisions to take
advantage of the benefit of purchasing health insurance from HIX. In this analysis, I still
allow the individual-level responses in the labor market.
The result is reported in Table 2.20. In Column (2), I show the results under the case
where all the components of the ACA are implemented. Compared with Column (2) in
Table 2.17, where the offer distribution is endogenously determined, the labor productivity
decline is much smaller. A similar result is obtained in Column (4) and (5), where the
amount of premium subsidies is changed from the ACA.
To understand this result, it is important to recognize how the offer distribution is
adjusted. As I explain in the last section, low skilled workers prefer to stay with low
productivity firms if they have premium subsides from HIX. This makes low productivity
firms that do not offer ESHI more attractive relative to more productive firms offering
ESHI, as these low productivity firms can hire and retain workers for longer. As a result,
low productivity firms are less likely to offer ESHI, which increases the likelihood that
these workers work at low productivity firms. Consequently, this channel becomes an
additional mechanism that lower aggregate labor productivity.
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Another interesting pattern involves the uninsured rate. In Column (2) and (3), the
reported uninsured rate is much lower relative to the one in Table 2.17. The main differ-
ence is the rate of firms offering ESHI. In Table 2.17, firms’ ESHI offering rate is much
higher, particularly for large firms. This causes workers to have less incentive to obtain
health insurance and utilize health care when they are young, as they expect to be covered
in the future.
Column (6) is the case where the premium is perfectly rated on the basis of age. Inter-
estingly, in this case we find much more decline in output and labor productivity relative
to the case where the offer distribution is endogenously adjusted. Here, young workers,
who are more likely to experience job-to-job quits, face much lower premia relative to older
workers in HIX. These workers have more incentive to stay at firms not offering ESHI. In
the case where offer distribution of compensation packages is endogenously adjusted, this
effect is partially muted because firms increase wage offer to take into account premium
differences in HIX.
Overall, these results indicate that the simulated outcomes substantially differ between
partial and general equilibrium settings. This indicates that an explicit modeling of labor
market interactions is crucial to understand the welfare impact of HIX.
2.7 Normative Analysis: Optimal Design of Health
Insurance Exchanges
In this section, I study whether the government can increase the welfare by altering the
major design components of HIX. The previous section has shown mechanisms whereby
each component of HIX leads to changes in the uninsured rate and labor market outcomes.
I find that the current design of HIX system decreases the aggregate labor productivity
by allocating more workers to relatively low productivity firms. This is mainly due to
the premium subsidies, which contributes to lower uninsured rate in HIX. Moreover, I
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also find that an adverse selection problem is much more severe for young individuals
under the current structure of HIX. Given these findings, the natural question is whether
there is a room for improving the welfare by altering the HIX system. To answer the
question, I study the optimal design problem of HIX system. First, I specify policy tools
for designing HIX. Next, I define the government problem of designing HIX. Then, I show
the main results obtained from the optimal design problem.
2.7.1 The Government Problem
Policy instruments for HIX
In my welfare analysis, I consider the following three policy instruments for HIX: (1)
age-based pricing regulation ωAGE, (2) premium subsidies S, and (3) tax penalties on the
uninsured IM37. I choose these policy instruments because these policies are regarded as
the major instruments affecting the uninsured rate in HIX. Moreover, in public economics,
these policy instruments are also regarded as the major instruments to correct welfare loss
from adverse selection in insurance markets.38 The key novelty of my analysis is to take
into account equilibrium labor market interactions. To define the government problem, I
specify their policy constraints in the optimal design problem. I proceed with analysis in
the following three cases:
Case 1. S and IM follow the same functional form as the ACA. For example, tax penalties
are specified as (ωim0 , ω
im
1 ) such that IM (y) = max {ωim0 × y, ωim1 } . In the ACA,
ωim0 = 0.025 and ω
im
1 = $695. I parameterize S in the same way:
S
(
y,RHIX(t)
)
=
 max
{
RHIX(t)−
[
ωs0 + ω
s
1
3y
ωs2
]
y, 0
}
if y <
ωs2
3
0, otherwise,
In the ACA, ωs0 = 0.035, ω
s
1 = 0.060, and ω
s
2 is the income at 400% federal poverty
37Note that the specification under the ACA is explained in Appendix B.3.
38See Einav, Finkelstein, and Levin (2010b) and Einav and Finkelstein (2011).
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level FPL400%.
Case 2. S and IM take a more flexible functional form. Specifically, they are specified so
that
S
(
y,RHIX(t)
)
=
exp(ωsa + ω
s
byt + ω
s
cy
2
t )
1 + exp(ωsa + ω
s
byt + ω
s
cy
2
t )
RHIX(t)
IM
(
y,RHIX(t)
)
=
exp(ωima + ω
im
b yt + ω
im
c y
2
t )
1 + exp(ωima + ω
im
b yt + ω
im
c y
2
t )
RHIX(t)
Case 3. S and IM are explicitly age-dependent:
S
(
y, t, RHIX(t)
)
=
exp
 ωsa + ωsbyt + ωscy2t
+ωsdt+ ω
s
et
2

1 + exp
 ωsa + ωsbyt + ωscy2t
+ωsdt+ ω
s
et
2

RHIX(t)
IM
(
y, t, RHIX(t)
)
=
exp
 ωima + ωimb yt + ωimc y2t
+ωimd t+ ω
im
e t
2

1 + exp
 ωima + ωimb yt + ωimc y2t
+ωimd t+ ω
im
e t
2

RHIX(t)
I study the possibility that the government can condition premium subsidies and tax
penalties on the uninsured by individual age for the following reasons. First, in HIX,
insurance premia are, to some extent, pooled across individuals with different ages due
to the age based pricing regulation. Second, I find in Section 2.6 that there is a sharp
difference in terms of the impact of the ACA across different age groups. Third, it is known
from recent optimal taxation and social insurance literature that age dependent policies
are welfare improving (see, for example, Akerlof (1978); Michelacci and Ruffo (2011);
Weinzierl (2011); Farhi and Werning (2013)). Motivated by these reasons, I examine the
welfare impact of age dependent premium subsidies and tax penalties, in addition to age
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based rating regulation.
Optimal design of HIX
The government chooses a combination of three policy instruments for HIX, THIX =
{ωAGE, S, IM}, to maximize the social welfare subject to the revenue constraint. There
are several ways to specify the social welfare function. By following the standard approach
used in the social insurance and optimal taxation literature, I assume that the government
is utilitarian. Moreover, I define the social welfare function as the ex-ante lifetime utility
of newborn individuals:
SW (THIX) =
∑
X˜0
V0(X˜0)g0
(
X˜0, 0, 0
)
where V0(X˜) is lifetime utility of newborn individuals. The revenue constraint is given by
RVtax(THIX) +RVp(THIX)− EXPsub(THIX) ≥ R.
The first term in the left hand side is the revenue from the income tax in the equilibrium
under the policy parameters THIX , which is given as
RVtax(THIX) =
∑
t
∑
X˜
∑
INS
∫
TI(X˜, θ, INS)gt
(
X˜, θ, INS
)
dθ,
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and RVp(THIX) is the revenue from tax penalties imposed on the uninsured and on large
firms not offering ESHI, given as
RVp(THIX) =
∑
t
∑
X˜
∫
IM
(
yt, R
HIX(t), t
)
gt
(
X˜, θ, 0
)
dθ
+
∑
t
∑
X˜
IM
(
b, RHIX(t), t
)
ut(X˜, 0)
+
∫
p
EM
∑
t
∑
X˜
lt
(
X˜, θed0 , 0
)
+ lt
(
X˜, θed0 , 2
)
×(1−∆(p))dΓ(p)
where the first line is the tax penalty on the uninsured who are employed, the second
line is the penalty on the uninsured among non-employed, and the third term is the
penalty on the large firms not offering ESHI. EXPsub(THIX) is government subsidies for
health insurance, which consist of the expenditure on the premium subsidies to HIX and
Medicaid:
EXPsub(THIX) =
∑
t
∑
X˜
∫
Sy
(
yt, R
HIX(t), t, X˜
)
gt
(
X˜, θ, 2
)
dθ
−
∑
t
∑
X˜
Su
(
RHIX(t), t, X˜
)
ut
(
X˜, 1
)
Finally, I specify that R is the government revenue obtained at the ACA, THIX = T
ACA
HIX .
Therefore, the solution of this government problem tells us the maximum welfare gain
achieved given the policy constraints relative to the ACA. In order to solve the planner’s
problem numerically, I use KNITRO, which is a solver for nonlinear optimization allowing
nonlinear inequality constraints.39 Moreover, I fix revenue constraint R as the revenue
obtained if THIX takes the parameter values adopted by the ACA.
39KNITRO is a derivative based optimization toolbox, and thus requires smoothness of the objective
function. To guarantee the smoothness, I add preference shock for insurance purchasing decisions for
HIX. I specify that it follows a Type-I extreme value distribution, where the scale parameter is set very
small: 0.005.
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2.7.2 Main Results
The general equilibrium analysis (with endogenous offer distribution of com-
pensation)
First, I investigate the optimal structure of HIX in a general equilibrium setting, i.e., the
setting where the offer distribution of compensation package is endogenously determined
by firm’s optimization problem. I begin by reporting the optimal policy parameters
for Case 1, which is the case where the government’s policy set is restricted within the
functional form implemented under the ACA.
Policy Parameter ACA optimal
Panel A: policy for age based rating
the MPR between the youngest and the oldest (ωAGE) 3.00 4.044
Panel B: premium subsidies to HIX
constant term (ωs0) 0.035 0.005
the coeff. for income (ωs1) 0.060 0.052
the maximum 4-month income eligible for subsidies 400% FPL 242% FPL
Panel C: individual mandates (tax penalty to the uninsured)
the minimum amount of annual tax penalty (ωim0 ) $695 $40.7
the percentage of tax penalty as a function of income (ωim1 ) 2.5% 2.99%
Table 2.21: Optimal Policy Parameters under Case 1
Table 2.21 shows the optimal structure of HIX under Case 1 and its comparison from
the ACA. The major differences are as follows: (1) the maximum premium ratio between
the oldest and the youngest ωAGE is larger; (2) the premium subsidies becomes more
progressive: available up to 242% of FPL, more generous subsidies to low income; (3)
individual mandates are set max {0.03× y, $29.5} , which indicates a larger tax penalty
for high income individuals and a lower penalty to low income individuals. However, the
welfare gain is modest. I measure the welfare gain by the annual lump-sum transfer to
individuals to have the same utility under the ACA environment as the one in the optimal.
For Case 1, it is merely $45.
Next, I examine the optimal design under Case 2, which allows more nonlinearity in
terms of the choice of premium subsidies and tax penalties. The result is shown in Table
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2.22. I find that ωAGE is even larger and the premium subsidies are still progressive. To
calculate the welfare gain, I use the same measure as used in Case 1. The welfare gain is
equivalent to an annual lump-sum transfer to each individual of $111. Overall, I find that
progressive subsidies and more transfers from the old to the young are welfare improving.
Optimal Policy Parameter
Panel A: policy for age based rating
The maximum premium ratio between the youngest and the oldest (ωAGE) 4.70
Panel B: premium subsidies to HIX
Constant term (ωsa) 0.05
The coeff. for income (ωsb) -0.50
The coeff. for income squared (ωsc) 0.002
Panel C: individual mandates (tax penalty to the uninsured)
Constant term (ωima ) -3.63
The coeff. for income
(
ωimb
)
0.16
The coeff. for income squared
(
ωimc
)
0.01
Table 2.22: Optimal Policy Parameters under Case 2
Now, I consider Case 3, which allows age dependent premium subsidies and individual
mandates. The optimal policy parameter is reported in Table 2.23. The general feature
of the optimal policy relative to the ACA scheme is: (a) it allows a larger maximum
premium ratio between the youngest and the oldest; (b) the ratio of premium subsidies to
the premium is substantially decreasing in income and age; (c) the ratio of tax penalties
over premium is very slightly increasing in income and age. Specifically, an important
pattern is that premium subsidies are decreasing in age, while they are set independently
in the ACA. The shape of optimal subsidies is summarized in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. As
is clear from Figure 2.3, individuals with income at 300% of the Federal Poverty Level
(FPL 300%) have very small subsidies over age, while those at FPL 133% receive large
premium subsidies when they are young, decreasing gradually over time. Moreover, from
Figure 2.4, one can see that premium subsidies become almost zero around a 4-month
income of $15,000, which is close to FPL 400% regardless of age. This pattern is similar
to the ACA.
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Optimal Policy Parameter
Panel A: policy for age based rating
The MPR between the youngest and the oldest (ωAGE) 3.74
Panel B: premium subsidies to HIX
Constant term (ωsa) 3.95
The coeff. for income (ωsb) -0.46
The coeff. for income squared (ωsc) 0.06
The coeff. for age (t = . . . , 132) (ωsd) -0.02
The coeff. for age squared (ωse) -0.02
Panel C: individual mandates (tax penalty to the uninsured)
Constant term (ωima ) -3.60
The coeff. for income (ωimb ) 0.005
The coeff. for income squared (ωimc ) 0.000
The coeff. for age (t = . . . , 132) (ωimd ) 0.003
The coeff. for age squared (ωime ) 0.000
Table 2.23: Optimal Policy Parameters under Case 3: Allowance of Age-Dependent Sub-
sidies and Individual Mandate
Figure 2.3: Optimal subsidies rate over ages
Column (2) in Table 2.24 reports the outcome under optimal HIX. First, it shows
the substantial increase in output and labor productivity: output per worker increases
by 0.1% and aggregate labor productivity increases by 0.6%. The increase in output is
achieved despite the fact that the nonemployment rate increases. The uninsured rate is
7.53% which is somewhat lower relative to the ACA, while the magnitude of the changes
is quite small compared with the pre-ACA economy where the uninsured rate is 23.6%.
In order to measure the welfare gain relative to the ACA, I assume that the government
provides a lump-sum transfer to all individuals in the ACA economy. I find that the ACA
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Figure 2.4: Optimal subsidies rate over income
will achieve the same level of utility as the optimal HIX if the government provide the
transfer which is $195 annually. The transfer corresponds to 7.6% of medical expenditure.
This eventually contributes to an increase in government expenditure of 1.1%, which is
substantial.
Columns (3) to (5) report what happens when each component of optimal HIX is
replaced by the component of HIX implemented under the ACA. Column (3) reports the
major outcomes if the premium subsidies scheme is replaced by the scheme implemented
under the ACA. I find that the uninsured rate is much higher while labor productivity
is lower. The rise in the uninsured rate is mainly explained by the fact that more young
and healthy individuals are uninsured. Column (3) reports the major outcomes if the
individual mandate scheme is replaced by the scheme implemented under the ACA. I find
that the uninsured rate is much smaller, as it induces more participation into HIX. While
labor productivity is still higher than the ACA, it is lower relative to the optimal HIX
reported in Column (2). Finally, Column (5) reports the major outcomes if the age based
rating regulation is replaced by the regulation under the ACA. I find that the uninsured
rate is higher while most labor market outcomes are similar to those reported in Column
(2). These results demonstrate that all of the components contribute to the changes in
outcomes, but redesigning premium subsidies has a crucial effect on labor productivity.
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To understand the mechanism generating the welfare gain, it is important to recognize
that under the optimal structure of HIX, relatively old workers gain less benefit than young
workers from purchasing health insurance from HIX, because the optimal structure sets
higher maximum premium ratio (MPR) and also allows premium subsidies to decrease
with age. By giving more subsidies to the young, the optimal structure can ameliorate
the adverse selection problems explained in Section (2.6.2). Because young workers are
given more premium subsidies, they have more incentive to participate in HIX. Moreover,
because the gain from participating in HIX is smaller for relatively old workers, this
structure gives old workers more incentives to work at firms offering ESHI. Because high
productivity firms are more likely to offer ESHI, this optimal structure can give more
incentives to workers to move from low to high productivity firms over the life cycle. This
intuition is confirmed by Figure 2.5, which shows that more older individuals are allocated
on more productive firms relative to the outcome under the ACA.
Figure 2.5: The fraction of employed workers in top 50% of firms (by productivity)
While these economic forces give the benefit of redistribution from old to young work-
ers, its cost is to make old workers worse off, in particular for those that lose their job
offering ESHI due to exogenous job destruction shocks and start working at firms not
offering ESHI. Indeed, Table 2.25 shows that the measure of the uninsured among the age
group 45-55 increases due to the decrease in premium subsidies. The optimal structure
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of HIX is therefore determined to take into account such a cost as well as the benefit
described above.
Age Group
ACA
(1)
Optimal HIX
(2)
Age Group Uninsured who are employed Uninsured who are employed
25-35 0.12 0.07
35-45 0.07 0.07
45-55 0.004 0.04
Table 2.25: Comparison of the uninsured rate by different age groups under the ACA and
under the optimal structure of HIX in Case 3.
Note: Uninsured who are employed is the measure of individuals who are uninsured and employed.
Finally, an interesting feature of the optimal structure is while premium subsidies are
substantially decreasing in age, tax penalties are not. This difference reflects the differen-
tial effect of subsidies and tax penalties, which arise in an economy where both HIX and
ESHI are modeled. Both larger subsidies and higher tax penalties give individuals more
incentive to obtain health insurance. However, while larger subsidies give individuals in-
centive to purchase heath insurance from HIX rather than to obtain health insurance from
employers, higher penalties do not directly give such incentive to individuals. Therefore,
in order to give incentive the old individuals to obtain health insurance from employers,
premium subsidies are set to decrease in age. This differential impact of the premium
subsidies and tax penalties has not pointed out in the existing works that study HIX
designs, as they do not consider ESHI. Therefore, this finding indicates the importance
of modeling ESHI and the labor market to understand the optimal design of HIX.
The partial equilibrium analysis
Next, I investigate how the optimal structure differs if one ignores general equilibrium
effects of labor markets. To this end, I assume that the offer distribution of compensation
package is fixed and the same as the one in the pre-ACA economy. Then, I solve the
worker’s problem taking into account the equilibrium determination of health insurance
premia in HIX.
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The optimal policy parameters under Case 3 are summarized in Table 2.26. The key
features of the optimal policies relative to the optimal HIX under the general equilibrium
case are as follows. First, average premium subsidies are, in general, larger, particularly for
low income individuals. This reflects the fact that the offer distribution is not adjusted,
and therefore does not contribute a reduction of labor productivity. Second, the tax
penalty on the uninsured is higher, particularly for high income individuals. Because tax
penalties do not increase the ESHI offering rate, higher penalties are needed to improve
the pool of HIX. Finally, the maximum premium ratio (MPR) between the oldest and the
youngest is slightly higher than the MPR under the general equilibrium case.
Optimal Policy Parameter
Panel A: policy for age based rating
The maximum premium ratio between the youngest and the oldest (ωAGE) 3.91
Panel B: premium subsidies to HIX
Constant term (ωsa) 4.63
The coeff. for income (ωsb) -0.31
The coeff. for income squared (ωsc) 0.22
The coeff. for age (t = . . . , 132) (ωsd) -0.01
The coeff. for age squared (ωse) -0.001
Panel C: individual mandates (tax penalty to the uninsured)
Constant term (ωima ) -3.62
The coeff. for income (ωimb ) 0.16
The coeff. for income squared (ωimc ) 0.01
The coeff. for age (t = . . . , 132) (ωimd ) 0.00
The coeff. for age squared (ωime ) 0.00
Table 2.26: Optimal Policy Parameters under Case 3 and Exogenous Offer Distribution
To understand how the implications differ if we use the optimal policies obtained under
the partial equilibrium setting, I report the comparison of outcomes simulated under the
general equilibrium setting between optimal HIX policies under general equilibrium (in
Column (2)) and optimal HIX policies under partial equilibrium (in Column (3)) in Table
2.27. First, by providing more subsidies, aggregate labor productivity is lower under op-
timal HIX policies under partial equilibrium (in Column (3)) than the productivity under
general equilibrium (in Column (2)). Moreover, due to a larger expenditure on premium
subsidies, the fraction of firms offering ESHI decreases and the total government expen-
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diture is sightly higher under the partial equilibrium. These results show the importance
of taking into account equilibrium effects when designing the optimal HIX.
Optimal HIX: GE
(1)
Optimal HIX: partial
(2)
Frac. of firms offering ESHI 0.6073 0.5646
Average labor productivity 2.4875 2.4775
Uninsured rate 0.0753 0.0853
Non-employment rate 0.0941 0.0938
Table 2.27: Counterfactual Policy Experiments: Comparison: Outcomes in general equi-
librium under (1) optimal policies obtained with endogenous offer distribution of com-
pensation packages and (2) optimal policies obtained with exogenous offer distribution of
compensation packages.
2.7.3 Discussion: the role of Medicaid expansion
So far, all the exercises are conducted under the assumption that Medicaid is expanded
as projected. However, as of August 2013, 25 states do not plan to expand Medicaid.
In this section, I investigate the interaction between Medicaid expansion and HIX. Med-
icaid expansion affects HIX as it affects the risk pools in HIX. Specifically, if Medicaid
is not expanded, individuals who would have been eligible for Medicaid will be absorbed
by HIX. Because these individuals are less healthy relative to the average population in
the economy, their absorption into HIX may increase health insurance premium in HIX,
worsening the adverse selection problem.40 Therefore, the question is how much effect
Medicaid expansion will have on risk pooling in HIX. At this stage, it is not clear how
state governments that decide not expand Medicaid will choose premium subsidies for
those who are eligible for Medicaid but ineligible for federal premium subsidies. How-
ever, for simplicity, I assume that individuals who were eligible for Medicaid obtain full
premium subsidies from HIX. That is, those individuals will be guaranteed to be insured
through HIX. I call this situation ”no-Medicaid expansion” in the remainder of the study.
40The link between Medicaid and the risk pools in individual insurance markets is investigated by
Clemens (2013).
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Therefore, the impact of no-Medicaid expansion is realized purely through its impact on
risk pools in HIX.
First, I evaluate the impact of the ACA with no-Medicaid expansion. I find that
the uninsured rate is 8.3%, which is higher than the rate under the ACA with Medicaid
expansion, which was 7.8%. The main reason is that the risk pool in HIX is worse due to
the entry of pre-Medicaid pools who are less healthy. This negative externality is large
enough that more employed workers choose to be uninsured. Next, I examine the optimal
structure of HIX, given the ACA budget constraint. To make the comparison transparent,
I assume that the pre-Medicaid eligible population still obtain health insurance for free
from HIX. I find that the optimal structure of HIX is qualitatively similar to the case
with Medicaid expansion, including the age dependence of premium subsidies. More
interestingly, I find that the welfare gain from the optimal design of HIX is rather small:
it amounts to $80, much smaller than the welfare gain with Medicaid expansion, which
amounts to $195. These results highlight the importance of interactions between Medicaid
and HIX.
2.8 Conclusion
In this study, I evaluate the current HIX system and investigate its optimal design, ac-
counting for adverse selection and equilibrium labor market interactions. I first develop
and estimate a life cycle equilibrium labor market search model integrated with the pre-
ACA health insurance market. Various forms of individual heterogeneity are incorporated
to understand the welfare consequences of HIX. Through counterfactual experiments, I
find that the ACA substantially reduces the uninsured rate. However, the ACA also de-
creases aggregate labor productivity by allocating more workers to less productive firms.
Next, I examine the optimal design of HIX by choosing the values of three major design
components – individual mandates, premium subsidies and age-based rating regulations.
I found that the optimal combination of these components makes it less beneficial for older
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workers to purchase health insurance from HIX, relative to young workers. Implementing
the optimal structure leads to a substantial welfare gain relative to HIX implemented
under the ACA, while achieving higher labor productivity and a slightly lower uninsured
rate. In this structure, the adverse selection problem in HIX among the young is reduced.
Moreover, it gives older workers an incentive to work at firms offering ESHI. This increases
the allocation of workers from low to high productivity firms, raising aggregate labor
productivity.
Finally, I assess the role of equilibrium labor market interactions by assuming that the
distribution of offers of compensation package is fixed and evaluating the impact of each
component of HIX as well as the optimal design of HIX. I find that both the impact of HIX
components and their optimal design are qualitatively and quantitatively very different
from the equilibrium with endogenous compensation packages, indicating the importance
of modeling equilibrium labor market interactions to evaluate HIX design.
There are a number of dimensions in which my stylized model could be extended to
capture other important features. One of the most important extensions is to allow mul-
tiple insurance products offered in HIX to understand the importance of adverse selection
across insurance plans within HIX. Such an extension allows us to study the optimal regu-
lation of insurance contracts, such as the choice of minimum creditable coverage. However,
there are a number of difficulties. First, it requires careful choices about the notion of
equilibrium, as certain types of equilibria (e.g., Nash equilibrium) may not exist in such
environment. Handel et al. (2013) make an important contribution in this regard. Sec-
ond, an additional important challenge is to model the situation where firms offer a menu
of ESHI contracts to workers, and to obtain data about the set of insurance plans that
workers face and firms offer. At this stage, it is very difficult to obtain such data. Third, it
also requires a more sophisticated modeling of individual health care utilization decisions.
While each of these issues is very challenging and requires a substantial departure from
this framework, these extensions are exciting opportunities for future work.
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Chapter 3
Advertising Competition and Risk
Selection in Health Insurance
Markets: Evidence from Medicare
Advantage
This chapter is co-authored with You Suk Kim.
3.1 Introduction
Medicare provides health insurance for the majority of elderly Americans. Although tra-
ditional fee-for-service Medicare is public insurance provided by the government, many
Medicare beneficiaries opt out of traditional Medicare to receive coverage from Medicare
Advantage (MA) plans offered by private insurance companies. A main factor that dif-
ferentiates MA plans from traditional Medicare is the provision of additional services at
the cost of a restricted provider network. In 2011, about 25% of Medicare beneficiaries
enrolled in MA. An MA plan receives a capitation payment from the government for its
enrollee and then bears the health care costs incurred by the enrollee. The capitation
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payment accounts for most of the plans’ revenues, even though MA plans often charge a
premium.
A potential problem of MA is that private insurers have incentives to selectively en-
roll low-cost, healthy individuals (or “risk-select”) due to an imperfect risk adjustment
of capitation payments. Table 3.1 illustrates the presence of strong incentives for risk
selection by private insurers, and the incentives are observed not only in Los Angeles but
also in other regions throughout the nation. Given that regulations prohibit an MA plan
from charging different premiums to individuals with different health risks, the oppor-
tunity to increase profits by enrolling healthier individuals provides insurers incentives
to risk-select. Moreover, there is regional variation in the amounts of over-payment for
the healthy, which creates incentives for MA plans to risk-select more intensively in re-
gions with these higher over-payments. Indeed, previous research on MA finds that MA
enrollees are healthier than traditional Medicare enrollees.1 Although preference hetero-
geneity between healthy and unhealthy individuals for MA plans can partly account for
the observed selection patterns, incentives for risk selection, as illustrated by Table 3.1,
are strong.
Self-reported Health Status
Excellent Very Good Good Fair Poor
Monthly Capitation Payment ($) 601.0 619.5 646.6 708.0 796.3
Monthly Health Expenditure ($) 266.0 347.8 575.4 923.7 2029.4
Monthly Over-payment ($) 335.0 271.3 71.2 -215.7 -1233.1
Table 3.1: Capitation Payment and Health Expenditure by Health Status in Los Angeles
County
Note: Over-payment = Capitation payment - Health Expenditure.
Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2000–2003
The main goal of this study is to empirically study incentives for private insurers to
use advertising as a means of risk selection and the impacts of advertising on the MA
market. Previous work on risk selection views advertising as one of the central tools of
1For examples, see Langwell and Hadley (1989); Mello et al. (2003); Batata (2004).
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risk selection (Van de Ven and Ellis 2000; Brown et al. 2012). MA plans might target
advertising to healthy beneficiaries, for example, through its content (Neuman et al. 1998;
Mehrotra et al. 2006). Moreover, advertising can be targeted to regions having greater
over-payments for the healthy. When private insurers can risk-select with advertising, the
effects will not be limited to MA enrollees and insurers, but the government’s budget will
also be affected through over-payments for the healthy. Despite the potential importance
of advertising in MA, however, there is no existing quantitative analysis on the effects of
advertising on risk selection or its effects on health insurance markets in general.
In order to understand the role of advertising, we develop and estimate an equilibrium
model of the MA market, which incorporates strategic advertising by insurers. On the
demand side of the model, consumers make a discrete choice to enroll with one of the
available MA insurers or to select traditional Medicare. We assume advertising affects a
beneficiary’s indirect utilities, thus capturing persuasive, prestige and signaling effects of
advertising. We capture the effect of advertising on risk selection with its heterogeneous
effects on demand, depending on an individual’s health status. Customer preferences for
a plan also depend on its other characteristics such as premiums and coverage benefits.
On the supply side, insurers simultaneously choose premiums and levels of advertising to
maximize profits. A firm’s revenue from an enrollee equals the sum of the premium and
capitation payment for the enrollee, while its cost of insuring an enrollee depends on plan
characteristics and the enrollee’s health risk. Thus the optimal pricing and advertising of
a plan takes into account the effects of these choices on the plan’s composition of health
risks.
Our empirical analysis relies on data from a variety of sources. First, we use data on
advertising expenditures by health insurers in the 100 largest local advertising markets
for the period 2000–2003 from AdSpender Database of Kantar Media, a leading market
research firm.2 Second, we use data on individual MA insurer choices, together with
2A local advertising market consists of a major city and its surrounding counties, and the 100 largest
markets cover more than 80% of the total U.S. population.
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information on the respondents’ demographic and health statuses. Third, we use data
sets published by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, which have information
on the number of enrollees and plan benefit characteristics for each plan in each county
in each year and capitation payments in each county in each year. The data show the
potential importance of advertising in relation to risk selection: There is a large varia-
tion in advertising expenditures across local markets, and advertising efforts by insurance
companies are concentrated in markets with higher margins from enrolling healthier indi-
viduals. Within a market, moreover, healthier individuals are more likely to enroll with
MA insurers that use more advertising.
We estimate the demand and supply side of the model in two steps, using generalized
method of moments. For estimation of the demand model in the first step, we allow
for time-invariant plan fixed effects and use instrumental variables to account for the
endogeneity of premiums and advertising stemming from (time-varying) unobserved plan
heterogeneity. In the second step, the supply model is estimated using the estimated
demand model and optimality conditions for observed pricing and advertising choices by
insurers. In the supply model, we account for the possibility that insurers choose zero
advertising, which is frequently observed in the data. Parameter estimates show that
advertising has a positive effect on overall demand, but a much larger effect on healthier
consumers.
With the estimated model, we investigate the effects of advertising on the MA market
and evaluate the effects of a policy that adjusts capitation payments based on an individ-
ual’s health risks. In order to investigate the effect of advertising on the MA market, we
simulate the model in an environment in which advertising is banned. The ban decreases
overall MA enrollment by 4% and enrollment for MA plans with above-average advertis-
ing spending by 9%. Despite the lower demand without advertising, we find that insurers
lower their premiums by very little, which results from the fact that MA enrollees become
less healthy on average without advertising, raising the MA insurers’ cost. The absence
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of advertising decreases the difference in the expected health expenditures of enrollees in
traditional Medicare and MA by 15%, which reduces the average excess capitation pay-
ment per MA enrollee by 4%. This finding implies that risk selection with advertising
accounts for 15% of the selection of healthier individuals into MA.
We also investigate the effects of a policy that reduces the incentive for risk selection.
We consider a perfectly risk-adjusted capitation payment so that the difference between
an enrollee’s capitation payment and expected health expenditure is the same for any
individual. We find that the risk adjustment policy has large effects on the equilibrium.
Monthly premiums increase from $30.1 to $51.1; advertising expenditures decrease by
30%; and overall MA enrollment rates decrease by 9%. Because the risk adjustment policy
reduces capitation payments for healthy enrollees, insurers compensate for the decrease in
revenues by increasing premiums. Moreover, insurers reduce advertising because insuring
the healthy is now less profitable. These findings highlight a strong link between risk
selection and advertising.
This study contributes to a large body of literature empirically investigating adverse
selection and risk selection in insurance markets. Previous research finds that an indi-
vidual’s heterogeneous characteristics, such as risk, risk preference, income, and cognitive
ability, are important determinants of selection patterns in insurance markets.3 More
recently, researchers empirically investigated the possibility that the insurer affects con-
sumer selection in different health insurance market settings. Bauhoff (2012) studies risk
selection in a German health insurance market by looking at how insurers respond differ-
ently to insurance applications from regions having different profitabilities. Brown et al.
(2012) provide descriptive evidence that insurers engage in risk selection in MA, using
the introduction of sophisticated risk adjustment of capitation payments to MA plans.
Kuziemko et al. (2013) study risk selection among private Medicaid managed-care insur-
ers in Texas and provide evidence that the insurers risk-select more profitable individuals.
3For examples, see Chiappori and Salanie (2000) for automobile insurance, Finkelstein and McGarry
(2006) for long-term care insurance, and Fang et al. (2008) for Medicare supplement insurance.
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Although the occurrences of risk selection are well documented in the related works, there
is still little research on its channels. This study adds to this literature by investigating
the role of advertising on risk selection.
Our focus on an insurance company’s behavior in insurance markets is related to a
new and growing body of literature studying demand and competition in insurance mar-
kets. For example, Lustig (2011) studies adverse selection and imperfect competition in
MA with an equilibrium model that endogenizes a firm’s choice of premium and plan
generosity by creating an index of generosity. Starc (2012) investigates the impact of
adverse selection on an insurer’s pricing and consumer welfare in an imperfectly com-
petitive market (Medicare supplement insurance).4 This study adds to this literature by
examining how advertising, which is a less explored and less regulated channel relative to
competition on pricing and coverage, affects risk selection and competition.
Lastly, this study is also related to the literature on advertising. Many empirical pa-
pers in the literature study the channels through which advertising influences consumer
demand–i.e., whether advertising gives information about a product or affects utility from
the product.5 More recently, researchers have studied the effects of advertising in an equi-
librium framework for different markets. Goeree (2008) studies advertising in the personal
computer market in the U.S., and Gordon and Hartmann (2013) study advertising in a
presidential election in the U.S. A paper that is closely related to ours is Hastings et al.
(2013), who also study advertising in a privatized government program (the privatized
social security market in Mexico). An important difference between this study and the
related works on advertising is that advertising in MA affects not only consumers and
insurers but also the government. If MA insurers can risk-select with advertising, the
enrollment decisions made by healthy individuals will directly affect government expen-
ditures because the government over-pays for the insurance of these individuals.
4For other works in this literature, see Bajari et al. (2011); Bundorf et al. (2012b); Carlin and Town
(2007); Cohen and Einav (2007); Dafny and Dranove (2008); Einav et al. (2010a,c); Nosal (2012); Town
and Liu (2003).
5For examples, see Ackerberg (2001, 2003); Ching and Ishihara (2012); Clark et al. (2009).
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes Medicare Ad-
vantage in greater detail. Section 3 describes the data and presents results from the
preliminary analysis. Section 4 outlines the model while Section 5 discusses estimation
and identification of the model. Section 6 provides estimates of the model, and Section 7
describes results from counterfactual analyses. Section 8 concludes.
3.2 Background on Medicare Advantage
Medicare is a federal health insurance program for the elderly (people aged 65 and older)
and for younger people with disabilities in the United States. Before the introduction
of Medicare Part D in 2006, which provides prescription drug coverage, Medicare had
three Parts: A, B, and C. Part A is free and provides coverage for inpatient care. Part
B provides insurance for outpatient care. Part C is the Medicare Advantage program,
previously known as Medicare + Choice until it was renamed in 2003.6
The traditional fee-for-service Medicare is comprised of Parts A and B, which reim-
burse costs of medical care utilized by a beneficiary who is covered by Parts A and B.
As an alternative to traditional Medicare, a Medicare beneficiary also has the option to
receive coverage from an MA plan run by a qualified private insurer. Insurers wishing to
enroll Medicare beneficiaries sign contracts with the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) describing what coverage they will provide, and at what costs. The com-
panies that participate in the MA program are usually health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) or preferred provider organizations (PPOs), many of which have a large presence
in individual or group health insurance markets, such as Blue Cross Blue Shield, Kaiser
Permanente, United Healthcare, etc. They contract with the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services on a county-year basis and compete for beneficiaries in each county
where they operate.
6Although we will focus on the period 2000–2003 for our analysis, we will refer to Medicare private
plans as Medicare Advantage plans instead of Medicare + Choice plans.
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The main attraction of MA plans for a consumer is that they usually offer more com-
prehensive coverage and provide benefits that are not available in traditional Medicare.
For example, many MA plans offer hearing, vision, and dental benefits which are not cov-
ered by Parts A or B. Before the introduction of Part D, prescription drug coverage was
available in MA plans, but not in traditional Medicare. Although a beneficiary in tradi-
tional Medicare is able to purchase Medicare supplement insurance (known as Medigap)
for more comprehensive coverage than basic Medicare Parts A and B, the Medigap option
is priced more expensively than a usual MA plan, many of which require no premium.
Therefore, MA is a relatively cheaper option for beneficiaries who want more comprehen-
sive coverage than traditional Medicare offers. In return for greater benefits, however,
MA plans usually have restrictions on provider networks. Moreover, MA enrollees often
need a referral to receive care from specialists. In contrast, an individual in traditional
Medicare can see any provider that accepts Medicare payments.
Previous works on MA find that healthier individuals are systematically more likely
to enroll in a MA plan.7 The selection pattern may result from preference heterogeneity
between healthy and unhealthy individuals for MA plans. For example, unhealthy indi-
viduals may dislike certain aspects of MA plans such as restricted provider networks and
referral requirements. However, it is also possible that insurers’ risk-selection reinforces
the direction of consumer selection. Indeed, incentives for MA plans to risk-select are
strong. By regulation, MA insurers must charge the same premium for individuals with
different health statuses in a county. More importantly, capitation payments from the
government do not fully account for variation in health expenditures across individuals.
Until the year 2000, the CMS paid capitation payments equal to 95% of the expected
costs of treating a beneficiary within traditional Medicare, and adjustments to payments
were made based only on an enrollee’s age, gender, welfare status, institutional status,
and location. However, these adjustments, based solely on demographic information, were
7For example, see Langwell and Hadley (1989); Mello et al. (2003); Batata (2004).
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found to account for only about 1% of an enrollee’s expected health costs (Pope et al.
2004). During the period of 2000–2003, which is a focus of this study, the CMS made
10% of capitation payments depend on inpatient claims data using the PIP-DCG risk
adjustment model, but the fraction of variations in expected health costs by the newer
system remained around 1.5% (Brown et al. 2012).8
3.3 Data and Preliminary Analysis
3.3.1 Data
This study combines data from multiple sources. We use the Medicare Current Beneficiary
Survey (MCBS) for the years 2000–2003 for individual-level information on MA enrollment
and demographic characteristics, including health status. Our data on advertising by
health insurers in local advertising markets for the years 2000–2003 were retrieved from
the AdSpender Database of Kantar Media, a leading market research firm. Market share
data for the years 2000–2003 are taken from the CMS State-County-Plan (SCP) files,
and insurers’ plan characteristics are taken from the Medicare Compare databases for the
years 2000–2003.9
The reason we study MA for the years 2000–2003 is because the MCBS does not
provide information on an individual’s choice of MA insurer from 2006 onward. We also
avoid using data right before 2006 because Medicare Part D was introduced in that year,
changing many aspects of the MA market.
8From the year 2004, a more sophisticated risk adjustment model is implemented. However, Brown
et al. (2012) find that MA insurers were still able to selectively enroll more profitable individuals because
even the new model did not perfectly account for variation in health expenditures across individuals. The
reason that we focus on the period 2000–2003 is discussed later when we introduce our data.
9We thank Kathleen Nosal for sharing Medicare Compare data with us.
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Individual-level Data
The MCBS is a survey of a nationally representative sample of Medicare beneficiaries.
This dataset provides information on a beneficiary’s demographic information such as age,
income, education, and location, as well as an extensive set of variables on an individual’s
health status: self-reported health status, difficulties in activities of daily living (ADL),
difficulties in instrumental activities of daily living (IADL), and a history of diseases such
as cancers, heart diseases, diabetes, etc. An important feature of this dataset is that it is
linked to administrative data in Medicare, which provides information on an individual’s
MA insurer choice, the amount of the capitation payment paid for an MA enrollee in the
sample, and the amount of Medicare claims costs for individuals in traditional Medicare.
For our analysis, we only use observations who are at least 65 years old. This means
that we exclude the sample of individuals under 65 who are on Medicare solely due to
disability. Although these individuals can purchase MA plans, we exclude them because
the main factor that affected capitation payments for the years 2000–2003 was age and
because we want to have samples of individuals who are more or less similar in terms of
their capitation payments. Because beneficiaries younger than 65 years old represent a
small fraction of MA enrollment (7%), we do not view this exclusion as a serious problem.
Health status An important variable from this dataset is an individual’s health status.
A health status can be measured in many different ways, and there are plenty of variables
in the MCBS that are related to health status. Because it is very difficult to include all
possible measures separately in the empirical analysis, we construct a one-dimensional
continuous measure of health status. Our measure of an individual’s health status is
expected claims costs if an individual were to be insured by Medicare Parts A and B.
To construct this measure of health status, we use information on an extensive set of
observed health statuses and the realized amount of Medicare Parts A and B claims for
each individual who remained in traditional Medicare. Because information on Medicare
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claims is available only for individuals in traditional Medicare, we have to impute expected
claims costs for MA enrollees using their observed health statuses. Thus, we first estimate
equations that relate Medicare claims costs to an extensive list of health characteristics
using beneficiaries enrolled in traditional Medicare. Then we calculate expected claims
costs not only for traditional Medicare enrollees, but also for MA enrollees.10 A detailed
discussion on constructing the health status variable is in the Appendix.
Capitation Payment For our analysis, we need to know how much an MA plan would
receive when enrolling a Medicare beneficiary with certain characteristics. Unfortunately,
the MCBS does not provide such information. Instead, it contains information on how
much an MA plan received for a Medicare beneficiary enrolled in MA. In order to cal-
culate a capitation payment amount for an enrollee, we exploit the fact that capitation
payments were mostly based on the simple demographic factors for the years 2000–2003,
as described in the previous section.11 First, we regress an actual capitation payment
for an MA enrollee in the MCBS on the enrollee’s demographic characteristics that are
used in the calculation of actual capitation payments. With coefficient estimates from the
regression, we calculate a capitation payment for any Medicare beneficiary. Because cap-
itation payments depend only on exogenous demographic characteristics, selection bias is
not a concern here even though the regression is run with data on MA enrollees only. The
coefficient estimates in the regression are reported in Table 3.2. The results show that
the variables included in the regression explain a large part of variation in capitation pay-
ments, with R-squared of 0.822. The estimates are used to calculate a capitation payment
amount for all Medicare beneficiaries including those who chose traditional Medicare.
10An implicit assumption here is that traditional Medicare and MA enrollees do not differ in unobserved
health status. Given the extensive list of variables on health status used in imputation, however, it is
reasonable to assume that we can capture most of the meaningful differences in health status.
11As explained in the previous section on MA, 10% of capitation payments depended on inpatient
claims data for the years 2000–2003. For this version of this study, we ignore the dependence of capitation
payments on the data, which only accounted for 0.5% of health expenditures Brown et al. (2012). Given
the small role of inpatient data in the calculation of capitation payments, we do not view the omission
as a serious problem.
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Dep. Var: Capitation Payment Paid for an MA Enrollee
Variables Coefficient Std. Err.
Female 219.3** (88.20)
Male with Age 65–69 -165.1** (81.18)
Female with Age 65–69 -286.2*** (34.91)
Male with Age 70–74 -67.81 (80.72)
Female with Age 65-69 -209.1*** (33.11)
Male with Age 75–79 36.74 (80.45)
Female with Age 75–79 -140.0*** (31.20)
Male with Age 80–84 97.85 (80.00)
Female with Age 80–84 -88.06*** (29.93)
Male with Age 85–89 135.2* (80.32)
Female with Age 85–89 -24.38 (29.44)
Male with Age 90–94 117.7 (83.38)
Female with Age 90–94 -51.31* (31.05)
Age -17.34*** (1.671)
Living in a Nursing Home -414.0 (287.0)
Medicaid Eligible -97.88* (56.98)
Avg. Capitation -1.485*** (0.180)
Avg. Capitation × Female -0.272*** (0.0341)
Avg. Capitation × Nursing Home 1.664*** (0.502)
Avg. Capitation × Medicaid 0.624*** (0.0885)
Avg. Capitation × Age 0.0336*** (0.00243)
Observations 8,020
R-squared 0.822
Table 3.2: Capitation Payments and Demographic Characteristics
Note: Avg. Capitation means the average capitation payment in county of residence
for each individual, which is extracted from the Medicare State-County-Plan databases
2000–2003. The regression was run only with the sample of MA enrollees.
Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2000–2003; Medicare State-County-Plan
databases 2000–2003.
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Advertising Data
AdSpender contains information on the annual advertising expenditures and quantities of
health insurers in different media such as TV, newspaper, and radio in the 100 largest local
advertising markets in the U.S. A local advertising market consists of a major city and
its surrounding counties, and its size is comparable to that of a Metropolitan Statistical
Area (MSA).12 Advertising quantity is defined as the number of times an advertisement
appeared in a medium in a given period, and this information is only available for TV and
newspapers. AdSpender categorizes advertising across product types whenever specific
product information can be detected in an advertisement, which allows us to isolate
advertising expenditures for an insurer’s MA plan in some instances. For example, some
expenditures are reported in detail (e.g. Humana Gold plan, which is an MA plan offered
by Humana Insurance Company), while others are reported more generally (e.g., Blue
Cross Blue Shield health insurance in general). An advertisement falls into the latter
category when it does not mention product names, or when it is for an insurer itself (not
for its specific products).
In constructing a measure of advertising levels for MA plans, we excluded advertising
expenditures specific to insurance products that are not MA plans. Whenever information
on a product is available in the data, for example, we can tell whether the product was
sold in individual or group markets for individuals not on Medicare. In the end, we use
advertising expenditures for MA plans and general advertising expenditures. Because the
latter is likely to be meant not only for the Medicare population but also for the non-
Medicare population, we make adjustments for expenditures for general advertisements,
while we do not make any changes to advertising expenditures for MA plans. To be
more precise, we denote admajmt and ad
g
jmt as a firm j’s MA-specific and general advertising
expenditures in a local advertising market m in year t, respectively. Our final measure of
12In the advertising industry, this local market is usually referred to as a Designated Media Market,
which is defined by Nielsen company.
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advertising expenditures for firm j’s MA plans in market m in year t, adjmt, is that:
adjmt = ad
ma
jmt + ψmtad
g
jmt
where ψmt ∈ [0, 1] is a number we use to adjust adgjmt. An important issue here is the
choice of ψmt. For example, if ψmt = 1, the total advertising spending for MA will simply
be the sum of the two kinds of advertising expenditures, which may overstate “true” MA
advertising spending. For our analysis, we use ψmt equal to the fraction of the population
that is at least 65 years old in each advertising market. Although the choice of ψmt is not
likely to lead to a perfect measure of advertising expenditures for MA, the choice of ψmt
will be a reasonable proxy for the relative importance of MA business for a firm operating
in a local advertising market.13
In our analysis, we do not distinguish between an insurer’s advertising expenditures
in different media.14 Instead, we use an insurer’s total advertising expenditure in a local
advertising market by summing the insurer’s advertising expenditures across all media in
the market. In analysis, we also use an insurer’s total advertising quantity. Because infor-
mation on advertising quantity is available only for TV and newspaper advertising, and
because a unit of TV advertising is very different from a unit of newspaper advertising, we
measure an insurer’s advertising quantity in terms of TV-advertising-equivalent quantity.
We construct this variable by dividing an insurer’s total advertising expenditures in a
local advertising market by the average cost of a unit of TV advertising in the market.
13We plan to conduct robustness checks for the choice of ψmt.
14We make this choice for two reasons. The first reason is that advertising in different media does not
have very distinctive effects on demand in our preliminary analysis. The second reason is that because
we endogenize advertising choices in the model, and because we simulate advertising equilibrium in our
counterfactual analysis, we did not want to add multiple advertising variables for which we would need
to find new equilibria.
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Plan-level Data
The Medicare Compare Database is released each year to inform Medicare beneficiaries
which private insurers are operating in their county, what plans they offer, and what ben-
efits and costs are associated with each plan. We take a variety of plan benefit character-
istics from the data such as premiums, dental coverage, vision coverage, brand and generic
prescription drug coverage, and the copayments associated with prescription drugs, pri-
mary care doctor visits and specialist visits, emergency room visits, skilled nursing facility
stays, and inpatient hospital stays. In addition to information about plan benefits, the
data also provide information from report cards on MA plan quality.15 We use four mea-
sures of plan quality: ease of getting referral to specialists, overall rating of health plan,
overall rating of health care received, and how well doctors communicate.
The CMS State-County-Plan (SCP) files provide the number of Medicare beneficiaries,
number of enrollees of each MA insurer, and average capitation payments in each county-
year. A problem with this dataset is that although many insurers offer multiple plans in
the same county, the aggregate enrollment information is at the insurer-county-year level,
not at the plan-insurer-county-year level. One way to deal with this issue is by taking the
average of characteristics of plans offered by an insurer as representative characteristics
of the insurer; and another approach is to take the base plan of each MA insurer as a
representative plan because the base plan is usually the most popular.16 17 For the current
version of this study, we take the first approach, and, as a result, each MA insurer will
15Dafny and Dranove (2008) find that the report cards on MA plan quality had an impact on demand
for MA plans.
16Previous research on MA also faced the same issue and had to deal with the issue in one of these
ways. For examples, see Hall (2007); Nosal (2012).
17Another approach taken previously by Lustig (2011) is to use the individual-level data, MCBS.
This dataset contains beneficiaries’ answers to questions about characteristics of MA plans they chose
such as premium paid, whether it provides vision, hearing, prescription drug coverage, etc. Using this
information, Lustig (2011) was able to match plans chosen by individuals in the MCBS with a specific
plan. In the current version of this study, we do not take this approach for two reasons. First, information
on an individual’s choice of a specific plan is not the most important information for us given our focus
on an individual’s choice of an MA insurer. Second, the approach requires extensive data work because
we have to compare the characteristics of an individual’s plan to the characteristics of each plan offered
by an insurer to match an individual with a specific plan. However, we plan on conducting robustness
checks with this approach later when revising this study.
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Mean Utility Interaction with Health Status
Generic drug Drug coverage (Generic + Brand)
Brand drug Inpatient copay ≤ 5 Days
Unlimited Drug Coverage Nursing Home copay ≤ 20 Days
Dental Emergency care copay
Routine Eye Exam Primary care physician copay
Glasses Specialist copay
Hearing Aids ease of getting referral to specialists
Hearing Exam overall rating of health plan
Nursing Home Copay ≤ 20 Days Dummy for Secure Horizon
Nursing Home Copay ≤ 100 Days Dummy for United Healthcare
Emergency Care Copay Dummy for Kaiser Permanente
Emergency Care Coinsurance Dummy for Blue Cross Blue Shield
ER Worldwide Coverage Dummy for Aetna
Primary Physician Copay Dummy for Humana
Primary Physician Coinsurance Dummy for Health Net
Specialist Copay
Specialist Coinsurance
Inpatient Copay ≤ 5 Days
Inpatient Copay ≤ 90 Days
Inpatient Coinsurance
ease of getting referral to specialists
overall rating of health plan
overall rating of health care received
doctors communicate well
# plans offered by a Firm-county-year
Table 3.3: Plan Characteristics Included in Analysis
Note: Dummies for different brands are implicitly included in insurer-county fixed effects in the
mean utility.
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(1) (2) (3)
No. of county-year 800 1264 385
Population (age ≥ 65)/ county 15,589 34,220 113,047
% MA enrollment 0.07 0.21 0.32
Monthly Capitation Payments / enrollee $520.3 $534.2 $613.3
Monthly Medicare costs/ enrollee $458.4 $459.1 $566.3
No. of Firms 1.30 2.63 5.19
No. of Firms with Advertising 0 1.88 4.43
Premium for Firms w/ ad < mean $57.8 $42.7 $29.9
Premium for Firms w/ ad > mean n/a $39.0 $47.4
Avg Market Shares for Firms w/ ad < mean 0.05 0.08 0.06
Avg Market Shares for Firms w/ ad > mean n/a 0.12 0.11
Total Number of Insurer-county-year 893 2648 1440
Table 3.4: Summary Statistics at County Level
Note: Column (1) is about counties belonging to a local advertising market having no ad-
vertising spending; Column (2) is about counties belonging to a local advertising market
where total advertising spending is below $250,000; and Column (3) is about counties be-
longing to a local advertising market where total advertising spending is at least $250,000.
Source: AdSpender 2000–2003; CMS state-county-plan files 2000–2003.
have only one representative plan available in each county in analysis.
3.3.2 Preliminary Analysis
In this section, we provide summary statistics from the data and descriptive evidence on
how advertising relates to risk selection. Table 3.4 displays characteristics of counties
depending on total advertising spending in a local advertising market to which a county
belongs. Although there are plenty of counties having no advertising spending, these
counties are small in population. There is also a strong correlation between advertising
and other county-level characteristics. Counties with larger advertising expenditures tend
to have a larger fraction of Medicare beneficiaries in MA, higher capitation payments,
higher health care costs in terms of traditional Medicare reimbursement rates, and more
MA insurers.
Table 3.5 shows the presence of strong incentives for risk selection in MA. A common
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Self-reported Market Categories
Health Status (1) (2) (3)
Excellent Capitation ($) 435.1 450.4 520.0
or Health Expenditures ($) 213.2 225.2 257.9
Very Good Over-payments ($) 221.9 225.2 262.1
Capitation ($) 440.0 464.3 536.4
Good Health Expenditures ($) 394.9 385.4 444.7
Over-payments ($) 45.1 78.9 91.7
Fair Capitation ($) 454.6 470.5 549.4
or Health Expenditures ($) 721.3 736.1 912.7
Poor Over-payments ($) -266.7 -265.7 -363.3
Number of Observations 2729 7594 7729
Table 3.5: Incentives for Risk Selection
Note: Column (1) is about counties belonging to a local advertising market without
any advertising spending; Column (2) is about counties belonging to a local advertising
market where total advertising spending is below $250,000; and Column (3) is about
counties belonging to a local advertising market where total advertising spending is at
least as large as $250,000.
Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2000–2003; AdSpender 2000–2003
pattern observed in this table is that monthly capitation payments do not account for the
large variation in health expenditures across individuals having different health statuses.
MA insurers are paid capitation payments greater than necessary to cover the health
expenditures of relatively healthy individuals whereas capitation payments for relatively
unhealthy individuals are not sufficient to cover their health expenditures. As a result,
MA insurers would have very strong incentives to selectively enroll healthier individuals
in any county. Moreover, there is regional variation in incentives for risk selection. In
counties belonging to local advertising markets with relatively large advertising spending,
enrolling healthy individuals is more profitable, and enrolling unhealthy individuals results
in a larger loss.18
In order to investigate incentives for risk selection and their regional variation more
18The regional variation results from the fact that the average and variance of health expenditures are
positively correlated. In a region where health care is more expensive, the average health expenditure is
higher. At the same time, the variance of health expenditures across individuals is also greater in the
region because it is usually the health expenditures of unhealthy individuals that increase disproportion-
ately more in a more expensive region.
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precisely, we run the following regression with the individual-level data:
Overpaymenti = β1rhi + β2rhi × capct + β3capct +Xiγ + i
Overpaymenti is the difference between in individual i’s capitation payment and health
status (measured in terms of expected traditional Medicare claims costs), which are cal-
culated with the individual-level data; rhi is individual i’s relative health status, which
is defined as a ratio of individual i’s health status to the average Medicare claims cost in
county c where individual i resides in year t; capct is the average capitation payment in
county c in year t; and Xi is a vector of other controls that determine the capitation pay-
ment for individual i such as age, Medicaid status, and institutional status. Regression
results are presented in Table 3.6. Because the minimum county-level average capitation
payment is larger than 200, βˆ1 + βˆ2capct < 0 in any county in any year. This means
that more over-payments will be made in regions having healthier individuals (lower rhi).
Moreover, βˆ2rhi + βˆ3 > 0 for rhi < 0.97, and the median and mean of rhi are 0.6 and
0.89, respectively. This means that over-payments for relatively healthy individuals are
greater in regions with higher average capitation payments. These results are summarized
in Figure 3.1, which is based on an individual of age 75 who is not eligible for Medicaid
and not living in a nursing home. The plots show that MA plans can increase profit by
enrolling healthier individuals and that risk selection is more profitable in regions with
higher average capitation payments.
Now given that insurers have more incentives for risk selection in regions with higher
capitation payments, we investigate how an insurer’s advertising in a local adverting mar-
ket is related to regional variation in capitation payments with the following regressions:
adjmt = βcapmt +Xmtγ + δj + jmt
adjmt = βcapmt +Xmtγ + ξjm + jmt
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Dependent Variable = Expected Over-payment
VARIABLES Coefficient Std. Err.
Relative Health 69.37*** (15.31)
Relative Health × Avg Capitation Paymentl -1.012*** (0.0278)
Avg Capitation Payment at the county-level 0.990*** (0.0214)
Observations 31,756
R-squared 0.977
Table 3.6: Relationship between Health Status and Over-payment by Location
Note: Other Controls are age, age-squared, age-cubed, Medicaid status, and whether
one lives in a nursing home.
Figure 3.1: Relationship between Health Status and Over-payment by Location
Note: Relative health =
Expected Health Expenditure
County-level Medicare Costs
; median of relative health = 0.6;
mean of relative health = 0.89. These plots were generated based on a regression of an
amount of over-payment on relative health, average capitation payment in each county,
interaction between relative health and average capitation payment, as well as other
control variables that determine a capitation payment. The regression results are reported
in Table 3.6. The plots were generated for an individual of age 75 that is not eligible for
Medicaid and not living in a nursing home. The plots show that over-payments are greater
for healthier enrollees and that over-payments for the healthy are greater in regions with
higher average capitation payments.
185
The two regressions are different only with respect to fixed effects. In the first specification,
δj denotes insurer fixed effects which are invariant over local advertising markets (m). In
the second specification, ξjm denotes insurer-advertising market fixed effects. adjmt is
either an advertising quantity or expenditure by insurer j in local advertising market
m in year t, depending on specification.19 capmt is the weighted average of capct (the
average capitation payment in county c in year t) across counties in local advertising
market m, with the population of each county as a weight. Xmt is a vector of other
control variables such as the population of market m, local TV advertising cost and
number of competing insurers in an advertising market. The results are reported in Table
3.7. For any specification, the results indicate that more advertising is done in local
advertising markets with higher average capitation payments, where over-payments for
healthy enrollees are greater. That is, MA insurers’ amounts of advertising respond to
regional variation in the profitability of risk selection.
Lastly, Table 3.8 shows that individuals with different health statuses are likely to
be enrolled with different insurers. MA plans in general tend to have healthier Medicare
beneficiaries than traditional Medicare, which is consistent with previous findings on
selection into MA. Among MA insurers, moreover, firms with more advertising tend to
have healthier enrollees.
3.4 Model
As discussed in a previous section, MA insurers contract with CMS for each county (c)
in each year (t). As a result, consumers in different counties face different choice sets.
However, each advertising decision is typically made on the basis of a local advertising
market (m), which contains several counties. Thus we assume individuals in different c
but in the same m are exposed to the same advertising level by the same firm. If county
19After all, we run four different regressions. Each equation is estimated with each of the two dependent
variables.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Ad Qty Ad Expenditure
Avg. Capitation 1.257*** 1.032* 0.568*** 0.693**
(0.247) (0.590) (0.128) (0.294)
Population (65 ¡) 7.94e-05** 3.94e-05 0.000139*** 2.48e-05
(4.03e-05) (0.000109) (2.09e-05) (5.50e-05)
Local TV Ad Cost -68.71** -94.20* 17.75 -13.37
(34.16) (48.08) (17.71) (23.98)
No. of Competitors 13.60* -20.59* 2.291 -9.311
(7.244) (11.58) (3.755) (5.788)
Fixed Effect Ins. Ins. - market Ins. Ins. - market
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.094 0.039 0.185 0.060
Observations 1,035 1,035 1,035 1,035
Table 3.7: Relationship between Advertising and Capitation Payments
Note: The dependent variable in specification (1) and (2) is advertising quantity by an MA
insurer in a local advertising market in a year, and that in specification (3) and (4) is advertising
spending in a local advertising market in a year. Specification (1) and (3) have market-invariant
insurer fixed effects, whereas specification (2) and (4) allow for market-specific insurer fixed
effects. Average capitation payments in a local advertising market is the average across average
capitation payments in each county belong to the advertising market, weighted by population
of each county. The variable, number of competitors, is constructed in a similar way by taking
the average across counties with a county population as a weight.
Insurer Category
County Category (1) (2) (3)
Counties with total ad spend = 0 0.936 0.930 N/A
Counties with total ad spend ∈ (0, $250K] 0.918 0.811 0.701
Counties with total ad spend > $250K 0.952 0.767 0.726
Counties with avg capitation < $500 0.919 0.799 0.726
Counties with avg capitation∈ [$500,$600] 0.918 0.818 0.722
Counties with avg capitation > $600 0.989 0.742 0.722
Overall 0.934 0.798 0.722
Table 3.8: Health Status and Insurer Choice by Medicare Beneficiaries
Note: Colum (1) is about Tranditional Medicare; Column (2) is about MA insurers with
the total advertising spending being below $150,000; (3) Column (2) is about MA insurers
with the total advertising spending being more than $150,000.
The reported number in each cell is the average relative health status of enrollees in each
insurer and market category.
Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2000–2003.
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c is included in ad market m, we denote c ∈ m.
3.4.1 Demand
Consider a consumer i, living in a county c (∈ m) in year t. Consumer i chooses to enroll
with one of the available MA insurers in each c and t or in traditional Medicare. We
assume that consumer i, living in a county c in year t, obtains indirect utility uijct from
insurer j as follows:
uijct = g(adjmt, rhi;φ) + pjctαi + xjctβi + ξjc + ∆ξjct + ijct
where
g(adjmt, rhi;φ) = (φ0 + φ1 log(rhi))× log(1 + φ2adjmt);
αi = α0 + α1 log(rhi);
βi = β0 + β1 log(rhi).
Each insurer has observable characteristics (adjmt, pjct, and xjct), insurer-county fixed
effect (ξjc), and an unobservable characteristic (∆ξjct). First, adjmt denotes insurer j’s
advertising quantity in advertising market m in year t. The effect of advertising on indirect
utility uijct is captured by g(adjmt, rhi;φ), which depends on individual i’s relative health
status (rhi).
20 Parameter φ0 reflects the effects of advertising that are independent of an
individual’s health status. The effects of advertising on risk selection are captured by its
heterogeneous effects on individuals with different rhi (φ1). We assume that the effects
of advertising diminish in its quantity by assuming that adjt enters g(·) in logarithm.
Parameter φ2 determines the curvature of function g(·).
With this specification of uijct, we assume that advertising affects indirect utility
20rhi is defined as a ratio of individual i’s health status (in terms of expected Medicare claims cost) to
the average Medicare expenditure in county c where individual i resides in year t. This definition of rhi
is used in the previous section for preliminary analyses.
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from an insurer, which is consistent with the persuasive, prestige and signaling effects of
advertising. The persuasive and prestige effects of advertising would directly affect utility
from an insurer, for example, by creating a certain positive image associated with the
insurer (Stigler and Becker 1977; Becker and Murphy 1993). Indeed, many advertisements
for MA show images of seniors living healthy lives: engaging in physically demanding
activities like running and golfing (Neuman et al. 1998; Mehrotra et al. 2006). These
advertisements may create a positive image associated with an insurer and lead to a higher
utility level from a plan of that insurer. The signaling effects of advertising will affect
demand for an insurer through expected utility by giving a signal about the (unobservable)
quality of the insurer (Nelson 1974; Milgrom and Roberts 1986). Because indirect utility
uijct is supposed to capture expected utility from an insurer, g(adjmt, rhi;φ) will contain
both effects of advertising. Another possible effect of advertising we do not exactly model
is the provision of information about the existence of a product, which is likely to affect
an individual’s consideration set. If advertising in MA indeed has such effects, they will
be captured as an increase in g(adjmt, rhi;φ) because we do not model the effects of
advertising on an individual’s consideration set.21
pjct denotes the premium of plan jct which a consumer pays in addition to the Medicare
Part B premium.22 The effect of pjct on utility is also potentially heterogeneous depending
on an individual’s health status. This is captured by parameter α1. xjct describes plan
jct’s characteristics other than adjmt and pjct. For example, xjct includes copayments for a
variety of medical services such as inpatient care and outpatient doctor visits and variables
21Effects of advertising on a consumer’s consideration set would be especially important in an environ-
ment where the number of available insurers is so large that consumers cannot easily know about available
options. In the MA market, however, the number of available insurers is limited for many individuals.
About 40% of Medicare beneficiaries have at most two insurers available in their county of residence;
and about 70% of Medicare beneficiaries have at most four insurers available in their county of residence.
Thus, although the informative effects of advertising can be still important in the MA market, the effects
are not likely to be as important as in markets with a large number of available products.
22When enrolling in a MA plan, an individual must pay the Medicare Part B premium as well as the
premium charged by the plan. Here I did not include Medicare Part B premium in pjct because almost
all Medicare beneficiaries, who remain in traditional Medicare, enroll in Medicare Part B and pay the
Medicare Part B premium.
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describing drug coverage, vision coverage, dental coverage, etc. xjct also includes quality
measures of insurers taken from report cards on MA plan quality. The quality measures
included in xjct are ease of getting a referral, overall rating of health care received through
a MA plan, and how well doctors in a MA plan communicate.23 With these quality
measures, we can control for an insurer’s characteristics that would be usually considered
unobserved. The effects of xjct are potentially heterogeneous with parameter β1 capturing
the differential effects of xjct on individuals having different health statuses.
24
ξjc denotes insurer-county fixed effects that capture time-invariant unobserved char-
acteristics of insurer j in county c such as size and quality of the insurer’s networks in a
region. An individual’s utility also depends on aspects of an insurer that are unobserved
by researchers but observed by consumers and insurers. ∆ξjct is a time-specific deviation
from ξjc. ∆ξjct captures time-varying unobserved characteristics and/or shocks to demand
for this insurer. We assume that ∆ξjct is known by consumers and insurers when they
make decisions. Lastly, ijct is idiosyncratic preference shock, which we assume is drawn
from Type I extreme value distribution and i.i.d across individuals, insurers, counties and
years.
In the model, the outside option is to enroll in traditional Medicare, from which a
consumer receives utility of ui0ct:
ui0ct = ziλ+ i0ct.
zi is a vector of an individual’s characteristics including relative health status (rhi), age,
Medicaid status, and whether the individual receives insurance benefits from an (former)
employer. These individual characteristics in ui0ct will control for the possibility of differ-
ent values of the outside option relative to MA, depending on individual characteristics.
23A detailed list of the variables used in analysis is reported in the Appendix.
24In order to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated, we do not interact every variable in
xjct with health status. We select which variables to interact with health status based on the results
of the preliminary analysis. A complete list of variables interacted with health status is reported in the
Appendix.
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For example, Medicaid-eligible individuals will receive more comprehensive coverage in
traditional Medicare without having to pay an additional premium. Those who receive
insurance benefits from employers will also have a different value of the outside option
compared to individuals only with basic Medicare Parts A and B coverage. Moreover,
many Medicare beneficiaries in traditional Medicare purchase Medicare supplement insur-
ance (so-called Medigap). Medigap is used in conjunction with traditional Medicare and
covers out-of-pocket expenditure risks of individuals in traditional Medicare.25 Because
we do not allow for an additional choice of purchasing Medigap in the model, the utility
from the possibility of purchasing Medigap is included in uioct. Previous research on Medi-
gap finds that selection into Medigap depends on an individual’s characteristics such as
health status (Fang et al. 2008). Then coefficient λ will also capture heterogeneous prefer-
ence for Medigap depending on zi. Moreover, it is possible that individuals have different
preferences for MA. For example, unhealthier individuals may dislike common aspects of
MA plans such as restricted provider networks and referral requirements for specialized
treatments. In this case, parameter λ will also capture heterogeneous preferences for MA.
With the functional-form assumption on ijct, we can analytically calculate the prob-
ability for an individual i with characteristics z to enroll plan jct. By defining ujct(zi) ≡
uijct − ijct, we can write the choice probability for plan jct as follows:
qjct(z) =
exp (ujct(z))
exp(u0ct(z)) +
∑
k∈Jct exp (ukct(z))
(3.1)
Then aggregate market share for a firm jct is
Qjct =
∫
z
qjct(z)dFct(z) (3.2)
where Fct(z) is the distribution of individual characteristics z in county c and year t.
25About 25% of Medicare beneficiaries purchase a Medigap plan.
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3.4.2 Supply
We assume that insurers play a simultaneous game in choosing optimal pricing and adver-
tising in each advertising market. In the model, a pricing decision is made for each county
(c) in each year (t), and an advertising decision is made for each advertising market (m)
in each year (t).
When insuring an individual with health status h (a nominal health expenditure, not
relative health rh) with plan characteristics xjct and market characteristics wct, insurer
jct expects to incur a marginal cost cjct(h) as follows:
cjct(h) = xjctγ1 + wctγ2 + hγ3 + ψj + ηjct. (3.3)
xjct is a vector of plan characteristics which are included in the utility specification of
a consumer such as drug coverage, copayment amounts for a variety of services, etc.
wct includes county characteristics that can potentially influence the cost of providing
insurance, including the number of hospitals, skilled nursing facilities and physicians in
a county. For example, insurers may be able to negotiate lower payments with providers
in markets having a large number of physicians and hospitals (Ho 2009). Importantly,
the marginal cost of insuring a consumer depends on the consumer’s health status h, and
this aspect of cjct(h) creates incentives for risk selection. ψj is a firm fixed effect that
capture different administrative costs and different ways of delivering health care at the
firm level (e.g., Aetna, Blue Cross Blue Shield, Secure Horizon, etc.). Lastly, ηjct is a
firm-county-year-specific shock to marginal costs that is constant across individuals with
different h. We assume that ηjct is observed by all insurers making pricing and advertising
decisions in a market.
Insurer j’s profit from a county c in year t, excluding advertising costs, is given by:
pijct = Mct
∫
z
(pjct + capct(z)− cjct(h))qjct(z)dFct(z).
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Mct is the population of those who are at least 65 years old in county c in year t, which is
the market size; pjct is the premium charged by insurer j in county c in year t; capct(z) is a
capitation payment that depends on county, year, age, gender, Medicaid status and insti-
tutional status; and qjct(z) is demand for insurer j by an individual having characteristics
z in (3.1).
Because each insurer makes an advertising decision for each advertising market, we
need to consider an insurer’s profit in an advertising market in order to analyze its ad-
vertising choice. An insurer j’s profit in advertising market m and year t is:
pijmt =
∑
c∈m
pijct −mcjmtadjmt
where mcjmt is constant marginal cost per unit of advertising. We assume that
mcjmt = exp
(
xadjmtγad + ζjmt
)
.
xadjmt includes the costs of TV advertising in media market m in year t, year dummies, and
dummy variables for large firms. We included eight dummy variables for each of the eight
largest firms. These dummy variables will capture different resources constraints faced by
different firms.26 27 ζjmt is a shock to the marginal cost, which is also known by all insurers
in a media market, but unobserved by researchers. We assume that ζjmt ∼ N(0, σ2ζ ).28
Nash equilibrium conditions for the game for insurers are that insurers’ choices maxi-
mize their profits given choices made by other insurers. For an insurer’s optimal pricing
26Although marginal cost of advertising is assumed to be constant, some firms using large amounts
of advertising may face different advertising costs due to volume discounts. The dummy variables can
capture the different discounts received by different firms having potentially different advertising amounts.
27Included insurers are Secure Horizon, Blue Cross Blue Shield, Kaiser Permanente, United Healthcare,
Aetna, Humana, Health Net, and Cigna. Although Secure Horizon is currently part of United Healthcare,
they were separate companies during the period of 2000–2003.
28The reason that we make a functional-form assumption for ζ will be discussed in the section for
identification and estimation.
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condition, we have the following condition for each pjct:
∂pijmt
∂pjct
=
∂pijct
∂pjct
= 0. (3.4)
An insurer’s optimal advertising conditions are:
∂pijmt
∂adjmt
=
∑
c∈m
∂pijct
∂adjmt
−mcjmt

= 0 for adjmt > 0
≤ 0 for adjmt = 0
. (3.5)
For the optimal advertising condition, we explicitly allow for the possibility of the corner
solution, which is no advertising.29 Because about 35% of insurer (j)-market (m)-year (t)
combinations do not advertise at all, we have to explicitly allow for the possibility that
insurers choose the corner solution. Condition (3.5) states that when an insurer spends a
positive amount of advertising spending, the optimal quantity of advertising maximizes its
profit, and that when an insurer does not advertise, its profit gain from a small quantity
of advertising should not be greater than its cost.
3.5 Identification and Estimation
For the discussion of identification and estimation of the model, we define θ as a vector
that contains all parameters in the model such that θ = (θd, θs). θd and θs are vectors of
parameters that enter the demand and supply side, respectively.
29Although premiums can be zero, we assume that even zero premium satisfies the pricing first order
condition with equality. This assumption is made mainly for computational convenience when solving the
model in counterfactual analysis. If an insurer chooses zero premium due to the constraint of nonnegative
premium, it is possible that we overestimate the marginal cost of providing insurance for insurers having
zero premium.
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3.5.1 Demand
Mean Utility In utility uijct, there are two kinds of parameters: θ
d
1 and θ
d
2. We define
θd1 to be parameters that enter ‘mean utility’ δjct, which is a part of uijct that does not
depend on individual characteristics. Precisely,
δjct = φ0 log(1 + φ2adjmt) + α0pjct + xjctβ0 + ξjc + ∆ξjct. (3.6)
θd2 is defined as parameters for interaction terms between insurer characteristics and in-
dividual characteristics. We let φ2, which determines diminishing returns of advertising
effects, be a part of θd2. Berry et al. (1995) show that given a value for θ
d
2, there is a
unique δ∗jct(θ
d
2) that solves for the system of equations given by the aggregate market
share equation (3.2). Then parameter θd1 is estimated using equation 3.6. A well-known
problem regarding identification of θd1 is that the unobserved characteristic (∆ξjct) and
two endogenous variables in the model (pjct and adjmt) are correlated, because ∆ξjct is
assumed to be known by consumers and insurers when they make decisions. This problem
is a typical endogeneity problem, and then a simple ordinary least squared regression of
δ∗jct(θ
d
2) on the observed variables in (3.6) will result in inconsistent estimates of θ
d
1.
Although the endogeneity problem causes challenges in identification, fixed effects ξjc
in δjct would control for a significant part of the unobserved heterogeneity of insurers.
Important characteristics that are not included in xjct are an insurer’s network size and
quality in a local market. For example, Kaiser Permanente, which is one of the largest
insurers in California, has a more extensive network in California than in other regions. As
long as such characteristics do not vary much over the time period considered in this study,
they will be controlled for by ξjc. Moreover, xjct includes an insurer’s quality measures
from report cards on MA plan quality, such as ease of getting a referral, overall rating
of an insurer, overall rating of health care received, and how well an insurer’s physicians
communicates with patients. By including these characteristics, we will be able to control
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for characteristics that would usually be considered unobservable.
However, it is still possible that xjct cannot capture all relevant characteristics of an
insurer that vary over time, which will result in the endogeneity problem. A typical
approach to accounting for the endogeneity problem is to use instruments that are cor-
related with the endogenous variables, but not with the unobservable. We construct two
sets of instruments. The first set of instruments are the averages of premiums and adver-
tising of the same parent company in other advertising markets. The use of functions of
endogenous variables in other counties as instruments is a strategy similar to Hausman
(1996) and Nevo (2001). Town and Liu (2003) use similar instruments in estimating a
model of demand for MA plans. The identifying assumption is that demand shock ∆ξjct
is not correlated with shocks affecting the premiums of insurer j in other markets, such
as demand and marginal cost shocks in the markets. A similar identifying assumption
is made for advertising of the same firm in other markets. A premium in a county will
be correlated with the average premiums of the same firm in other markets through, for
example, common company-level components affecting premiums. The same argument
also holds for advertising.
The second set of instruments are variables that affect a plan’s premium and advertis-
ing choices, but do not affect utility directly. One such variable is the cost of a unit of TV
advertising in a local advertising market, which affects an advertising decision, but does
not affect utility directly. Other such variables are capitation payments in other counties
in the same advertising market. Because capitation payments in other counties in the
same advertising market will affect advertising in the advertising market, the payments
in other counties can be valid instruments as long as they do not enter the utility of a
consumer in a county.30
30The second instrument using capitation payments in other counties is similar to the instruments used
in Nosal (2012), who studies demand for MA plans.
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Resulting moment conditions employed in the estimation are:
E[∆ξjct|Γ] = 0. (3.7)
Γ is a set of instruments that includes the aforementioned two sets of instruments as well
as xjct.
Preference Heterogeneity Important information for identification of parameters
for preference heterogeneity θd2 is an individual’s insurer choice from the MCBS (the
individual-level data). Parameter θd2 will be identified by variation in the characteris-
tics of insurers chosen by individuals having different characteristics. Identification of θd2
is aided by variation in insurer characteristics, not only across insurers within a region
but also across regions. For example, advertising quantities vary across local advertising
markets depending on how profitable risk selection is in the market, as illustrated in the
previous section for preliminary analysis. Moreover, individuals in different regions will
have different choice sets, and this variation in choice sets provides information on the
substitution patterns of different individuals.
An important parameter in θd2 is the parameter that determines the heterogeneous
effect of advertising depending on an individual’s health status (φ1), which captures the
effect of advertising on risk selection. A potential concern in identifying φ1 is that there
may be insurer characteristics, not included in xjct but correlated with adjmt, that have
different effects on the demand of individuals having different health status. Given the
available data, it is impossible to allow for insurer-county fixed effects ξjc that depend
on an individual’s health status and to control for them.31 In order to alleviate this
concern, we interact many different variables in xjct with health status, including not
only usual characteristics such as drug coverage and copayments but also the quality
measures from report cards on MA plans and dummy variables for each of the seven largest
31If there is information on an insurer’s aggregate market share by different health statuses, it is possible
to allow for ξjc that depends on health status.
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insurers. The latter variables are highly correlated with adjmt, and their interactions with
health status will limit the role of omitted insurer characteristics that can have differential
effects on individuals having different health statuses. The quality measures will control
for important aspects of insurers, with potential heterogeneous effect, that cannot be
described by usual coverage characteristics. Moreover, an interaction between a dummy
variable for a large insurer and health status will capture an aspect of the insurer that
may have differential effects on individuals having different health statuses.
In order to construct micro-moments for an individual’s insurer choice and combine
them with aggregate moments (3.7), we use the score of the log-likelihood function for a
choice by an individual observed in the MCBS, as in Imbens and Lancaster (1994). The
likelihood function for an individual’s choice is:
L =
∏
i,j,c,t
qjct(zi)
dijct
where zi is a vector of characteristics of individual i in the individual-level data; and dijct
is an indicator variable that equals one when individual i chooses plan jct. Then our
micro-moments are
∂ log(L)
∂θd2
= 0. (3.8)
3.5.2 Supply
Cost of Providing Insurance Estimation of parameters of the supply side relies on
the optimality conditions for pricing and advertising, presented in (3.4) and (3.12). The
first order condition for optimal pricing (3.4) is equivalent to the following condition:
Qjct +
∫
z
(pjct + capct(z))
∂qjct(z)
∂pjct
dFct(z)
∂Qjct
∂pjct
=
∫
z
cjct(h)
∂qjct(z)
∂pjct
dFct(z)
∂Qjct
∂pjct
= xjctγ1 + wctγ2 +H(qjct, Fct)γ3 + ψj + ηjct(3.9)
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where qjct(z) and Qjct are demand of an individual with characteristic z (which includes
h) and aggregate demand for insurer j in county c in year t, respectively; and
H(qjct, Fct) ≡
∫
z
h
∂qjct(z)
∂pjct
dFct(z)
∂Qjct
∂pjct
.
An examination of (3.9) reveals that its left-hand side is a function of demand side param-
eters and data. Because demand side parameters can be identified with only the demand
model and data, the left-hand side of (3.9) can be treated as known. Then optimality
condition (3.9) leads to a linear estimating equation. Because we assume that an in-
surer’s choice of xjct is exogenous to the model, and because market characteristics wct
are exogenous, we have the following moment conditions:
E[ηjct|xjct] = 0 and E[ηjct|wct] = 0. (3.10)
These assumptions will identify parameters γ1 and γ2.
However, we cannot have a similar condition for parameter γ3 because H(qjct, Fct) is
potentially endogenous to ηjct. Because an insurer’s choice of pjct will be directly depen-
dent on ηjct in the model, and because pjct will determine qjct(z), variable H(qjct, Fct) may
be correlated with ηjct. This endogeneity problem necessitates an instrument that is cor-
related with H(qjct, Fct), but not with ηjct. In order to find an instrument for H(qjct, Fct),
it is important to understand what H(qjct, Fct) means. By definition, H(qjct, Fct) mea-
sures the average health status of consumers switching from insurers jct to other insurers
due to an increase in a premium of insurer jct. Because an individual’s health status h is
measured as expected claims cost for Medicare Parts A and B, an important determinant
of H(qjct, Fct) is overall health care cost in county c in year t. As a result, H(qjct, Fct)
must be highly correlated with county-level average Medicare claims cost FFSct, which
exhibits large variation across counties. Since we control for market characteristics wct
that may influence an insurer’s marginal cost, it is likely that FFSct is uncorrelated with
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ηjct, which leads to the identifying assumption for γ3 such that
E[ηjct|FFSct] = 0. (3.11)
Advertising Cost The optimality condition for an advertising quantity (3.5) identifies
parameter γad in advertising marginal cost mcjmt. This condition is equivalent to the
following condition:
ζjmt

= log
(∑
c∈m
∂pijct
∂adjmt
)
− xadjmtγad for adjmt > 0
≥ log
(∑
c∈m
∂pijct
∂adjmt
)
− xadjmtγad for adjmt = 0
(3.12)
As is clear in (3.12), the optimality condition for insurers using zero advertising results
in an inequality condition, which creates a challenge in estimation and identification. We
deal with this problem by assuming a functional form for the distribution for advertising
cost shock ζjmt such that ζjmt ∼ N(0, σ2ζ ).32 33 In order to set up moment conditions, we
use the score of the log-likelihood function for each insurer’s observed advertising quantity
choice, using the first order conditions (3.12). The likelihood function for the advertising
choice is:
Γ =
∏
j,m,t
fζ(ζ
∗
jmt)
1[adjmt>0]
(
1− Fζ(ζ∗jmt)
)1[adjmt=0]
where ζ∗jmt = log
(∑
c∈m
∂pijct
∂adjmt
)
− xadjmtγad, and fζ and Fζ are the pdf and cdf of ζ. Then
the moment conditions for advertising cost are
∂ log(Γ)
∂γad
= 0 (3.13)
∂ log(Γ)
∂σζ
= 0.
32Goeree (2008) faces the same problem of rationalizing zero advertising by some firms in the personal
computer market, and she also deals with this problem by making a functional-form assumption for the
unobservable.
33Note that a function-form assumption is not necessary for η when estimating the parameters in the
marginal cost of providing insurance because there are no inequality optimality conditions for pricing.
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An alternative approach, not taken in this study, is to set-identify γad using the moment
inequality method as in Pakes et al. (2011), which will result in an upper and lower bound
for γad. If the moment inequality method is used, it will be straightforward to calculate
a lower bound by calculating an increase in profits (excluding advertising cost) when
insurers increase a unit of advertising from the amount observed in the data. Marginal
cost of advertising must be greater than the calculated increase in profits because the
observed advertising quantity is assumed to maximize profits. A moment for a lower
bound is calculated by averaging over each insurer’s lower bounds for advertising cost.
A natural way to derive an upper bound of advertising cost is to calculate the decrease
in profits when insurers decrease a unit of advertising from the observed advertising
choice. However, deriving the upper bound is more challenging in this model because
some insurers choose zero advertising and because an advertising quantity cannot be
negative. As a result, we can calculate upper bounds only for insurers that choose positive
advertising quantities. Because we can only average over insurers with positive advertising
for a moment for the upper bound, we will have a selection problem. However, Pakes et al.
(2011) show that if a researcher assumes that ζ comes from a symmetric distribution, it
is still possible to derive an upper bound.
A tradeoff between the two approaches to dealing with the inequality first order con-
ditions is that a functional-form assumption on ζ can lead to point-identification of pa-
rameters at the cost of a stronger assumption on unobservable ζ. However, the moment
inequality method is not completely free of an assumption on ζ either. For this reason,
we choose to make a functional-form assumption.34
3.5.3 Estimation Algorithm
The demand and supply models are estimated separately in two steps. The estimation
method we use is generalized method of moments. First, we estimate the demand model
34For robustness checks, we plan to check how our results depend on different assumptions on ζ and
to estimate the model with the moment inequality method.
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using moments (3.7) and (3.8) with the nested fixed point algorithm as in Berry et al.
(1995). We define Gd(θ
d) to be a vector of the moments for the demand side. Our
criterion function is given by Ψd(θ
d) = Gd(θ
d)′WGd(θd) where W is a weighting matrix.
Our estimation routine searches for θd that minimizes Ψd(θ
d). Evaluation of Gd(θ
d) can
be broken into the following steps for each choice of θd:
1. Given θd, we solve for mean utility δ∗(θd) = {δ∗jct(θd)}j,c,t that satisfies the conditions
for aggregate market shares (3.2), using the contraction mapping used in Berry et al.
(1995).
2. With θd and δ∗(θd), we calculate the demand qjct(z) of an individual with charac-
teristic z using equation (3.1).
3. We evaluate Gd(θ
d) with qjct(z).
Once we estimate θd, the supply model is estimated using moments (3.10), (3.11), and
(3.13).
3.6 Estimates
3.6.1 Utility
Table 3.9 displays estimates for the parameters of primary interest. The estimate of the
parameter for the differential effects of advertising on utility is negative, which means that
the effects of advertising are greater for healthier consumers because a healthier individual
has lower rhi. The total effect of advertising on an individual with relative health status
rhi is φ0 +φ1 log(rhi). In the data, the median of log(rhi) is -0.6, and the value of log(rhi)
is negative for a majority of individuals.35 As a result, although the estimate for φ0 is
not large enough to be statistically significant, φ0 + φ1 log(rhi) will be larger than φ0
for many individuals with log(rhi) < 0. Moreover, less healthy individuals receive more
35The distribution of rh has a long right-tail. The median of rh is 0.6, and the mean of rh is 0.9.
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utility from the outside option than healthier individuals, according to the estimates for
the parameters for relative health status in the utility for the outside option. In other
words, healthier individuals are more likely to choose MA than less healthy individuals
even without advertising. The estimates for price coefficients indicate that individuals
receive negative utility from a higher premium, and that healthier individuals are less
sensitive to premium although the estimate for α1 is not statistically significant.
Variables Estimates Std. Err.
Ad effects (φ0) 0.040 (0.063)
log (rhi)×Ad effects (φ1) -0.036** (0.018)
Curvature of Ad effects (φ2) 0.012** (0.005)
log (rhi)×Outside option (part of λ) 0.233** (0.097)
Premium (α0) -0.002*** (0.0005)
log (rhi)×Premium (α1) 8.0e-4 (7.4e-4)
Table 3.9: Estimates for Key Parameters in Utility
Table 3.10 presents semi-elasticities of demand with respect to an increase of $1,000
in advertising expenditures, which measures percentage change in demand for a $1,000
increase in advertising expenditures.36 An increase of $1,000 in advertising expenditures
by an insurer increases demand by 0.063% on average. Elasticities for different health
statuses show that the effects of advertising are substantially different across individuals
having different health statuses. The elasticity for an individual whose rhi is lower than
the 25th-percentile of the distribution of rhi is more than four times greater than the
elasticity for an individual, whose rhi is more than the 75th-percentile of the distribution
of rhi. Semi-elasticity of demand with respect to a premium is -0.25, which means that a
dollar increase in a premium decreases demand by 0.25%. Moreover, healthier individuals’
price semi-elasticity is larger in its absolute value than that of less healthy individuals.
The estimates imply that although MA plans are preferred by healthy individuals
in general, advertising reinforces the direction of selection into MA. As mentioned in a
36We calculate semi-elasticity instead of elasticity because zero advertising is observed for about 35%
of insurers. When an advertising expenditure is zero, elasticity becomes zero. For the same reason, we
calculate semi-elasticity for premiums. MA insurers often charge a premium of zero.
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Semi-Elasticities of Demand Ad ($1,000) Price ($1)
Overall Semi-elasticity 0.063% -0.25%
Semi-elasticity for hi < 25% 0.092% -0.28%
Semi-elasticity for hi > 25% and hi < 50% 0.070% -0.26%
Semi-elasticity for hi > 50% and hi < 75% 0.050% -0.24%
Semi-elasticity for hi > 75% 0.020% -0.22%
Table 3.10: Elasticity of Demand with Respect to Advertising and Premiums
previous section, unhealthy individuals may dislike the HMO aspects of MA plans such as
restricted provider networks and referral requirements for specialized medical treatment.
These aspects will be especially inconvenient especially for unhealthy individuals, who
expect to utilize medical care intensively. In addition to the heterogeneous preferences
between healthy and unhealthy individuals for MA, advertising also attracts healthier
individuals into MA.
There are several mechanisms to generate the estimated heterogeneous effects of adver-
tising on demand. First, the estimates may reflect contents of advertising designed to be
more appealing to healthy individuals, as claimed by Neuman et al. (1998) and Mehrotra
et al. (2006). Alternatively, insurance companies may deliberately choose which media
to advertise because individuals with different characteristics may be exposed to different
media to different degrees. For example, more educated individuals are more likely to
read a newspaper, and insurers may target these individuals with newspaper advertising
because more educated individuals tend to be healthier.37 Another possibility is that
individuals with different health statuses respond differently to the same advertising. In
order for an insurer’s advertising to induce an individual to enroll with the insurer, the
individual must be able to purchase a plan from the insurer. In fact, many Medicare
beneficiaries have difficulties with activities related to purchasing a plan according to the
individual-level data: About 10% of Medicare beneficiaries have difficulties in using the
37An example of research that studies the effects of advertising in different media on individuals with
different characteristics is Goeree (2008), who studies advertising in the U.S. personal computer market.
We are unable to incorporate this detailed mechanism of risk selection into our analysis because of the
lack of data that relate an individual’s characteristics and media consumption patterns.
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telephone; about 20% of them have difficulties in shopping for personal items; about 15%
of them have difficulties in managing money; and about 50% of them do not use the In-
ternet. Moreover, individuals with such characteristics are more likely to be unhealthy in
the data. Then individuals without the difficulties who would be induced by advertising
are likely to be relatively healthy.
Estimates for other parameters in utility are reported in Table 3.11 and 3.12. Many
variables that enter mean utility are statistically significant. For example, consumers
prefer insurers that offer generic and brand drug coverage and drug coverage without an
annual coverage limit. However, many variables that interact with health status are not
statistically significant. Exceptions are the coefficients for Medicaid status and whether an
individual receives health insurance benefits from a (former) employer, which determine
heterogeneous utility of the outside option. As expected, individuals on Medicaid are
less likely to purchase a MA plan; and individuals with employer-sponsored benefits are
also less likely to purchase MA. These estimates result from the fact that having either
option usually increases the value of staying in traditional Medicare. Medicaid, combined
with Medicare, provides more generous coverage than traditional Medicare, without an
additional premium. Moreover, employer-sponsored benefits also provide a cheap option
for supplemental coverage without MA plans.
The imprecise estimates for the parameters for most interaction terms imply that many
plan characteristics do not have large impacts on the insurer choice of individuals with
different health statuses. This may be because variation in the data that identifies the
relevant parameters comes from observed insurer choices, not plan choices, by individuals
with different health statuses. Even if individuals with different health statuses select
into plans with different characteristics within an insurer, an observed insurer choice
cannot provide information on such selection patterns unless the characteristics of overall
plans of different insurers are very different.38 However, parameters for the effects of
38As a robustness check, we plan to consider the possibility that individuals make a choice at the
plan-level, not at the insurer-level. See footnote 17 for details.
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VARIABLES Estimates Std. Err.
Generic drug 0.423*** (0.147)
Brand drug 0.275*** (0.0399)
Unlimited Drug Coverage 0.105*** (0.0355)
Dental -0.0318 (0.0362)
Routine Eye Exam -0.172*** (0.0278)
Glasses -0.134*** (0.0349)
Hearing Aids 0.204*** (0.0340)
Hearing Exam 0.0982*** (0.0370)
Nursing Home Copay up to 20 Days -0.00173*** (0.000590)
Nursing Home Copay up to 100 Days -0.00209*** (0.000383)
ER Copay -0.000702 (0.00108)
ER Coinsurance -0.108*** (0.0125)
ER Worldwide Coverage 0.145*** (0.0417)
Primary Physician Copay -0.00111 (0.00247)
Primary Physician Coinsurance -0.0446*** (0.00679)
Specialist Copay -0.00262* (0.00137)
Specialist Coinsurance 0.0424*** (0.00631)
Inpatient Copay up to 5 Days 9.36e-05 (6.99e-05)
Inpatient Copay up to 90 Days 0.00159*** (0.000275)
Inpatient Coinsurance -0.0581*** (0.00454)
Quality: ease of getting referral to specialists -0.00873 (0.0159)
Quality: overall rating of health plan 0.202*** (0.0177)
Quality: overall rating of health care received -0.0731*** (0.0235)
Quality: doctors communicate well -0.0378* (0.0206)
Number of plans offered by a Firm-county-year 0.0268*** (0.00311)
Year FE Yes
Firm - county FE Yes
Table 3.11: Estimates for Parameters in Mean Utility (δjmt)
insurer-level characteristics, such as advertising quantities and dummy variables for large
insurers, will not be affected by our focus on an individual’s choice of insurer because
these characteristics are constant across each insurer’s plans.
3.6.2 Cost
Table 3.13 displays estimates for marginal costs of providing insurance to an enrollee
whose specification is given in (3.3). The most important parameter here is the coefficient
for health status, which is measured as expected Medicare reimbursement costs. The
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Variables Estimates Std. Err.
Health×Drug coverage -0.112 (0.140)
Health×Inpatient copay -1.2e-5 (2.3e-4)
Health×Skilled nursing facility copay 0.002 (0.001)
Health×Emergency care copay 0.002 (0.002)
Health×Primary care physician copay -2.3e-4 (0.007)
Health×Specialist copay -0.005 (0.004)
Health×How easy to get a referral for SP -0.066** (0.034)
Health×Overall rating health plan 0.016 (0.037)
Health×Secure Horizon -7.5e-4 (0.135)
Health×United Healthcare 0.016 (0.119)
Health×Kaiser Permanente -0.083 (0.142)
Health×Blue Cross Blue Shield -0.107 (0.074)
Health×Aetna 0.013 (0.102)
Health×Humana -0.149 (0.140)
Health×Health Net -0.107 (0.142)
Medicaid×Outside option 1.464*** (0.189)
Employer benefits×Outside option 2.049*** (0.048)
Age×Outside option -0.107 (2.695)
Age-squared×Outside option 0.046 (0.017)
Table 3.12: Estimates for Preference Heterogeneity
coefficient is very precisely estimated, and its effect is that a one-dollar increase in expected
Medicare claims cost leads to an increase of $0.86 for an MA insurer. This means that
the average health status of an insurer’s enrollees is an important determinant of the
insurer’s cost of providing insurance, which will create strong incentives to risk-select
healthy individuals.
The marginal cost of providing insurance also depends on other characteristics. No-
tably, county-level characteristics are important determinants of marginal cost. We find
that marginal cost increases with population density and with the percentage of the popu-
lation that lives in urban areas. It may be because counties, which are densely populated
and urban, are usually more expensive to operate in. Moreover, the higher the num-
ber of hospital beds and skilled nursing facilities, the lower the marginal cost, which is
consistent with the finding that these factors determine the relative bargaining power of
managed-care firms when setting reimbursement rates to providers (Ho 2009).
207
Variables Estimates Std. Err.
Expected Health Expenditure (h) 0.865*** (0.0320)
Dental 21.00*** (4.532)
Routine eye exam 10.39** (4.972)
Skilled nursing facility copay -0.669*** (0.0985)
Emergency care copay -1.027*** (0.221)
Primary care doctor copay 1.878*** (0.403)
Specialist copay -0.860*** (0.236)
How easy to get a referral for SP 17.30*** (2.638)
Overall rating health plan -13.42*** (3.021)
Population density 0.00337*** (0.000221)
Percentage of urban population 0.365*** (0.0565)
No. of hospital beds -0.395*** (0.0910)
No. of skilled nursing facility -37.97*** (10.88)
Insurer Dummy Yes
Year Dummy Yes
Table 3.13: Estimates for Marginal Costs of Providing Insurance
Table 3.14 presents estimates for marginal costs of advertising. The estimates show
that local TV advertising costs increase an insurer’s marginal cost of advertising and that
different firms potentially have different costs of advertising, possibly because the firms
face different resource constraints..
Variables Estimates Std. Err.
Local TV Advertising Cost 0.491*** (0.123)
Secure Horizon 0.039 (0.135)
United Healthcare -0.271*** (0.119)
Kaiser Permanente 0.572*** (0.142)
Blue Cross Blue Shield -1.123*** (0.074)
Aetna -0.272*** (0.102)
Humana -0.103 (0.140)
Health Net -.557*** (0.142)
Standard Deviation of ζ (σξ) 1.356*** (0.579)
Year Dummy Yes
Table 3.14: Estimates for Marginal Costs of a Unit of Advertising
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3.7 Counterfactual Experiments
With the estimated model, we conduct counterfactual analyses to understand the impacts
of advertising on the MA market and how incentives for risk selection affect insurers’
advertising decisions.
3.7.1 Ban of Advertising
In this counterfactual analysis, we simulate an equilibrium of the model where advertising
is banned. The simulation has two purposes. First, we investigate how advertising affects
the choices made by consumers and insurers, and how it affects over-payments by the
government. Second, we study how much advertising can account for the selection of
healthier individuals into MA.
In implementing this counterfactual analysis, we force each insurer’s advertising quan-
tity to zero and let insurers re-optimize their premiums. The results are presented in
Table 3.15. We refer to the observed equilibrium in the data as the baseline. The ban
on advertising decreases overall MA enrollment by 4% and decreases demand for insurers
having above-average advertising expenditures in the baseline by 9%. Although a decrease
in demand would usually lead to a lower premium, the ban on advertising does not have a
large effect on premiums, which decrease by less than a dollar on average. The negligible
effect of advertising on premiums results from the fact that advertising attracts relatively
healthy individuals, which lower the costs of providing insurance. With the ban, MA
enrollees become less healthy on average, resulting in a larger increase in average health
expenditures for insurers having a relatively large amount of advertising in the baseline.
For these insurers, an increase in average expected Medicare claims cost is about $14,
which is about 43% of the average premium charged by these insurers. Such an increase
in the cost of providing insurance will offset incentives to lower premiums that result from
the reduction in demand caused by the lack of advertising.
Table 3.16 presents the results on consumers’ welfare. We calculate two different mea-
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Baseline Ban on Ad
All firms Share of beneficiaries 0.243 0.236 (-4%)
(N = 4864) Average Premium ($) 32.4 31.5
Average Health Status ($) 402.3 408.5
Over-payment per enrollee ($) 136.9 130.8 (-4%)
Insurers with Share of beneficiaries 0.101 0.092 (-9%)
Above-average ad Average Premium ($) 32.4 31.1
(N = 881) Average Health Status ($) 407.4 421.1
Over-payment per enrollee ($) 150.4 137.6 (-8%)
Table 3.15: Ban on Advertising
Note: A share of beneficiaries is the fraction of the total Medicare beneficiaries who choose
any MA insurers or insurers with above-average advertising spending.
sures of consumers’ surplus. In the first measure, we include the effects of advertising
on utility whereas we exclude these effects in the second measure. The first measure
of welfare is consistent with the informative and complementary view of advertising.39
The informative view holds that advertising provides information about the existence of
a product or (unobserved) characteristics of a product that is difficult to be unobserved
before consuming the product. As mentioned in the section for the demand model, the
effect of advertising on indirect utilities in the model will capture an increase in expected
utility due to advertising.40 The complementary view holds that consumers receive a
higher utility from a product when the product is advertised, which reflects a positive
image or greater prestige generated by advertising (Stigler and Becker 1977; Becker and
Murphy 1993). Therefore, according to these views, advertising will have a direct impact
on an individual’s indirect utility from an insurer. When consumers’ surplus is calculated
according to these views of advertising, we find that consumer welfare decreases because
consumers do not receive utility from advertising with the ban and because the ban does
not reduce premiums much. The second measure of welfare is supposed to capture the
part of utility derived from insurer characteristics other than advertising, which is con-
sistent with the persuasive view of advertising. This view holds that advertising does
39For a discussion of different views of advertising and their welfare implications, see a survey by
Bagwell (2007).
40For examples, see Stigler (1961); Nelson (1974); Butters (1977); Schmalensee (1977); Grossman and
Shapiro (1984); Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984); and Milgrom and Roberts (1986).
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not add any real value to consumers (Bagwell, 2007). When consumers’ welfare is cal-
culated according to the persuasive view, we find that advertising increases consumers’
welfare because advertising just distorts a consumer’s decision according to the persuasive
view. However, the welfare could have increased even more if the ban on advertising had
decreased premiums by a greater amount.
Baseline Ban on Ad
Case 1
rhi < 25% $112.8 $108.3
rhi > 75% $135.7 $133.9
Overall $116.6 $114.8
Case 2
rhi < 25% $101.9 $108.3
rhi > 75% $131.6 $133.9
Overall $109.5 $114.8
Table 3.16: Consumer’s Surplus with a Ban on Advertising
Note: In case 1, the calculation of consumer surplus included the effects of advertising on
utility. In case 2, however, we exclude the effects of advertising on utility in the calculation
of consumer surplus. That rhi < 25% refers to the group of individuals whose relative
health status rhi is below the 25th percentile in the distribution of relative health status.
That is, this group is the healthiest. That rhi > 75% refers to the group of individuals
whose relative health status rhi is above the 75th percentile in the distribution of relative
health status. That is, this group is the most unhealthy.
Now we turn to the second purpose of this counterfactual analysis, which is to in-
vestigate how much advertising accounts for the selection of healthier individuals into
MA (which is called “advantageous selection”, as opposed to adverse selection). In the
baseline, MA enrollees are healthier than traditional Medicare enrollees. According to
Table 3.17, the average health status of enrollees in traditional Medicare, in terms of
Medicare claims cost, is higher than that of MA enrollees by $60.6. The difference in
average health status between the two groups decreases by 15% with the ban on adver-
tising. This means that advertising accounts for 15% of advantageous selection into MA,
and that the rest of the selection can be explained by preference heterogeneity for MA
plans. In other words, although preference heterogeneity is a more important determinant
of advantageous selection into MA, advertising by MA insurers reinforces the direction of
selection.
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Baseline Ban on Ad
Health Status of Enrollees in traditional Medicare ($) 462.9 460.3
Health Status of Enrollees in MA ($) 402.3 408.5
Difference between traditional Medicare and MA($) 60.6 51.8 (-15%)
Over-payments per MA enrollee ($) 136.9 130.8 (-4%)
Over-payments per a random beneficiary ($) 104.3 104.3
Additional over-payments per MA enrollee ($) 32.6 26.5 (-19%)
Table 3.17: Health Compositions in traditional Medicare vs MA (Ban on Advertising)
Note: The numbers in the third row is the difference between the first and second row, and
an additional over-payment is the difference between an over-payment per MA enrollee
and over-payment per a random beneficiary.
Because advertising reinforces advantageous selection into MA, it leads to over-paying
of capitation payments to MA plans. In the data, MA plans are over-paid even for a
random Medicare beneficiary, as reported in Table 3.16. A reason for this over-payment
is that capitation payments were higher than average traditional Medicare costs during
this period. Moreover, capitation payments are calculated based on Medicare costs of
beneficiaries in traditional Medicare, who are less healthy than MA enrollees. Because
over-payments exist even with a random selection into MA, we calculate additional over-
payments caused by a non-random selection into MA and compare how these additional
over-payments change with the ban on advertising. We find that advertising accounts
for 19% of additional over-payments per MA enrollee, and that the rest of the average
additional over-payment is attributable to preference heterogeneity between healthy and
unhealthy individuals for MA.
3.7.2 Risk Adjustment
In this counterfactual analysis, we simulate the effects of a perfectly risk-adjusted capi-
tation payment on the MA market equilibrium in order to investigate how incentives for
risk selection affect an insurer’s choices. A perfectly risk-adjusted capitation payment is
a capitation payment that perfectly accounts for variation in health expenditures across
individuals having different health statuses. In this counterfactual analysis, let c˜apct(h)
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denote the new capitation payment in county c in year t that directly depends on an
individual’s health status h in terms of Medicare claims cost. We assume that:
c˜apct(h) = h+ constct. (3.14)
That is, the difference between a capitation payment to an MA insurer and an individual’s
health status is constant for individuals having different health statuses. An important
choice we need to make in this counterfactual analysis is the choice of constct because it
determines the overall generosity of a capitation payment. In order to make the results
of this counterfactual analysis comparable to the baseline, we choose constct to be the
average of the over-payments per MA enrollee in each county-year in the baseline. That
is, noting that capct(z) is a capitation payment in the baseline that depends on individual
characteristic z,
constct = E[capct(z)− h|dct(z) = 1].
Expectation is taken over individual characteristics z, and dct(z) is an indicator that equals
one if an individual with characteristic z chooses any MA plan in county c in year t in
the baseline. This new capitation payment structure changes amounts of over-payments
for individuals with different h but keeps the average over-payment unchanged.
We simulate insurers’ premiums and advertising quantities in the new environment,
and the results are presented in Table 3.18. The risk-adjusted capitation payments have
large effects on insurers’ choices. The average advertising expenditure decreases by 30.7%,
and the average premium increases from $32.4 to $51.1. The results are similar for insurers
whose advertising expenditures were above the average in the baseline. The average
advertising expenditure by these insurers decreases by 27.8%, and the average premium
increases from $32.4 to $63.5.
The large decrease in advertising expenditure results from a decrease in marginal
profits from enrolling healthy individuals. With the perfect risk-adjustment considered
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Baseline Risk Adjustment
All firms Ad expenditure ($) 78.2K 53.7K (-30.7%)
(N = 4864) Premium ($) 32.4 51.1
Share of Beneficiaries 0.243 0.221 (-9%)
Expected health expenditures ($) 402.3 406.7
Over-payment per enrollee ($) 140.2 140.2
Firms with Ad expenditure ($) 392.4K 282.4K (-27.8%)
Above-average ad Premium ($) 32.4 63.5
(N = 881) Share of Beneficiaries 0.101 0.091 (-8.8%)
Expected health expenditures ($) 407.4 411.9
Over-payment per enrollee ($) 150.4 145.4
Table 3.18: Risk Adjustment
in this counterfactual analysis, capitation payments decrease for healthy individuals and
increase for unhealthy individuals. Because advertising has a greater effect on healthier
individuals, the perfect risk-adjustment will result in a decrease in marginal profit from an
additional unit of advertising, which will lead to a decrease in advertising spending. This
finding highlights the importance of risk selection in driving incentives for MA insurers
to advertise.
The decrease in revenues from healthy individuals due to the perfect risk-adjustment
also leads to increases in premiums. Given our finding that healthy individuals prefer MA
more than less healthy individuals even without advertising, MA enrollees are relatively
healthy even with the lower advertising expenditure caused by the perfect risk-adjustment.
Because the risk-adjustment reduces revenues from enrolling healthy individuals for MA
insurers, the insurers increase premiums to compensate for the decrease in revenues. An-
other factor that contributes to the increase in premiums is that unhealthier individuals
are less sensitive to premiums. Because unhealthy individuals now become more profitable
to insure, insurers will have incentives to increase premiums to exploit their relative in-
sensitivity to premiums.
Due to the decrease in advertising and the increase in premiums, overall MA enrollment
decreases by about 9%, and MA enrollees become less healthy on average. The average
over-payment per MA enrollee does not change very much because the constant term in
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(3.14) was chosen to be equal to the average over-payment in the baseline. However,
the average over-payment for insurers having above-average advertising in the baseline
decreases because their enrollees are healthier than those of other insurers because they
still advertise more than other insurers even in the new environment. The increase in
premiums results in a reduction in consumers’ welfare, which is presented in Table 3.19.
Because the magnitude of the increase in premiums is large, consumers’ welfare decreases,
regardless of individual health status and whether we include the effects of advertising
on utility. The changes in insurers’ choices due to the risk-adjustment also leads to a
less healthy pool of MA enrollees, which results in a decrease in the difference in health
status between enrollees in MA and enrollees in traditional Medicare by 11%. Lastly, the
average additional over-payment in the new environment does not change because the
constant term in (3.14) was chosen to match the average over-payment in the baseline.
Baseline Risk Adjustment
Case 1
rhi < 25% $112.8 $96.8
rhi > 75% $135.7 $128.3
Overall $116.6 $110.9
Case 2
rhi < 25% $101.9 $99.1
rhi > 75% $131.6 $129.5
Overall $109.5 $107.3
Table 3.19: Consumer’s Surplus with Risk Adjustment
Note: In case 1, the calculation of consumer surplus included the effects of advertising on
utility. In case 2, however, we exclude the effects of advertising on utility in the calculation
of consumer surplus. That rhi < 25% refers to the group of individuals whose relative
health status rhi is below the 25th percentile in the distribution of relative health status.
That is, this group is the healthiest. That rhi > 75% refers to the group of individuals
whose relative health status rhi is above the 75th percentile in the distribution of relative
health status. That is, this group is the most unhealthy.
3.8 Conclusion
This is the first study to quantify the effects of advertising on risk selection and com-
petition in health insurance markets and to investigate how incentives for risk selection
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Baseline Risk Adjustment
Health Status of Enrollees in traditional Medicare ($) 462.9 459.8
Health Status of Enrollees in MA ($) 402.3 406.1
Differences between traditional Medicare and MA($) 60.3 53.7 (-11%)
Over-payments per MA enrollee ($) 136.8 138.5
Over-payments per a random beneficiary ($) 104.3 138.5
Additional over-payments per MA enrollee ($) 32.6 0
Table 3.20: Health Risk Compositions in traditional Medicare vs MA (Risk Adjustment)
Note: The numbers in the third row is the difference between the first and second row, and
an additional over-payment is the difference between an over-payment per MA enrollee
and over-payment per a random beneficiary.
affect insurers’ advertising expenditures. We document strong incentives for risk selection
by insurance companies in MA due to an imperfect risk adjustment of capitation pay-
ments, and we also show how the incentives for risk selection vary over different regions.
We present descriptive evidence that MA insurers advertise more in regions where risk
selection is more profitable. For the main analysis, we develop and structurally estimate
an equilibrium model that incorporates strategic advertising by insurers. The estimates
suggest that advertising increases overall demand with a larger effect on healthier individ-
uals. With a counterfactual analysis where advertising is banned, we find that advertising
accounts for 15% of the selection of healthier individuals into MA. By reinforcing the se-
lection of healthier individuals into MA, advertising reduces the costs of MA insurers and
keeps premiums from increasing although advertising increases demand for MA insurers.
By implementing a perfectly risk-adjusted capitation payment, moreover, we also find
that incentives for risk selection can account for about 30% of advertising spending in the
data, which highlights an important link between advertising and risk selection.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Numerical Algorithm to Solve the Equilibrium
of the Benchmark Model
In this appendix, we describe the numerical algorithm used to solve the equilibrium of
the benchmark model in Section 1.4.
1. (Discretization of Productivity). Discretize the support of productivity [p, p]
into N finite points {p1, ..., pN}, and calculate the probability weight of each p ∈
{p1, ..., pN} using Γ (p).1
2. (Initialization). Provide an initial guess of the wage policy function and the health
insurance offer probability (w00(p), w
0
1(p),∆
0(p)) for all p ∈ {p1, ..., pN}.
3. (Iterations). At iteration ι = 0, 1, ..., do the following sequentially, where we index
the objects in iteration ι by superscript ι :
(a) Given the current guess of the wage policy function and the health insurance
offer probability (wι0(p), w
ι
1(p),∆
ι(p)), construct the offer distribution F ι(w, x)
1See Kennan (2006) for a discussion about the discrete approximation of the continuous distributions.
In our empirical application, we set N = 200; and set p1 = 0.1 and pN = 6. We also experimented with
N = 800. The results are similar.
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by using (1.34) and (1.33).
(b) By using F ι(w, x), numerically solve worker’s strategy
(
wxh, s
x
h (·, ·) , qxh
)
and
calculate Uh and Vh(w
ι
x(p), x) for h ∈ {U,H}, x ∈ {0, 1}, and p on on support
[p, p]. Moreover, calculate Vh(w, x) for w ∈ W , where W is the discrete set of
potential wage choices.2
(c) Calculate unemployment uιh and employment distribution e
x,ι
h G
x,ι
h (w
ι
x(p)) for
all p ∈ {p1, ..., pN} by solving functional fixed point equations (1.14), (1.17),
(1.21) and (1.25);3
(d) Calculate nιh (w
ι(p), x) and nι (wι(p), x) for all p by respectively using (1.26)
and (1.27). Moreover, calculate nι (w, x) for w ∈ W ;
(e) Update the firm’s optimal policy (w∗ι0 (p), w
∗ι
1 (p),∆
∗ι(p)) for all p using (1.29)
and (1.30);4
(f) Given (w∗ι0 (p), w
∗ι
1 (p)), calculate pi
∗ι
0 (p) and pi
∗ι
1 (p) from (1.29) and (1.30) and
obtain ∆∗ι(p) by using (1.31).
4. (Convergence Criterion)
(a) If (w∗ι0 (p), w
∗ι
1 (p),∆
∗ι(p)) satisfies d(w∗ι0 (p), w
ι
0(p)) < tol, d(w
∗ι
1 (p), w
ι
1(p)) <
tol and d(∆
∗ι(p),∆ι(p)) < tol where tol is a pre-specified tolerance level of
convergence and d (·, ·) is a distance metric, then firm’s optimal policy converges
and we have an equilibrium.5
2The number discrete values of potential wage choices is set to 400 in our empirical application.
3Although we do not have a proof that the unique fixed point exists, we always find the unique solution
regardless of initial guess of uh and e
x
hG
x
h(w(p)).
4See Proposition 3 below for a numerical shortcut in the updating of wι+10 (p) and w
ι+1
1 (p).
5In solving for the equilibrium we set tol to 1.0e-6.
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(b) Otherwise, update (wι+10 (p), w
ι+1
1 (p),∆
ι+1(p)) as follows:
wι+10 (p) = ωw
ι
0(p) + (1− ω)w∗ι0 (p),
wι+11 (p) = ωw
ι
1(p) + (1− ω)w∗ι1 (p),
∆ι+1(p) = ω∆ι(p) + (1− ω)∆∗ι(p),
for ω ∈ (0, 1) and continue Step 2 at iteration ι′ = ι+ 1.
Given our convergence criterion, it is clear that the convergence point of our numerical
algorithm will correspond to steady state equilibrium of our model.
Proposition 3. For each p, optimal wage policy must satisfy
w1(p) =
 (p−m1H)nH(w1(p), 1) + (pd−m1U)nU (w1(p), 1)
− ∫ p
p∗1
[nH(w1(p˜), 1) + dnU (w1(p˜), 1)] dp˜− pi1(p∗1)

nH(w1(p), 1) + nU (w1(p), 1)
(A.1)
w0(p) =
 pnH(w0(p), 0) + pdnU (w0(p), 0)
− ∫ p
p∗0
[nH(w0(p˜), 0) + dnU (w0(p˜), 0)] dp˜− pi0(p∗0)

nH(w0(p), 0) + nU (w0(p), 0)
. (A.2)
where p∗x = inf{p ∈ [p, p] : nH(wx(p), x) > 0 and nU(wx(p), x) > 0} and
pi1(p
∗
1) =
 [p∗1 − w∗1(p∗1)−m1H ]nH(wt1(p∗1), 1)
+ [p∗1d− w1(p∗1)−m1U ]nU(wt1(p∗1), 1)

pi0(p
∗
0) =
 [p∗0 − w0(p∗0)]nH(w0(p∗0), 0)
+ [p∗0d− w0 (p∗0)]nU(w0(p∗0), 0)
 .
Proof. To prove Proposition 3, we first establish a lemma that:
Lemma 4. For any distribution F (w, x), wx(p) is increasing in p for each x.
Proof. The proof is based on revealed preference argument. Choose any p and p′ in [p, p]
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such that p > p′ and fix x ∈ {0, 1}. Notice that
pix (p) =
 (p− wx(p)− xmxH)nH(wx(p), x)
+ (pd− wx(p)− xmxU)nU(wx(p), x)
− xC
≥
 (p− wx(p′)− xmxH)nH(wx(p′), x)
+ (pd− wx(p′)− xmxU)nU(wx(p′), x)
− xC
≥
 (p′ − wx(p′)− xmxH)nH(wx(p′), x)
+ (p′d− wx(p′)− xmxU)nU(wx(p′), x)
− xC
= pix (p
′, k)
≥
 (p′ − wx(p)− xmxH)nH(wx(p), x)
+ (p′d− wx(p)− xmxU)nU(wx(p), x)
− xC,
where the second line comes from the fact that wx(p) is the optimal wage policy for a firm
with productivity p and third line is implied by the assumption that p > p′. The fifth line
is implied by the fact that wx(p) is the optimal policy for a firm with productivity p, not
p′. Therefore, we have
(p− p′) [nH(wx(p), x) + nU(wx(p), x)] ≥ (p− p′) [nH(wx(p′), x) + nU(wx(p′), x)] .
Since nh(w, x) is increasing in w, this inequality holds if and only if wx(p) ≥ wx(p′).
Now we complete the proof of Proposition 3. Define p∗x =inf{p ∈ [p, p] : nH(wx(p), x) >
0 and nU(wx(p), x) > 0} for x = 0, 1. From Lemma 4, wx(p) is increasing in p; also
nh(w, x) is increasing in w; thus we have nH(wx(p), x) > 0 and nU(wx(p), x) > 0 for
p > p∗x. Define
p˜i (wx, x) ≡ max
x
 (p− wx − xmxH)nH(wx, x)
+ (pd− wx − xmxU)nU(wx, x)
 .
220
Notice that the solution wx(p) is equal to the one defined in (1.29) and (1.30) and be
independent of C. By applying envelope condition, we have
p˜i′x(p) = nH(wx(p), x) + dnU(wx(p), x)
for p > p∗x. By taking integral over [p
∗
x, p], we then obtain
p˜ix(p) =
∫ p
p∗x
n [H(wx(p˜), x) + dnU(wx(p˜), x)] dp˜+ p˜ix(p
∗
x).
By equating it with (1.29) and (1.30), we obtain (A.1) and (A.2). This is a form of wage
policy which we utilize in our numerical algorithm.
A.2 Omitted Formula in Section 1.6.1
In this appendix, we provide the formula omitted in Section 1.6.1:
Pr(ht+3 = U |xt, xt+1, xt+2, ht = H) = pixtHHpixt+1HH (1− pixt+2HH )
+pixtHH(1− pixt+1HH )pixt+2UU
+(1− pixtHH)(1− pixt+1UU )(1− pixt+2HH )
+(1− pixtHH)pixt+1UU pixt+2UU ;
Pr(ht+3 = H|xt, xt+1, xt+2, ht = U) = (1− pixtUU)pixt+1HH pixt+2HH
+(1− pixtUU)(1− pixt+1HH )(1− pixt+2UU )
+pixtUU(1− pixt+1UU )pixt+2HH + pixtUUpixt+1UU (1− pixt+2UU );
Pr(ht+3 = U |xt, xt+1, xt+2, ht = U) = (1− pixtUU)pixt+1HH (1− pixt+2HH )
+(1− pixtUU)(1− pixt+1HH )pixt+2UU
+pixtUU(1− pixt+1UU )(1− pixt+2HH ) + pixtUUpixt+1UU pixt+2UU .
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A.3 Derivation of Likelihood Function
We will first derive the likelihood contribution of the labor market transitions of unem-
ployed workers. Consider an unemployed worker at period 1 with health status is h1,
who experiences an unemployment spells l and in period l+ 1 transitions to a job (w˜, x) .
Moreover, denote hl ≡ (h1, h2, ..., hl) be the realized history of health status between j = 1
to l. In our data scenario, we assume that the initial h1 but we do not observe h2, ..., hl.
The likelihood contribution of observing such a transition is:
uh1
M
×
∑
hl∈{H,L}l
Pr(su(h
l))×
∑
hl+1∈{H,L}
Pr(hl+1|hl)× [λuf(w˜, 1)]1(x=1)× [λuf(w˜, 0)]1(x=0) (A.3)
where
Pr(s(hl)) = Πlj=2
{
Pr(hj|hj−1)×
[
(1− λu) + λu
(
F
(
w1hj , 1
)
+ F
(
w0hj , 0
))]}
and 1(x = 1) is an indicator function such that it takes one if we observe a transition to
employment with (w˜, 1) at period l + 1, and similarly 1 (x = 0) is an indicator function
such that it takes one if we observe a transition to employment with (w˜, 0) at period l+1.
To understand (A.3), note that the first term in (A.3), uh/M, reflects the assumption
that the initial condition of individuals is drawn from steady state worker distribution
because uh/M the probability that an unemployed worker with health status h is sam-
pled. The second term in (A.3) is the probability that individual experiences l periods
of unemployment with health status transitions (h2, ..., hl) during the process; note that
the term
[
(1− λu) + λu(F (w1hj , 1) + F (w0hj , 0)
]
is the probability that the individual does
not receive an offer or receives an offer that is lower than the relevant reservation wages
w1hj or w
0
hj
. The third to fifth terms in (A.3) are the probability that his health transitions
from hl to hl+1 in period l + 1 and receive an acceptable offer (w˜, x) from the relevant
density function f (w˜, x).
We can similarly derive the likelihood contribution of the job dynamics of employed
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workers. Consider an employed worker in period 1 with health status h1 working on a
job with compensation package (w, x). Suppose that the worker experiences a job status
changes in period l + 1, and denote hl be the realized history of health status between
j = 1 to l (h1, h2, ..., hl) . We again assume that we observe h1 but do not for h2 . . . , hl.
For an employed worker, there are four possible changes in job status:
• [Event “Job Loss”] the individual experienced a job loss at period l + 1;
• [Event “Switch 1”] the individual transitioned to a job (w˜, x′) such that x′ = x and
the accepted wage is w˜ > w;
• [Event “Switch 2”] the individual transitioned to a job (w˜, x′) such that x′ = x and
the accepted wage is w˜ < w;
• [Event “Switch 3”] the individual transitioned to a job (w˜, x′) such that x′ 6= x and
the accepted wage is w˜.
The likelihood contribution is given by:
exhg
x
h (w)
M
×
∑
hl∈{H,L}l
Pr(se(h
l)) (A.4a)
×
∑
hl+1∈{H,L}
Pr(hl+1|hl) (A.4b)
×

δ
[
(1− λe) + λe
∑
x˜ F (w
x˜
hl+1
, x˜)
]
if Event is “Job Loss”
λef(w˜, x) if Event is “Switch 1”
δλef(w˜, x) if Event is “Switch 2”
(1− δ)λef(w˜, x′) + δλef(w˜, x′) if Event is “Switch 3”,
where
Pr(se(h
l)) = Πlj=2
Pr(hj+1|hj−1)(1− δ)
 (1− λe)
+λe
(
F (w, x) + F
(
sx
′
hj
(w, x), x′
))


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and x′ 6= x. To understand (A.4a), note that similar to that in (1.37a), the first term in
(A.4a), exhg
x
h(w)/M, is the probability of sampling an employed worker with health status
h working on a job (w, x) ; the second term in (A.4a) is the probability that individual
stays with the job (w, x) for l periods of unemployment with health status transitions
(h2, ..., hl) during the process. The remaining two terms in (A.4b) express the likelihood
of observing health transition from hl to hl+1 in period l + 1 and one of the four job
status change events. For example, the event “Job Loss” is observed in period l+ 1 with
probability δ
[
(1− λe) + λe
∑
x˜ F (w
x˜
hl+1
, x˜)
]
because in order for a job loss to occur, the
worker has to experience an exogenous shock that destroys the current match (which
occurs with probability δ), and then does not get matched to another accepted job (which
occurs with probability (1 − λe) + λe
∑
x˜ F (w
x˜
hl+1
, x˜)). To understand the probability
of event “Switch 2”, we note that in order for a worker to switch to a job (w˜, x′) with
x′ = x but w˜ < w, the worker must have experienced a job separation (which occurs with
probability δ), but is then lucky enough to find an acceptable job immediately, which
happens with probability λef(w˜, x). The probability of the other job switch events are
derived similarly.
A.4 Estimation Procedure
The following is the procedure we use to implement the GMM estimator in Section 1.6:
1. (Initialization) Initialize a guess of the parameter values θ;
2. (Solving for Equilibrium Offer Distribution) Given the guess, solve equilib-
rium numerically using the algorithm we provided in Section A.1. Obtain the offer
distribution Fˆ (w, x) from the equilibrium;
3. (Calculating the Worker-Side Moments) Use Fˆ (w, x) in place of F (w, x) in
the likelihood functions of the observed worker-side data based on (1.37) and (1.38),
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and obtain the numerical derivative of likelihood with respect to parameters θ1 ≡
(λu, λe, δ, γ, µh, b) and use them as a subset of the moments in (1.35);
6
4. (Calculating the Employer-Side Moments) Use Fˆ (w, x) and other equilibrium
elements obtained in (2) to calculate the employer-side moments listed in Section
1.6.4;
5. (Iteration) Evaluate the GMM objective (1.36) and iterate until it converges.
A.5 Equilibrium of the Counterfactual Economy
A.5.1 Steady State Equilibrium for the Post-Reform Economy
A steady state equilibrium for the post-reform economy is a list
〈(
wxh, s
x
h (·, ·) , qxh, x∗h, x∗h (·)
)
, (uxh, e
x
h, G
x
h (w)) , (wx (p) ,∆ (p) , F (w, x)) , R
EX
〉
such that the following conditions hold:
• (Worker Optimization) Given F (w, x) and REX ,
– wxh solves the unemployed workers’ job acceptance decision problem for each
(h, x) ∈ {U,H} × {0, 1} ;
– sxh (·, ·) solves the job-to-job switching problem for currently employed workers
for each (h, x) ∈ {U,H} × {0, 1}
– qx
h
describes the optimal strategy for currently employed workers regarding
whether to quit into unemployment for each (h, x) ∈ {U,H} × {0, 1} ;
– x∗h and x
∗
h (·) respectively solve (1.41) and (1.47) for h ∈ {H,U} .
6Note from (1.37) and (1.38), the likelihood function of the worker labor market transitions depends
only on θ1, given F (w, x) .
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• (Steady State Worker Distribution) Given workers’ optimizing behavior de-
scribed by (wxh, s
x
h (·, ·) ,
qx
h
, x∗h, x
∗
h (·)
)
and F (w, x) and REX , (uxh, e
x
h, G
x
h (w)) satisfy the steady state condi-
tions for worker distribution (details are provided in Section A.5.3).
• (Firm Optimization) Given F (w, x), REX and the steady state employee sizes
implied by (uxh, e
x
h, G
x
h (w)), a firm with productivity p chooses to offer health insur-
ance, i.e., x = 1, with probability ∆ (p) and chooses not to offer health insurance
with probability 1 − ∆ (p), where ∆ (p) is given by (1.31). Moreover, conditional
on insurance choice x, the firm offers a wage wx (p) that solves (1.48) and (1.49)
respectively for x = 0 and 1.
• (Equilibrium Consistency) The postulated distributions of offered compensa-
tion packages are consistent with the firms’ optimizing behavior (wx (p) ,∆ (p)) .
Specifically, F (w, x) must satisfy:
F (w, 1) =
∫ ∞
0
1(w1(p) < w)∆(p)dΓ(p),
F (w, 0) =
∫ ∞
0
1(w0(p) < w) [1−∆(p)] dΓ(p).
• (Equilibrium Condition in Insurance Exchange) The premium in exchange
is determined by (1.50).
A.5.2 Numerical Algorithm for the Counterfactual Policy Ex-
periments
We use numerical methods to solve the equilibrium. The basic iteration procedure to solve
the equilibrium for the counterfactual environment remains the same as that described in
Section A.1, but there are two important changes. First, we need to find the fixed point of
not only (w0(p), w1(p),∆(p)) but also R
EX , the premium in insurance exchange. Second,
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because the penalty associated with employer mandate depends on size of the firm, for
example, the threshold under the ACA for firms to pay penalty if they do not offer health
insurance is 50; as a result we need to modify the algorithm to allow for a potential mass
point of employer size just to the left of 50 (say, 49 workers) when we derive optimal wage
policy w0(p).
Finally, the establishment of the health insurance exchange with community rating
may result in multiple equilibria under some counterfactual policy experiments. In our
numerical simulations, we sometimes find multiple equilibria and we will discuss their
implication.
Because of the size dependent employer mandate, there may exist a mass point of
wage offer w49 under which firm size is equal to 49 if x = 0:
nH(w49, 0) + nU(w49, 0) = 49.
Note that w49 is endogenously determined in equilibrium. We now provide our numerical
algorithm:
1. Guess (w0(p), w1(p),∆(p)) for p = p1, . . . , pN and R
EX .
2. Solve value function and employment distribution as before. Notice that there may
exist an interval of productivity [p∗, p∗∗] such that there is a mass point of wage offer
w49 = w0(p) = w0(p
′), for p, p′ ∈ [p∗, p∗∗].
3. Once we solve employment distribution, find w49 by linear interpolation of firm size
distribution.
4. Update w1(p) as in the benchmark case. w0(p) is updated in the following way:
(a) From p1, solve w0(p) by maximizing (p−w)(nH(w, 0)+nU(w, 0)). If nH(w, 0) >
0 and nU(w, 0) > 0, then solve it by using the equation implied from the
envelope condition, as before. Repeat this for p2, p3 . . . as long as w0(p) < w49.
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(b) If we find p∗ such that w(p∗) > w49 where w(p∗) = arg max(p∗−w)(nH(w, 0) +
nU(w, 0)), then from p
∗, solve firm’s problem by
max {Π49(p),Πpe(p)}
where
Π49(p) = (p− w49)(nH(w49, 0) + nU(w49, 0));
Πpe(p) = max
w
(p− w)(nH(w, 0) + nU(w, 0))− PE (nH(w, 0) + nU(w0, 0)) .
(c) If we find p∗∗ such that Π49(p∗∗) < pipe(p∗∗), then for the remaining p > p∗∗,
evaluate w0(p) by
w0(p) =
 pnH(w0(p), 0) + pdnU(w0(p), 0)−∫ p
p∗∗ [nH(w0(p˜), 0) + dnU(w0(p˜), 0)] dp˜− pi0(p∗∗)

nH(w0(p), 0) + nU(w0(p), 0)
−PE(nH(w0(p), 0) + nU(w0(p), 0)),
the derivation of which basically follows Proposition 3 in benchmark case but
reflects the existence of employer mandate.
5. Update REX using (46). Continue it until it converges.
In Step 4 (c) we utilize the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Suppose that there exists a p∗∗ such that Π49(p∗∗) < Πpe(p∗∗). Then, for any
p > p∗∗, Π49(p) < Πpe(p).
Proof. Proof is by contradiction. Suppose that there exists p′ > p∗∗ such that Π49(p′) ≥
Πpe(p
′). Then, notice that
Π49(p
′) ≥ Πpe(p′) ≥ Πpe(p∗∗) > Π49(p∗∗)
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where the second inequality is from the revealed preference argument. Therefore, we must
have:
Π49(p
′)− Π49(p∗∗) > Πpe(p′)− Πpe(p∗∗). (A.5)
The left hand side of (A.5) is:
Π49(p
′)− Π49(p∗∗) = (p− p∗∗) (nH(w49, 0) + nU(w49, 0)) .
The right hand side of (A.5) is:
Πpe(p
′)− Πpe(p∗∗)
= {(p′ − w(p′)) [nH(w(p′), 0) + nU(w(p′), 0)]− PE(n(w(p′)))}
−{(p∗∗ − w(p∗∗)) [nH(w(p∗∗), 0) + nU(w(p∗∗), 0)]− PE(n(w(p∗∗)))}
≥ (p′ − w(p∗∗)) [nH(w(p∗∗), 0) + nU(w(p∗∗), 0)]− PE(n(w(p∗∗)))
−{(p∗∗ − w(p∗∗)) [nH(w(p∗∗), 0) + nU(w(p∗∗), 0)]− PE(n(w(p∗∗)))}
= (p− p∗∗) [nH(w(p∗∗), 0) + nU(w(p∗∗), 0)] .
Since w(p∗∗) > w49, we must have Πpe(p′)−Πpe(p∗∗) > Π49(p′)−Π49(p∗∗). A contradiction.
A.5.3 Steady State Distribution of Employment in Counterfac-
tual Experiments
We provide a derivation of steady state employment distribution used in our counterfac-
tual policy experiments. Note that worker’s insurance status can be x ∈ {0, 2} for the
unemployed and x ∈ {0, 1, 2} for the employed, because of the insurance exchange.
First, we define the resource constraints of the economy:
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∑
h∈{U,H}
(u0h + u
2
h + e
0
h + e
1
h + e
2
h) = M. (A.6)
Next, we provide the determination of the unemployment. The inflow into unemploy-
ment with health status h and insurance status x is given by: if x = x∗h,
[uxh]
+ ≡ (1− ρ) [δ(1− λe) + δλe(F (w1h, 1) + F (w0h, 0)]
× [e0hpi0hh + e1hpi1hh + e0h′pi0hh′ + e1h′pi1hh′ + e2hpi2hh + e2h′pi2hh′]
+(1− ρ)
∑
x=0,2
uxh′pi
x
hh′ [1− λu
(
1− F (w1h, 1)− F (w0h, 0)
)
] +Mρµh
+(1− ρ)(1− δ)e1h′G1h′(w1h)pi1hh′
× [1− λe (1− F (w1h, 1)− F (w0h, 0))]
+(1− ρ)(1− δ) (e0h′G0h′(w0h)pi0hh′ + e2h′G2h′(w0h)pi2hh′)
× [1− λe (1− F (w1h, 1)− F (w0h, 0))] ;
otherwise, [uxh]
+ = 0.
The outflow from unemployment with health status h and insurance status x is de-
scribed as follows. If x = x∗h where x
∗
h is defined in (1.41),
[uxh]
− ≡ uxh
{
ρ+ (1− ρ) [pixh′h + pixhhλu (1− F (w1h, 1)− F (w0h, 0))]} ;
otherwise, [uxh]
− = 0. Then, in a steady-state we must have
[uxh]
+ = [uxh]
− , h ∈ {U,H} .
Now we provide the steady state equation for workers employed on jobs (w, x) with
health status h. Note that the inflow of workers with health status h on jobs (w, 1) ,
denoted by [e1h (w)]
+
, is given by:
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[
e1h (w)
]+ ≡ (1− ρ)f(w, 1)

λu
(
u0hpi
0
hh + u
0
h′pi
0
hh′ + u
2
hpi
2
hh + u
2
h′pi
2
hh′
)
+(1− δ)λe

∑
x′=0,2 e
x′
h G
x′
h
(
s0h (w, 1)
)
pix
′
hh
+
∑
x′=0,2 e
x′
h′G
x′
h
(
s0h′ (w, 1)
)
pix
′
hh′
+pi1hhe
1
hG
1
h(w) + pi
1
hh′e
1
h′G
1
h′(w)

+δλe
 e0hpi0hh + e0h′pi0hh′ + e1hpi1hh
+e1h′pi
1
hh′ + e
2
hpi
2
hh + e
2
h′pi
2
hh′


+(1− ρ)(1− δ)e1h′g1h′ (w)pi1hh′
×
[
1− λe
(
1− F˜h (w, 1)
)]
,
where h′ 6= h and F˜h(w, 1) is defined by
F˜h(w, 1) = F (w, 1) + F
(
s0h (w, 1) , 0
)
.
Denote the outflow of workers with health status h from jobs (w, 1) by [e1h (w)]
−
, and
it is given by
[
e1h (w)
]− ≡ e1hg1h(w){ρ+ (1− ρ) [pi1h′h + pi1hh (δ + λe(1− δ)(1− F˜h(w, 1)))]} . (A.7)
The steady state condition requires that
[
e1h (w)
]+
=
[
e1h (w)
]−
for h ∈ {U,H} and for all w in the support of F (w, 1) . (A.8)
Similarly, the inflows of workers with health status h into jobs (w, 0) , denoted by
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[e0h (w)]
+
, are given as follows. If x∗h(w) = 0, where x
∗
h(w) is defined in (1.47),
[
e0h (w)
]+
= f(w, 0)(1− ρ)
×

λu
[
uhpi
0
hh + uh′pi
0
hh′ + u
2
hpi
2
hh + u
2
h′pi
2
hh′
]
+λe(1− δ)

e1hG
1
h
(
s1h(w, 0)
)
pi1hh + e
1
h′G
1
h′(s
1
h′(w, 0))pi
1
hh′
e0hG
0
h(w)pi
0
hh + e
0
h′G
0
h′(w)pi
0
hh′
+e2hG
2
h(w)pi
2
hh + e
2
h′G
2
h′(w)pi
2
hh′

+δλe
 e1hpi1hh + e1h′pi1hh′ + e0hpi0hh
+e0h′pi
0
hh′ + e
2
hpi
2
hh + e
2
h′pi
2
hh′


+(1− ρ)(1− δ)
∑
x=0,2
exh′g
x
h′(w)pi
x
hh′
×
[
1− λe
(
1− F˜h(w, 0)
)]
,
where h 6= h′ and F˜h(w, 0) is defined by
F˜h(w, 0) = F (w, 0) + F (s
1
h(w, 0), 1);
and [e0h (w)]
+
= 0 otherwise. The outflows of workers with health status h from jobs
(w, 0), denoted by [e0h (w)]
−
, are given by:
[
e0h (w)
]−
= e0hg
0
h(w)
{
ρ+ (1− ρ)
[
pi0h′h + pi
0
hh(δ + (1− δ)λe(1− F˜h(w, 0))
]}
.
The steady state condition thus requires that
[
e0h (w)
]+
=
[
e0h (w)
]−
for h ∈ {H,U} and for all w in the support of F (w, 0) .
Similarly, the inflows of workers with health status h into jobs (w, 2) with health
insurance through exchange, denoted by [e2h (w)]
+
, are given as follows. If x∗h(w) = 2,
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where x∗h(w) is defined in (1.47),
[
e2h (w)
]+
= f(w, 0)(1− ρ)
×

λu
[
uhpi
0
hh + uh′pi
0
hh′ + u
2
hpi
2
hh + u
2
h′pi
2
hh′
]
+λe(1− δ)

e1hG
1
h
(
s1h(w, 0)
)
pi1hh + e
1
h′G
1
h′(s
1
h′(w, 0))pi
1
hh′
e0hG
0
h(w)pi
0
hh + e
0
h′G
0
h′(w)pi
0
hh′
+e2hG
2
h(w)pi
2
hh + e
2
h′G
2
h′(w)pi
2
hh′

+δλe
 e1hpi1hh + e1h′pi1hh′ + e0hpi0hh
+e0h′pi
0
hh′ + e
2
hpi
2
hh + e
2
h′pi
2
hh′


+(1− ρ)(1− δ)
∑
x=0,2
exh′g
x
h′(w)pi
2
hh′
×
[
1− λe
(
1− F˜h(w, 0)
)]
,
where h 6= h′ and F˜h(w, 0) is defined by
F˜h(w, 0) = F (w, 0) + F (s
1
h(w, 0), 1);
and [e2h (w)]
+
= 0 otherwise. The outflows of workers with health status h from jobs
(w, 0), denoted by [e0h (w)]
−
, are given by:
[
e2h (w)
]−
= e2hg
2
h(w)
{
ρ+ (1− ρ)
[
pi2h′h + pi
2
hh(δ + (1− δ)λe(1− F˜h(w, 0))
]}
.
The steady state condition thus requires that
[
e2h (w)
]+
=
[
e2h (w)
]−
for h ∈ {H,U} and for all w in the support of F (w, 0) .
These steady state conditions pin down the distribution of employment and are used
to calculate firm size distribution as in the benchmark case.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
Appendix
B.1 Numerical Algorithm
I describe the numerical algorithm which is used to solve the equilibrium of pre-ACA
model described in section 2.2. I discretize the support of Γ, [p, p], into finite points.
Then, I solve the equilibrium by the following fixed-point algorithm.
1. First, I provide an initial guess of the skill price and the fraction of firms offering
ESHI (
〈
θed0,0(p), θ
ed
1,0(p)
〉ed
,∆0(p)) for all p on support [p, p].
2. At iteration ι = 0, 1, ..., I do the following sequentially, where I index the objects
in iteration ι by superscript ι :
(a) Given the current guess of the health insurance costs and the health insurance
offer probability (
〈
θed0,ι(p), θ
ed
1,ι(p)
〉ed
,∆ι(p)), I construct an offer distribution of
compensation package F ed(θ, INS).
(b) Then, I numerically solve individual value functions backwards from the period
T − 1. The main obstacle of solving individual life cycle problems is the large
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size of state spaces. There, to speed up the computation, I apply Keane and
Wolpin (1994)’s interpolation method.
(c) Given the value function, I solve the steady state distribution gˆt
(
X˜, INS, θ
)
and ut(X˜) sequentially from age t = 1.
(d) Using gˆt
(
X˜, INS, θ
)
and ut(X˜), I solve (
〈
θˆed0 (p), θˆ
ed
1 (p)
〉ed
, ∆ˆ(p)) for each p
using (2.17), (2.18), and (2.14).
3. After completing the step (d) at iteration ι, I check whether the equilibrium object
converges.
(a) If ((
〈
θed0,ι(p), θ
ed
1,ι(p)
〉ed
,∆(p)) satisfies d(θed0,ι(p), θˆ
ed
0 (p)) < tol, d(θ
ed
1,ι(p), θˆ
ed
1 (p)) <
tol for ed ∈ {NC,C} and d(∆ι∗(p),∆ι(p)) < tol where tol is a pre-specified
tolerance level of convergence and d (·, ·) is a distance metric, then firm’s opti-
mal policy converges and we have an equilibrium.
(b) Otherwise, update (
〈
θed0,ι+1(p), θ
ed
1,ι+1(p)
〉ed
,∆ι+1(p)) as follows:
θed0,ι+1(p) = wθ
ed
0,ι(p) + (1− w)θˆed0 (p),
θed1,ι+1(p) = wθ
ed
1,ι(p) + (1− w)θˆed1 (p)
∆ι+1(p) = w∆ι(p) + (1− w)∆ˆ(p),
for the pre-specified weight w ∈ (0, 1) and continue Step 2 at iteration ι′ = ι+1.
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B.2 Omitted Derivations in the Counterfactual Ex-
periments
B.2.1 Value Function
Consider a non-employed worker having characteristics X˜t = (ed, type, Et, ht) and insur-
ance status INS ∈ {0, 2}. Then, his value function is defined by
V t0 (X˜t, INS) = Emt

maxxt Ut(Ct(xt, 
m
t , X˜t, INS), 0, ht)
+β
∑
hˆ Pr(ht = h|X˜t, xt, mt )λedu Vˆ t0 (X˜t+1)
+β
∑
hˆ Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜t, xt, mt )(1− λedu )V t+10 (X˜t+1)
 , (B.21)
subject to budget constraint (2.19) where X˜t+1 = (ed, type, Et, hˆ) and
Vˆ t0 (X˜t+1) =
∫
Ent max
 V
t+1
0 (X˜t+1) + 
n
t ,
V t+11 (X˜t+1, θ, INS)
 dF ed(θ, INS)
V t+10 (X˜t+1) = max
{
V t+10 (X˜t+1, 0) + 
HIX
t , V
t+1
0 (X˜t+1, 2)
}
.
HIXt is i.i.d. preference shock to purchase health insurance from HIX. Note that the main
change is a possibility that the unemployed can purchase health insurance from HIX.
Similarly, consider an employed worker having characteristics X˜t = (ed, type, Et, ht)
and insurance status INS ∈ {0, 1, 2} and who are offered skill price θ. His value function
is also defined by:
V t1 (X˜t, θ, INS) = Emt

maxxt Ut(Ct(xt, 
m
t , X˜t, θ, INS), 1, ht)
+β
∑
hˆ Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜t, xt, mt )δedVˆ t1 (X˜t+1)
+β
∑
hˆ Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜t, xt, mt )(1− δed)V˜ t1 (X˜t+1, INS, θ)

(B.22)
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subject to budget constraint (2.19) where X˜t+1 = (ed, type, Et + 1, hˆ) and Vˆ
t
1 (X˜t+1) and
V˜ t1 (X˜t+1, INS, θ) are defined as follows:
Vˆ t1 (X˜t+1) = (1− λede )V t+10 (X˜t+1)
+ λede
∫
Ent max
 V
t+1
0 (X˜t+1) + 
n
t ,
V t+11 (X˜t+1, θ
′, INS ′)
 dF (θ′, INS ′)
where V t+10 (S˜
0
t+1) is defined above; V
t+1
1 (X˜t+1, θ
′, INS ′) is defined as follows. If the health
insurance is offered from the employer, then
V t+11 (X˜t+1, θ
′, INS ′) = V t+11 ((X˜t+1, θ
′, 1)),
Otherwise, it takes the form
V t+11 (X˜t+1, θ
′, INS ′) = max
{
V t+11 (X˜t+1, θ, 0) + 
HIX
t , V
t+1
1 (X˜t+1, θ, 2)
}
.
Similarly,
V˜ t1 (X˜t+1, θ, INS) = (1− λede )Ent max
 V
t+1
0 (X˜t+1) + 
n
t ,
V t+11 (X˜t+1, θ, INS)

+ λede
∫
Ent max

V t+10 (X˜t+1) + 
n
t ,
V t+11 (X˜t+1, θ, INS),
V t+11 (X˜t+1, θ
′, INS ′)
 dF (θ
′, INS ′)
The difference between V t+11 (X˜t+1, θ, INS) and V
t+1
1 (X˜t+1, θ
′, INS ′) is that the compen-
sation package in the former is determined by the current employer, but by a potential
employer in the latter. The terminal value is the same as (2.6).
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B.2.2 Steady State Worker Distribution
The steady state distribution of gt
(
X˜, θedINS, INS
)
and ut(X˜, INS) are characterized
as follows. First, define g˜t
(
X˜, θed, NINS
)
as the measure of employed workers having
characteristics (t, X˜) who are offered skill price θ but not offered health insurance:
g˜t
(
X˜, θ,NINS
)
= gt
(
X˜, θed, 0
)
+ gt
(
X˜, θed, 2
)
.
It is determined by
g˜t
(
X˜, θ,NINS
)
1 + n
=
∑
INS′=0,2
∑
ht−1
gt−1
(
X˜A−1, θ, INS
′
)
×Emt
[
Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜A−1, θ, INS′, mt )
]
×
 (1− δed)(1− λede ) Pr(ΩE1 (θ, 1, X˜))
+(1− δed)λede (Pr(ΩE2 (θ, 1, X˜)) Pr(Ω1(θ, 1, X˜))

+
∑
ht−1
∑
INS′
ut−1
(
X˜B−1, INS
′
)
×Emt
[
Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜B−1, mt )
]
Pr(ΩE1 (θ, 1, X˜))
× λedu fed(θ, 1)
+
∑
ht−1
∑
INS′
∫
gt−1
(
X˜A−1, θ
′, INS′
)
×Emt
[
Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜A−1, θ′, INS′, mt )
]
1(θ, 1, θ′, INS′)dθ′
× (1− δed)λede fed(θ, 1)
+
∑
ht−1
∑
INS′
∫
gt−1
(
X˜A−1, θ
′, INS′
)
×Emt
[
Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜A−1, θ′, INS′, mt )
]
Pr(ΩE1 (θ, 1, X˜))dθ
′
× δedλede fed(θ, 1) (B.23)
where X˜A−1 = (ed, type, Et−1, hˆ) and X˜
B
−1 = (ed, type, Et, hˆ) are individual characteristics
in the last period for the employed and non-employed respectively which can turn into X˜
in this period, and Pr(ΩE1 (X˜, θ, INS)) is the probability that individuals with X˜ prefer
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to work a job with compensation package (θed, INS) over being non-employed, which can
formally be expressed as
Pr(ΩE1 (X˜, θ, INS)) = Pr(V˜
t
0 (X˜) + 
n
t < V
t
1 (X˜, θ
ed, INS))
where the value of choosing non-employed is
V˜ t0 (X˜) = E[max{V˜ t0 (X˜, 0), V˜ t0 (X˜, 2) + HIXt }]
and Pr(ΩE2 (θ
ed, INS)) is the probability that individuals who receive a job offer from
other firms decide to stay the current job:
Pr(ΩE2 (θ, INS, X˜)) = F
ed(θ, INS) + F ed(θ˜ÎNS(X˜, θ), ÎNS)
for ÎNS 6= INS where θ˜ÎNS(X˜, θ) is threshold skill price which can be defined as
V t1 (X˜, θ, INS)) = V
t
1 (X˜, θ˜ÎNS(X˜, θ), ÎNS)).
1(θ, INS, θ′, INS ′) is the indicator function such that individuals prefer to take an offer
from (θ, INS) over (θ′, INS ′):
1(θ, INS, θ′, INS ′) =
 1 if V
t
1 (X˜, θ, INS)) > V
t
1 (X˜, θ
′, INS ′))
0 otherwise
Then, one can characterize gt
(
X˜, θ, INS
)
as
gt
(
X˜, θ, 2
)
= EHIXt [Pr
[
V t1
(
X˜, θ, 2
)
+ HIXt > V
t
1
(
X˜, θ, 0
)]
]g˜t
(
X˜, θ,NINS
)
and gt
(
X˜, θ, 0
)
= g˜t
(
X˜, θ,NINS
)
− gt
(
X˜, θ, 2
)
. gt
(
X˜, θ, 1
)
is derived in the same
way as in the main text. Therefore, I omit its derivation here.
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One can characterize the determinants of steady state measures of non-employed at
age t with characteristics X˜, u˜t(X˜), as follows. First, define u˜t(X˜) as the measure of
non-employed workers with characteristics (t, X˜) which satisfy
u˜t(X˜) = ut(X˜, 0) + ut(X˜, 2)
u˜t(X˜)
1 + n
=
∑
INS′=0.2
∑
ht−1
ut−1
(
X˜B−1, INS
′
)
×Emt
[
Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜B−1, mt )
]
(1− λedu )
+
∑
INS′=0.2
∑
ht−1
ut−1
(
X˜A−1, INS
′
)
×Emt
[
Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜A−1, mt )
]
Pr(ΩU1 (X˜))λ
ed
u
+
∑
ht−1
∑
INS
∫
gt−1
(
X˜A−1, θ, INS
)
×Emt
[
Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜A−1, mt )
]
Pr(ΩU2 (X˜, θ
ed, INS))dF (p′)(1− δed)
+
∑
ht−1
∑
INS
∫
gt−1
(
X˜A−1, θ, INS
)
×Emt
[
Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜A−1, mt )
]
dθδed(1− λede )
+
∑
ht−1
∑
INS
∫
gt−1
(
X˜A−1, θ, INS
)
×Emt
[
Pr(ht = hˆ|X˜A−1, mt )
]
Pr(ΩU1 (X˜))dθδ
edλede (B.24)
where X˜A−1 and X˜
B
−1 are defined as above, and Pr(Ω
U
1 (X˜)) is the probability that the
non-employed with characteristics X˜ decides to turn down the offer:
Pr(ΩU1 (X˜)) =
∫
Pr(V˜ t0 (X˜) + 
n
t > V
t
1 (X˜, θ
ed, INS))dF (θed, INS).
Pr(ΩU2 (X˜, θ
ed, INS)) is the probability that the employed with characteristics X˜ and a
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job with compensation package (θed, INS) decides to quit into the non-employed:
Pr(ΩU2 (X˜, θ
ed, INS)) = Pr(V˜ t0 (X˜) + 
n
t > V
t
1 (X˜, θ
ed, INS)).
Then, one can characterize ut
(
X˜, INS
)
as
ut
(
X˜, 2
)
= EHIXt [Pr
[
V t0
(
X˜, 2
)
+ HIXt > V
t
0
(
X˜, 0
)]
]u˜t
(
X˜
)
and ut
(
X˜, 0
)
= u˜t
(
X˜
)
− ut
(
X˜, 2
)
.
B.3 Parameterization of Policy Parameters
I describe the approach to parameterize the stylized version of the ACA in the model.
The approach follows Aizawa and Fang (2013) which examines the impact of ACA on
labor market outcomes, but several modifications are made to fit the model environment
in this study.
B.3.1 Penalties associated with individual mandate
The tax penalty on the uninsured in the ACA (from 2016 when the law is fully imple-
mented) is set that the uninsured need to pay a tax penalty of the greater value of $695
per year or 2.5% of the taxable income above the Tax Filing Threshold (TFT), which can
be written as:
IMACA (y) = max {0.025× (y − TFT 2011) , $695} , (B.35)
where y is annual income.
I adjust the above formula in several dimensions. First, I adjust the scale of policy
parameters to fit the 2007 economic environment. I estimated the model using data sets
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in 2004-2007 where the price level is normalized to 2007 value, while the ACA policy
parameters are chosen to suit the economy in 2011. It is well known that the U.S. health
care sector has a very different growth rate than that of overall GDP; in particular,
there are substantial increases in medical care costs relative to GDP. Thus I need to
appropriately adjust the policy parameters in the ACA to make them more in line with
the U.S. economy in 2007. I implement the adjustment as follows: the $695 amount
is adjusted by the ratio of the 2007 Medical Care CPI (CPI Med 2007) relative to the
2011 Medical Care CPI (CPI Med 2011); I choose this adjustment given the idea that the
penalty amount $695 is chosen to be proportional to 2011 medical expenditures. I then
multiply it by 1/3 to reflect the fact that the period-length in the model is four-month.
Second, I adjust the TFT 2011 by the ratio of 2007 CPI of all goods (CPI All 2007)
relative to the 2011 CPI of all goods (CPI All 2011). I also multiply it by 1/3 to reflect
the choice of the four-month model period in this study.1 Finally, I adjust the percentage
2.5% by the differential growth rate of medical care and GDP, i.e., multiply it by the
relative ratio of CPI Med 2007
CPI All 2007
and CPI Med 2007
CPI All 2007
. With these adjustments, the tax penalties
on the uninsured are parameterized as:
IMACA(y) = max

0.025× (
CPI Med 2007
CPI All 2007 )
(CPI Med 2011CPI All 2011 )
×
 y − 13TFT 2011
×CPI All 2007
CPI All 2011
 ,
1
3
× $695× CPI Med 2007
CPI Med 2011

where w is four-month income in dollars.
B.3.2 Penalties associated with employer mandate
Tax penalties on employers in the ACA are set that firms with 50 or more full-time
employees that do not offer coverage need to pay a tax penalty of $2,000 per full-time
1I obtain CPI data for medical care and all goods both from Bureau of Labor Statistics website:
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm.
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employee per year, excluding the first 30 employees from the assessment.2 That is,
EMACA (l) = (l − 30)× $2, 000. (B.36)
As in the case of individual mandate, I first adjust the above formula by first scaling the
$2,000 per-worker penalty using the ratio of the 2007 Medical Care CPI relative to the
2011 Medical Care CPI and by multiplying it by 1/3 to reflect our period-length of four
months instead of a year, i.e., for l >= 50,
EMACA(l) =
1
3
[
(l − 30)× $2, 000× CPI Med 2007
CPI Med 2011
]
.
While it is ideal to apply this formula precisely in the model, to simplifiy the numerical
algorithm, I approximate this penalty function as a differentiable function by removing
the discontinuity, by following the approximation technique used by MaCurdy, Green,
and Paarsch (1990).
B.3.3 Medicaid expansion
ACA stipulates that individuals with income below 133% of Federal Poverty Level (FPL)
are able to enroll in the free public insurance Medicaid. While it is ideal to model
this threshold carefully, given my sample selection those who are below 133% of Fed-
eral Poverty Level (FPL) tend to be non-employed. Moreover, there is a certain technical
difficulty to model this threshold as described below. Therefore, to simplify the analysis,
I assume that only non-employed individuals will be covered by Medicaid. As I mention
in Section 2.6.1, I also consider the case that Medicaid expansion is not implemented.
2In July 2013, the government decided to postpone the implementation of the employer mandate until
2015.
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B.3.4 Premium subsidies in HIX
In the ACA, federal premium subsidies are available to individuals who purchase health
insurance from HIX if their incomes are less than 400 % of the Federal Poverty Level
(FPL), denoted by FPL4003. The premium subsidies will be set on a sliding scale such
that the premium contributions are limited to a certain percentage of income for specified
income levels. If an individual’s income is at 133% of the FPL, denoted by FPL133,
premium subsidies will be provided so that the individual’s contribution to the premium
is equal to 3.5% of his income; when an individual’s income is at FPL400, his premium
contribution is set to be 9.5% of the income. If his income is above FPL400, he is no
longer eligible for premium subsidies. Note that the premium support rule as described in
ACA creates a discontinuity at FPL133: individuals with income below FPL133 receives
free Medicaid, but those at or slightly above FPL133 have to contribute at least 2.3% of
his income to purchase health insurance from HIX. To avoid this discontinuity issue, I
instead adopt a slightly modified premium support formula as follows:
S
(
y,RHIX(t)
)
=

max
 R
HIX(t)− [0.0350 + 0.060 3y
FPL400
]
y
×CPI Med 2007
CPI Med 2011
, 0
 if y < FPL4003
0, otherwise,
(B.37)
where w is four-month income.
As I mention in Section 2.6.1, at this stage, it is unclear whether premium subsidies
will be given to individuals with less than FPL133 who live in states where Medicaid is
no expanded. In this study, I assume that those individuals will obtain health insurance
at zero premium from HIX.
3I assume that FPL is defined for a single person. In 2007, it is $11,200 annually.
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B.3.5 Age-based pricing regulation
In the ACA, they set the maximum premium ratio between the oldest and the youngest
ωA = 3. Therefore, if it binds,
ωAGER
HIX(1) = RHIX(T ).
The issue is that it does not specify how the premium can vary over age. For simplicity,
I assume that the premium is linearly increasing in t. Given this restriction, in order to
satisfy the market clearing condition in HIX, insurance premia in HIX must be determined
as follows:
RHIX(t) = RHIX(1) + (ωAGE − 1)(t− 1)
T − 1 R
HIX(1)
RHIX(1) = (1 + ξHIX)R
∗
HIX
[
T − 1
ωAGE − 1 + T − 1 + (ωAGE−1)(T+1)2
]
(B.38)
where R∗HIX is the pooled premium among the all the participants in HIX:
R∗HIX = (1 + ξHIX)
∑
t
∑
X˜
∫
E[mX˜,t∗ |INSt = 2]gt
(
X˜, θ, 2
)
dθ.
To understand the role of age based pricing regulation, I also consider the case where
there is no regulation: in such a case, premia are determined as
RHIX(t) = (1 + ξHIX)
∑
X˜
∫
E[mX˜,t∗ |INSt = 2]gt
(
X˜, θ, 2
)
dθ. (B.39)
That is, each age group consists of separate risk pool.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Constructing Health Status
In our analysis, an individual’s health status is measured as expected Medicare Parts A
and B claims cost if the individual were to receive insurance from traditional Medicare
(Medicare Parts A and B). In order to construct the variable, we use the individual-
level data. Because individuals in MA are not directly covered by traditional Medicare,
information on Medicare Part A and B claims is available only for those in traditional
Medicare. Therefore we need to impute predicted Medicare costs for MA enrollees. Our
construction of the health status variable has two steps:
1. First, using beneficiaries in traditional Medicare, we estimate two equations that
relate Medicare claims costs to an extensive list of health status and demographic
characteristics.
2. We calculate predicted claims cost for traditional Medicare enrollees using the es-
timates. We impute the predicted Medicare claims costs for MA enrollees in the
data, using their observed health and demographic characteristics and the estimates
obtained in the first step.
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First Step In the first step, we estimate two equations that relate an individual’s
realized Medicare claims cost to an extensive list of health and demographic variables.
In the first equation, we estimate the probability that an individual ever incurs positive
Medicare claims cost. Approximately 5.6% of individuals have zero claims cost in a given
year, and we account for the possibility of zero health expenditure using the following
logistic regression:
Prob(y > 0|x) = exp(xβ1)
1 + exp(xβ1)
. (C.11)
y denotes an individual’s Medicare claims cost, and x is a vector of health and demographic
characteristics. For x, we include an extensive list of health variables such as self-reported
health status, whether an individual has difficulties in activities of daily living (ADL) and
instrumental activities of daily living (IADL), and histories of diseases such as cancer,
heart disease, diabetes, etc. We also include the average Medicare claims cost for each
county and year to control for regional differences in health care costs. In the end, we
include 76 variables in x. Parameter β1 is estimated with maximum likelihood, and the
results are presented in Table C.1.
Using the second equation, we estimate the relationship between an amount of Medi-
care claims cost and health characteristics for individuals having positive claims costs.
We estimate the following equation:
log(y) = xβ + 
 ∼ N(0, (zγ)2)
where y and x are the same as in the first equation; and z is a subset of x that includes
self-reported health status, whether an individual is living in a skilled nursing facility,
average Medicare claims cost for each county, and interaction terms between county-level
average Medicare claims costs and other variables in Z. We estimate parameters β and
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γ with the method of moments. The first set of moments is:
E[log(y)|x, y > 0] = xβ2.
The second set of moments is:
E[y|z, y > 0] = exp
(
xβ2 +
(zγ)2
2
)
.
The right-hand side of the second condition is derived from the assumption that  is
normally distributed. The first set of moments will pin down β2, and the second set of
moments will pin down γ. The estimates are presented in Table C.2.
Note that we make an implicit assumption here that  is independent of the logistic
error term for equation (C.11). This means that a correlation between Prob(y > 0|x) and
E[y|x] only depends on x, not on the error terms. Although it is possible to allow for
correlated error term, we make such an assumption for simplicity.
Second Step Given estimates of parameters βˆ1, βˆ2, and γˆ, we calculate predicted Medi-
care claims cost for each individual. Because y is not observed only for individuals in MA,
we have to impute predicted Medicare claims for MA enrollees using the estimates. An
important assumption we make for the imputation is that x contains all relevant health
characteristics of an individual. That is, individuals in MA and traditional Medicare are
not different in unobserved health, conditional on x. This assumption implies that  is a
purely random shock to claims costs, and individuals do not select on  when choosing
between MA and traditional Medicare. Without this assumption, the imputation of pre-
dicted Medicare claims costs for MA enrollees will not be valid. Although it is possible
that x may not capture all relevant health characteristics, the large number of variables
in x would minimize the role of unobserved health characteristics.
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We calculate predicted Medicare claims cost in the following way:
E[y|z] = Prob(y > 0|x)× E[y|x, y > 0]
=
exp(xβˆ1)
1 + exp(xβˆ1)
× exp
(
xβˆ2 +
(zγˆ)2
2
)
.
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Dependent Variable: Dummy for Positive Medicare Claims Cost
Variables Coefficient Std. Err.
Black -0.781*** (0.0764)
Hispanic -0.540*** (0.0957)
Living in a nursing home 1.924** (0.815)
Health status: excellent -0.286* (0.153)
Health status: very good 0.00109 (0.149)
Health status: good 0.159 (0.145)
Health status: fair 0.354** (0.147)
Difficulty using phone -0.123 (0.106)
Difficulty light housework -0.0820 (0.134)
Difficulty heavy housework 0.384*** (0.0809)
Difficulty preparing meals 0.545*** (0.162)
Difficulty shopping -0.0864 (0.125)
Difficulty handling bills -0.307** (0.123)
Difficulty bathing 0.187 (0.131)
Difficulty dressing -0.283* (0.167)
Difficulty eating -0.282 (0.206)
Difficulty stooping -0.156 (0.109)
Difficulty walking -0.0743 (0.0826)
Difficulty using toilet 0.304* (0.178)
History with skin cancer 0.533*** (0.0726)
History with other cancers 0.622*** (0.0783)
History of high blood pressure 0.583*** (0.0501)
History of heart attack 0.219*** (0.0845)
History of angina pectoris 0.342*** (0.0963)
History of other heart conditions 0.420*** (0.0757)
History of stroke 0.253*** (0.0896)
History of rheumatoid arthritis 0.0372 (0.0972)
History of arthritis 0.411*** (0.0500)
History of diabetes 0.675*** (0.0827)
County-level Medicare cost -0.00965*** (0.00182)
County-level Medicare cost × Nursing home 0.00123 (0.00139)
County-level Medicare cost × Age 0.000131*** (2.42e-05)
Medicaid 0.745*** (0.0961)
Employer-sponsored insurance benefit dummy 0.363*** (0.0550)
Observations 44,088
Pseudo R-squared 0.158
Table C.1: Logit Regression for Positive Medicare Claims Cost
Note: Other controls included are dummy variables for various groups of age, gender,
interactions of age and gender, income, education, marital status, self-reported health
status compared to a year ago. The number of variables included in this logit regression
is 78.
Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary 2000–2004.
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Dependent Variable: Medicare Claims Cost
Variables Coefficient Std. Err.
Black -0.0420 (0.0333)
Hispanic -0.0149 (0.0461)
Living in a nursing home 0.513*** (0.194)
Health status: excellent -0.580*** (0.0525)
Health status: very good -0.347*** (0.0489)
Health status: good -0.140*** (0.0469)
Health status: fair -0.0758* (0.0457)
Difficulty using phone -0.188*** (0.0374)
Difficulty light housework 0.0469 (0.0396)
Difficulty heavy housework 0.204*** (0.0238)
Difficulty preparing meals 0.143*** (0.0447)
Difficulty shopping -0.00237 (0.0380)
Difficulty handling bills -0.0195 (0.0411)
Difficulty bathing 0.199*** (0.0380)
Difficulty dressing 0.0639 (0.0463)
Difficulty eating -0.0271 (0.0633)
Difficulty stooping -0.111*** (0.0335)
Difficulty walking 0.0477* (0.0264)
Difficulty using toilet 0.108** (0.0493)
History with skin cancer 0.240*** (0.0199)
History with other cancers 0.437*** (0.0214)
History of high blood pressure 0.104*** (0.0181)
History of heart attack 0.228*** (0.0256)
History of angina pectoris 0.224*** (0.0263)
History of other heart conditions 0.284*** (0.0208)
History of stroke 0.124*** (0.0266)
History of rheumatoid arthritis 0.147*** (0.0270)
History of arthritis 0.174*** (0.0180)
History of diabetes 0.348*** (0.0210)
County-level Medicare cost 0.00109* (0.000627)
County-level Medicare cost × Nursing home 0.00108*** (0.000282)
County-level Medicare cost × Age 1.87e-05** (7.95e-06)
Medicaid 0.0820** (0.0323)
Employer-sponsored insurance benefit dummy -0.0112 (0.0179)
Observations 41,603
R-squared 0.249
Table C.2: Regression of Medicare Claims Costs on Health Characteristics
Note: For this regression, only the individuals with positive Medicare claims costs are
included. Other controls included are dummy variables for various groups of age, gender,
interactions of age and gender, income, education, marital status, self-reported health
status compared to a year ago. The number of variables included in this logit regression
is 78.
Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary 2000–2004.
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